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Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology has been widely applied in many
applications, such as the supply chain and warehouse management. A typical RFID
system consists of RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end server. Usually, a tag
is a constrained device attached to an object. It can be scanned by a reader and
identified by the server.
An important branch of RFID research is RFID authentication protocols. There
have been many research works addressing RFID authentication issues. The security
and privacy of RFID protocols have become hot research topics. Many protocols
have been proposed to achieve various requirements. According to the different
features of protocols, the related security and privacy issues should be considered.
The security and privacy solutions, including the model definition and protocol
analysis, are the major work of this thesis.
Some existing protocols have attempted to achieve a strong privacy. Unfortu-
nately, even if they sacrifice the efficiency and cost of protocols, most of them cannot
reach the highest privacy level called wide-strong privacy. To address this issue, we
review these problems existing in previous work and propose some potential solu-
tions. We then present a wide-strong private RFID authentication protocol with a
formal proof of privacy. We also study a scenario that a server can only assist a
reader to authenticate tags without obtaining any tag’s identity. Accordingly, we
introduce a novel concept called authorized RFID authentication and propose three
protocols to adapt to different environments.
As an extension of RFID authentication protocols, RFID tag ownership trans-
fer protocols have different security requirements. An ownership transfer protocol
transfers a tag’s ownership from the current owner to a new owner. A precondition
of a tag ownership transfer is to verify the validity of tags. Apart from the tag
authentication, it is also necessary to check the authenticity of the current owner.
Based on this observation, we introduce an ownership chain to solve the problem and
we propose a secure ownership transfer protocol. Moreover, the ownership of a tag
may be shared by multiple users. A shared tag ownership transfer is allowed if all
the owners agree. In an environment where a trusted third party is unavailable, one
needs to prevent some owners from forging the transfer agreements of others. We
present a hybrid protocol that a tag stores constant-size secret keys and an owner
can individually prove a partial ownership. The proposed protocol guarantees that
the shared ownership cannot be transferred prior to the presence of a full agreement.
iii
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An example of using untrusted readers is yoking-proof which guarantees the
simultaneous presence of two tags. It also requires that a proof can be verified by
an offline verifier. Grouping proof, which allows multiple tags to be verified, is a
generalized version of yoking-proof. A limitation of grouping proof is that it can only
authenticate a single group of tags, which is insufficient in many cases. We introduce
the yoking-group proof so that it can verify the existence of multiple individual tag
groups. We propose an anonymous yoking-proof protocol as a building block and
present an anonymous yoking-group proof protocol. The security of two proposed
protocols are analyzed in the universal composible framework.
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A typical RFID system consists of three main components, namely RFID tags,
readers, and a back-end server. It exploits radio waves to exchange data between
wireless devices. Usually, an RFID reader sends a request to target tags and collects
the tags’ responses. The reader then forwards data to the back-end server which
manages a database. The server checks the validity of the responses and a tag is
valid if its valid record is stored on the database. Compared with a barcode system,
RFID is an improved technique that has several features: 1) RFID systems provide
automated contactless authentication of tags. 2) Each tag is assigned a unique
identifier which indicates a specific object. 3) Because of the uniqueness of RFID,
an authorized user can locate and trace a tag. It is useful in many applications,
such as warehouse management and child care.
RFID protocols describe interactions between participating entities. There are
varied types of protocols which serve for different requirements, such as security, effi-
ciency and others. In Figure 1.1, we provide a map of RFID protocol considerations.
The research regarding the tag side is challenging, because tags have extremely lim-
ited capabilities. In an RFID system, all the components, except tags, can utilize
traditional security techniques which are sufficient to achieve security and privacy
objectives. For example, typical RFID protocols assume that the communication
channel between the reader and back-end server is secure. Therefore, most research
focuses on protecting the tag’s security and privacy.
Privacy and Security of Tags. Correctness and soundness are important to the
security of RFID authentication protocols. A secure protocol guarantees that an
adversary has negligible probability to impersonate an uncorrupted legitimate tag.
The privacy of a protocol preserves the tag anonymity and untraceability. A tag
should be identifiable by an authorized verifier and it cannot be recognized by an
attacker who has protocol instances. Many proposed protocols focus on the security
and privacy problems and some solutions also use security to describe privacy issues.
Tag unforgeability is one aspect of the security of protocols. It guarantees that
an adversary cannot forge valid responses of tags. Additionally, a low-cost RFID
tag is usually without tamper-proof protection. If a tag has been corrupted and
cloned, a back-end server should have abilities to detect and reject counterfeited tags.
1






















































Figure 1.1: RFID protocol considerations.
Physically uncloneable function (PUF) [MV10, SD07] is a tool to prevent tags from
counterfeiting and many PUF-based protocols [TB06, BR07, BCI08b] have been
proposed. PUFs use physical features of tags to generate unpredictable outputs
and physical attacks against a tag’s PUF will immediately modify the PUF. An
attack which attempts to corrupt and clone tags can be easily prevented. Moreover,
side-channel attacks exploit physical information, such as timing information and
power consumption, to capture the secret of tags. Even if PUF is used, it cannot
prevent a side-channel attacker from counterfeiting uncompromised tags. In RFID
systems, clone detection [Aba09, LOIM09, ZCJ13, BJRS13] can detect counterfeited
tags with high probability. Prevention, which is provided by cryptographic tools and
PUFs, and detection are two general strategies of resisting tag cloning attacks.
Apart from the tag unforgeability, various security problems are illustrated in
different applications. For example, yoking-proof protocols [Jue04, CYH+08, HP12]
need to convince a verifier that two tags are presented simultaneously. An attacker,
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who does not have both tags, violates the security of a protocol if he/she can output
a valid proof. We discuss details of yoking-proof protocols and their variants in
Chapter 7. Some other security issues will also be demonstrated and solved in this
thesis.
Tag anonymity and untraceability are two important privacy requirements. An
RFID authentication protocol is anonymous if an attacker cannot recover a tag’s
identity from the protocol instances. Tag untraceability usually means that tags are
indistinguishable in different sessions. Given two tags and the protocol instances, an
adversary should only have a negligible advantage to correctly find the tag involved
in the specific instance. RFID privacy models focus on tag untraceability since
it normally implies tag anonymity. Tag privacy also has several levels, such as
weak privacy and forward privacy. There have been many proposed privacy models
[LDL10, Vau07, NSMSN08], but they are still incomplete [CM13]. For example,
these models cannot completely capture some important features of adversaries, like
the use of corrupted tags.
To analyze the security and privacy of RFID protocols, there are two approaches.
The first is to analyze the protocol under different attacks, so that it is considered
as an informal analysis. The other approach is to prove the tag’s security and
privacy in formal models. If a protocol is proven secure, an adversary is unlikely
to succeed in attacks which are captured in the model. A privacy model defines
the abilities of adversaries and a game which starts by providing the adversary with
public parameters. The characterization of the adversary is captured by oracles
and the adversary queries these oracles following some rules of the game. In the
privacy proof, an adversary interacts with the system initialized by the challenger.
We say that the adversary breaks the privacy of a protocol if he wins the game.
The oracles and the rules also specify the level of privacy models. As an example,
Vaudenay’s privacy model [Vau07, Vau10] defines eight levels of RFID privacy such
that each level is restricted by the access of oracles. Security models formalize the
security requirements, such as tag unforgeability. The approach of security reduction
is similar to the approach of privacy proofs.
Assumptions are important in security and privacy analyses. There are two
types of assumptions: the assumptions related to the adversary’s power and the
computational complexity assumptions. RFID protocols are different from tradi-
tional cryptographic schemes since the hardware severely limits capabilities of tags.
In some scenarios, we have to make assumptions which restrict the actions of ad-
versaries. Consider that a protocol adopts symmetric-key cryptography and the ad-
versary is allowed to corrupt tags, so it is impossible to preserve the tag’s backward
privacy after it has been compromised. Many symmetric-key based RFID protocols
[Tsu06, CLL05, FMTRCRDF11a] assume that the tag is incorruptible and add re-
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strictions to adversaries. System assumptions, such as the secure communication
channel between the reader and server, can also specify the abilities of attackers.
Complexity assumptions are used in formal proofs. To show security and privacy,
we prove the equality between breaking the protocol and solving mathematically
hard problems.
Informal security and privacy analysis consider a set of attacks, such as re-
play attack and man-in-the-middle attack, against protocols. It utilizes security
assumptions and operations of the protocol to demonstrate security and privacy. A
drawback of informal analysis is that the adversary’s actions are restricted, thus he
protocol may be vulnerable to variants of attacks if it uses the informal analysis.
Computational Capabilities of Tags. Low-cost RFID tags are normally assumed
to perform lightweight protocols. Most traditional cryptographic schemes, such as
AES, DES and public key encryption schemes, are unaffordable. An important
task of RFID protocols is to reduce the computational cost of tags and achieve the
required security.
There are two types of RFID protocols: symmetric-key based protocols and
asymmetric key based protocols. A low-cost tag is desired to carry lightweight oper-
ations such as XOR, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and pesudorandom number gen-
erators (PRNG). Some protocols use CRC to provide confidentiality, while it is vul-
nerable to several attacks due to the lack of cryptographic operations [PLOHCvdL11].
Symmetric-key based schemes are necessary to achieve weak privacy. Collision-
resistant cryptographic hash functions and lightweight symmetric-key encryption
schemes [LK06a] can also achieve forward privacy if there is a secure tag key up-
date. Moreover, public key cryptography (PKC) is needed in protocols which re-
quire strong privacy. PKC provides many useful properties and an RFID protocol
cannot achieve wide-strong privacy without using public key encryption schemes
[Vau07]. A drawback is that tags have to sacrifice efficiency and cost. Asymmetric
key based RFID protocols usually require tags to perform some heavy computa-
tions, such as modular operations and exponentiation. One challenging task of
using PKC is to efficiently implement these operations so that some research work
focuses on hardware platform design [HWF08, PPH11]. In addition, elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) has been widely used in public key based RFID protocols
[LBV08, LBV09, BLS+10, vDR10, BSSV11, BLS+12, PH13].
Efficiency. The efficiency of RFID protocols is an essential requirement of RFID
systems. There are three main aspects which are computational costs of tags,
time consumption and communication bits. Types of cryptographic schemes in-
fluence the computational cost of tags. Symmetric-key based protocols normally
provide high efficiency even if some hash functions require many calculations. Many
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cryptographic operations, such as modular exponentiation, in ECC-based proto-
cols are heavy and they make tag authentication inefficient. The cost of tag-
reader communication is another consideration of the efficiency. HB-like protocols
[HB01, Pir06, BCD06, GRS08, RG12] are lightweight RFID protocols that computa-
tional costs are affordable to low-cost tags. Since these protocols need to run several
times for a tag authentication, large amount of communication bits is a disadvan-
tage. An important problem is to make trade-offs between communication bits and
computational costs. It is hard to find an efficient solution for both of them if a
protocol requires strong privacy. The back-end server’s performance also impacts
efficiency of the whole system. An authentication process which needs exhaustively
tag key search could be inefficient.
Hardware Conditions. Capabilities of RFID tags depend on hardware platforms.
There are three types of tags which are active tags, semi-active tags and passive
tags. Active tags have strong computational capabilities since they are battery em-
bedded. Traditional security solutions are normally affordable to preserve security
and privacy of tags, but active tags are expansive. Semi-active tags also have batter-
ies and their capabilities are between active tags and passive tags. Compared with
active tags, they only use their batteries to activate chips. Passive tags are low-cost
and suitable for large-scale deployment, such as the supply chain. A restriction of
passive tags is that they have limited capabilities. For example, some cryptographic
operations like hashing may not be implemented on passive tags because they need
a large number of gates. The size and type of tag memory are important to RFID
protocol design. Some protocols [BR05, Pir06] which require tags to store counters
in non-volatile memory will increase the cost of tags. The use of counters have some
potential security and privacy problems as well. A passive tag can usually store
several hundred bits of information, including identity, keys and other data. Large
memory causes high power consumption so that RFID protocols should reduce the
requirement of tag memory. Finally, tamper-proof resistant hardware cannot be
implemented on low-cost passive RFID tags.
Reader and Server. In an RFID system, readers and the back-end server are
powerful devices to perform various tasks. RFID readers use radio waves to interact
with tags and server’s database stores all the information of tags. Some system
models also allow a reader to possess keys of tags and we usually assume that readers
and back-end server are mutually trusted. System scalability which requires efficient
tag key search is another direction of RFID research. Many proposed protocols
[Jue06, WLHL07] utilize special data structures to assign and store keys of tags,
and then reduce the complexity of key search during tag authentication.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.2 Problems
Our work focuses on some problems motivated by observations of current RFID
research. An important one is that many proposed protocols cannot be provably
secure and they may be vulnerable to potential attacks. It is necessary to give formal
proofs of security and privacy for protocol analysis. In this section, we provide an
overview of the problems addressed in this thesis.
RFID Protocols on Strong Privacy. Tag privacy has been widely discussed
in previous work and many authentication protocols have been proposed. However,
wide-strong privacy is still hard to achieve. We find several common problems of
some current protocols and it is useful to provide general ideas of solving these
issues.
Tag Ownership Chains. RFID tag ownership transfer protocols use own-
ership verification to verify current owners. Existing protocols illustrate that the
knowledge of the tag’s secret shows the current ownership. If a tag cannot provide
any tamper-proof protection, current ownership verification is indeed insufficient. A
powerful adversary can recover internal state of tags and impersonate the current
owner. We need a solution which checks the validity of previous ownership to resist
this attack.
Shared RFID Tag Ownership Transfer. Traditional ownership transfer
protocols assume that a tag has a single owner and the secret information of the
tag is completely possessed by one owner. Some protocols extend the concept to
multiple owners and these solutions require a trusted third party (TTP) to transfer
the secret. We consider an environment where TTP is unavailable. Several security
problems, such as individual ownership proof, agreed ownership transfer and secure
key update are challenging to design a secure shared ownership transfer protocol in
two-party model.
Relationship of RFID Entities. A back-end server normally controls the
whole RFID system that it stores the information of readers and tags. Readers
transmit tag’s responses to the server and receives the result. We have to consider
some new privacy issues in scenarios where tags, readers and back-end server are
independent. For instance, the reader’s privacy is important if readers only need
the computational assistance of the server rather than the tag authentication. A
protocol should prevent the result of authentication like the tag’s identity from being
obtained by the server. Also, the server needs to provide verifiable responses to the
readers. There is no existing solution that addresses these problems.
Group Tags Authentication. Yoking-proof protocols allow an offline server
to check the existence of two tags. A reader is usually assumed to be untrusted and it
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is prevented from obtaining the tag’s identity. Grouping proof protocol [SS05, BR05,
PHER07] which is a generalized version of yoking-proof guarantees the simultaneous
presence of multiple tags. Imagine that several individual groups of tags need to
be scanned together and a verifier requires to recognize the different groups. We
cannot apply grouping proof protocols since these tags cannot be considered as a
single group. The group integrity and anonymity are also important security and
privacy requirements. A solution which solves these issues is needed.
1.3 Thesis Organization
This thesis consists of 8 chapters which present from the background of RFID au-
thentication protocols to the outcomes of our work. The first chapter briefly intro-
duces considerations of RFID authentication protocols and previews some issues.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces some fundamental backgrounds on RFID protocols and
cryptographic primitives. We give the definition of RFID tag authentication proto-
cols and several typical attacks. We present tools related to this thesis, including
bilinear maps, cryptographic hash functions, Merkle trees, forking lemma, complex-
ity assumptions and random oracles.
Chapter 3 focuses on the strong privacy of RFID tag authentication. We review
a recent proposed protocol and show two common security problems of existing
protocols. We then introduce a new RFID authentication protocol which achieves
wide-strong privacy.
Chapter 4 addresses a problem of RFID ownership transfer protocols. In the
chapter, we analyze limitations of current ownership transfer protocols and describe
a system model with transfer chain. We define two types of adversaries and present
the corresponding security models. An RFID ownership transfer protocol which is
provably secure will be proposed.
Chapter 5 considers the shared tag ownership transfer. We introduce a scenario
of tag ownership sharing and a system model without TTP. Some security require-
ments and challenges are illustrated and a security model is given. We propose the
first shared ownership transfer protocol for two-party system model and discuss the
hardware cost of tags.
Chapter 6 considers a new relationship between RFID tags, readers and the
back-end server. We describe a system model where all entities are relatively inde-
pendent and introduce the privacy of readers. We address some security and privacy
issues and propose three authorized RFID authentication protocols. The proposed
protocols have different features that adapt to different environments.
Chapter 7 introduces a concept of yoking-group proofs. We review yoking-proof
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protocols and grouping proof protocols and show some restrictions. We extend
these two concepts and discuss their relationship. A novel system model and an
anonymous yoking-group proof protocol are also presented.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides the background related to this thesis. We give the definition
of RFID authentication protocols and review some attacks, cryptographic tools and
complexity assumptions.
2.1 RFID Authentication Protocols
An RFID protocol defines a set of rules performed between tag, reader and back-end
server. An essential purpose of RFID protocols is to authenticate tags that it is so-
called RFID tag authentication. There are main requirements of tag authentication
protocols: 1) Accept a legitimate tag if the tag’s valid record is stored on back-end
database, otherwise reject; 2) Prevent an unauthorized third party from obtaining
tag’s identity; 3) Provide tag untraceability that is the location of a tag is sensitive to
adversaries. A typical RFID tag authentication protocol consists of four algorithms
which are Setup, SendTag, SendReader and Verify.
• Setup: It takes as input a security parameter k, initiates a server S, readers {Ri}
and creates tags {Ti}, where
(S, {Ri}, {Ti})← Setup(k).
• SendTag: It takes as input a message m and outputs a challenge/request c, where
c← SendTag(m),
and then c is sent from Ri to Ti.
• SendReader: It takes as input a messagem and tag’s secret parameters tsp, outputs
a response m′, where
m′ ← SendReader(m, tsp),
and then m′ is sent from Ti to Ri.
• Verify: It takes as input a tag’s response m and server’s secret parameters ssp,
outputs 1 if the tag is valid, otherwise it outputs 0.
{0, 1} ← Verify(m, ssp).
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A reader usually launches a session by using SendTag algorithm. Upon receiving
the request, the tag uses its secret data, such as the state information and secret
keys, to generate a response m′. Note that SendTag and SendReader algorithms
can be repeated several times in this phase. Upon receiving the tag’s response, the
reader sends it to the back-end server through a secure channel. The server then
runs Verify and checks the validity of the tag. We say that a tag is authenticated
if its information is in the database. During the authentication, messages which
contain tag’s information should only be verifiable by the server.
RFID Mutual Authentication Protocols. Some RFID authentication proto-
cols provide mutual authentication where tags and readers can mutually check the
validity. The reader authentication is similar to tag authentication, while the reader
authentication is started by a tag. A reader needs to show the knowledge of the
secret, such as the tag’s key and generates correct responses. The tag accepts the
reader if the response is valid. In symmetric-key based mutual authentication proto-
cols [PV08, CYK11, Pir11], a reader authentication normally starts after a successful
tag authentication. One reason to this is that only if the reader knows the tag’s
identity, it can use the shared secret to convince the tag of its validity. It is other-
wise hard to find the correct secret since a tag is usually anonymous prior to valid
tag authentication. As a solution, public key based mutual authentication protocols
allow reader authentication to be performed before tag authentication [HPP14].
2.2 Attacks on RFID Protocols
RFID protocols are vulnerable to various attacks due to different reasons. In terms
of communication channel, RFID tag and reader interact in wireless environments
allowing an adversary to eavesdrop the communication. Eavesdropping is consid-
ered as an elementary ability to collect information which can be used in further
operations. An attacker is also allowed to actively query tags to obtain responses.
Apart from gathering information, a strong adversary can corrupt tags and manip-
ulate messages, such as interception and modification. We briefly introduce several
typical attacks on RFID protocols as follows.
Replay Attack. It is a simple but effective attack which does not require any
secret information. In this attack, an adversary firstly eavesdrops the interaction
between tag and reader to collect transmitted messages. The adversary later can
trivially resend those messages to achieve a goal like passing tag authentication.
There are two approaches to replay messages based on different purposes. One
is to replay a tag’s response to a reader when an adversary attempts to impersonate
the tag. For instance, [OSK03] is a 2-pass protocol where a reader only sends as
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query a “request” instead of a fresh challenge. An attacker can obtain the next valid
tag response by sending the same request and replay it to the reader later on. The
replay attack can also be used to trace a tag. A protocol is likely to be attacked
if it adopts deterministic functions, such as symmetric-key encryption schemes and
hash functions, without key update or fresh nonces. [FDW04] is an example where
an attacker can replay a reader’s challenge to the tag then trace its location. A
solution to overcome replay attacks is for a tag to take fresh values as input to
generate responses.
Desynchronization Attack. It is an important attack on stateful protocols which
need to synchronize the shared information between tag and server in each successful
session. Generally, an adversary attempts to cheat one entity that the other has
successfully updated the state. If a legitimate tag is desynchronized with the server,
it can no longer be authenticated and the denial-of-service (DoS) attack is occurred.
A low-cost tag is vulnerable to desynchronization attack if there is no reader
authentication. For example, a tag in protocol [OSK04] updates its secret key
without the verification of queries. An adversary can continuously query the tag and
let it exceed the maximum number of tag authentication. Any future tag response
then will be rejected and the server cannot re-synchronize with the tag. Therefore,
a reader authentication is needed before tag state updates.
In another attack model, an adversary needs to alter messages exchanged be-
tween reader and tag. A protocol which employs reader authentication usually
changes the state on server and tag after a successful tag authentication and reader
authentication, respectively. Consider that an adversary modifies the reader’s re-
sponse and makes it invalid. The response will be rejected and the tag remains the
current state. If the server has updated the state, then it is desynchronized with
the tag. Someone may advise that a tag sends reader an acknowledgment to inform
the key update. However, the acknowledgment can also be modified that it prevents
the server from updating keys. Many protocols [SM08, FMTRCRDF11a, ZZLW10]
adopt the solution which keeps both old key and new key on server. The server
and tag can then be re-synchronized in the next authentication if they have been
attacked.
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack. It is a powerful attack against many
RFID authentication protocols. In this attack, an adversary engages the interaction
between tag and reader without being detected. For each exchanged message, the
adversary can manipulate it in some manners, such as redirection and modification.
Hopper and Blum [HB01] proposed a lightweight RFID authentication protocol
called HB protocol which only requires a tag to perform an inner product overGF (2).
Juels and Weis [JW05] later found flaws in the HB protocol and introduced the HB+
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protocol as a solution. However, the protocol is vulnerable to an active MITM attack
[GRS05]. Roughly speaking, an adversary modifies one bit of the reader’s challenge
during tag authentication. According to the result of authentication, the adversary
can determine whether the corresponding bit of the tag’s secret key is 1. The shared
secret keys then can be revealed by repeating this operation enough times.
A requirement of tag authentication is that the tag must be in close physical
proximity to the reader during the authentication. Some adversaries use MITM
attack to make a distance fraud which forges the distance information between reader
and tag. In this case, an adversary redirects messages and convinces the reader of
a tag’s false location. MITM attack is also referred as the relay attack. Kfir and
Wool [KW05] then demonstrated the possibility of relay attack in RFID protocols.
Distance bounding protocols [BMV13a, BMV13b, BC93, HK05, One12, BMV13c]
which measure the distance between tag and reader are considered as solutions to
this attack.
Side-channel Attacks. Compared with the above attacks, side-channel attacks
exploit physical information, such as timing information and power consumption,
to break protocols. Different input of a protocol may cause distinct features of
power consumption based on the hardware implementation of tags. For instance,
an input bit 1 usually requires more calculations than the value 0. It indicates the
difference related to the computational cost and an adversary is possible to recover
the input from obtained information. To resist such attacks, a secure hardware
implementation or obfuscating computation techniques are needed. These topics
are important but they are out of scope for our research.
2.3 Cryptographic Tools
2.3.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions [RS04, Riv92, ZPS92, KR00, AdM04] are used to
achieve several information security purposes, such as data integrity checks and
authentication. In symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols, hash func-
tions are considered to be adequate tools to protect the communication. Although
the hardware cost of hash functions is questionable to some low-cost tags, many se-
cure lightweight protocols use cryptographic hash functions. For example, the hash
lock protocol [WSRE03] and its variants [Lee10, Khe13] are based on secure hash
functions.
A hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a deterministic function that takes as
input an arbitrary length bit string and outputs a fixed l-bit string which is called a
hash value. One feature of hash functions is that the hash value y can be efficiently
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computed from a given input string x. We say that H is a secure cryptographic
hash funtion if it satisfies the following requirements.
• Pre-image resistance: A hash function H is one-way (pre-image resistance) if
given a hash value y, it is computationally infeasible to find an input x, such that
H(x) = y.
• Second pre-image resistance: A hash function H is second pre-image resis-
tance if given an input x1, it is computationally infeasible to find another input
x2 6= x1, such that H(x2) = H(x1) [NY89].
• Collision resistance: A hash function H is collision resistance if it is computa-
tionally infeasible to find two different inputs (x1, x2), such that H(x1) = H(x2)
[Dam87, BR97].
2.3.2 Merkle Trees
A Merkle tree is a tree structure based on hash functions and it is also named
hash tree. There are various applications of Merkle trees, such as Merkle signature
scheme [Mer89], data storage and integrity checks in cloud computing [HHPS11].
Practically, binary Merkle trees are normally applied in protocols. We give the
definition of a binary Merkle tree as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Merkle Tree). A binary Merkle tree based on a hash function H is
a binary tree which satisfies the following conditions:
• For each label L of a leaf, there is a preimage m, such that L = H(m).
• For each label N of an intermediate node, it is a hashing of its left L1 and right
L2 children, such that N = H(L1, L2).
Given the root of a Merkle tree, both leaves and intermediate nodes are deter-
ministic in a specific order. If the underlying cryptographic hash function is secure,
there is a negligible probability to generate another Merkle tree which has the same
root value. A root value then can be used to represent the relationship between a
Merkle tree and the data. In addition, a sibling path which is as following shows
the significant knowledge of a Merkle tree.
Definition 2.2 (Sibling Path). We say that a path P = (L1, N0, N1, · · · , Ni) is a
sibling path of a leaf L1 if it consists of labels of all siblings of nodes on the path
from L1 to the root, where i is the height of the Merkle tree, and the root value of
Merkle tree is the same as the value computed on P.
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2.3.3 Random Oracles
Many cryptographic protocols employ a powerful tool named random oracle in their
security reductions. Random oracles were introduced by Bellare and Rogaway
[BR93]. They refer to an ideal cryptographic hash function as a random oracle
which outputs uniform and truly random values. In a security reduction, a hash
function can be replaced by a random oracle if it is needed. Then, the challenger
who controls random oracles simulates corresponding outputs for queries issued by
an adversary. According to the truly randomness of oracle outputs, an adversary
cannot detect any difference and the simulation is ideal. In hash-based RFID pro-
tocols, the random oracle is a tool if we need to formally analyze the security of
protocols. However, it is clear that truly random hash values are infeasible in real
applications. A protocol which is provably secure with random oracles may be inse-
cure in practice [CGH04]. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to evaluate the security of
RFID protocols with random oracles (or other oracles), otherwise strong security is
extremely hard to achieve.
2.3.4 Forking Lemma
The concept of forking lemma depicted in Lemma 2.1 was firstly introduced by
Pointcheval and Stern [PS96]. The idea is adopted in security reduction of digital
signatures where random oracles are used. Roughly speaking, forking lemma utilizes
the oracle replay attack which applies the same random tape in two different random
oracles and thus obtains different outputs regarding the same input. If there is an
adversary who can break the scheme, the challenger can solve the underlying hard
problem by using the forking lemma. Indeed, a precondition of using forking lemma
is that two different hash functions can be applied in a scheme. On the other hand,
a hash function is usually fixed in a scheme and it cannot be alternated in practice.
Therefore, random oracles which can be manipulated in the simulation have to be
employed to solve this problem. Bellare and Neven [BN06] presented a generalized
version of forking lemma and we review the definition as below.
Lemma 2.1. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary, given public
parameters as input, if A has non-negligible probability to find a tuple (m, r, σ, h),
where σ is a valid signature of a message m and h is the oracle output of a random
tape r, then A as in Figure 2.1 has non-negligible probability to find another valid
tuple (m, r, σ′, h′) with the same random tape r and different random oracles such
that h 6= h′.
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Figure 2.1: Forking answers to random oracle queries.
2.3.5 Bilinear Maps
Bilinear maps (pairings) was introduced by Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [MOV93]
to attack elliptic curve based cryptographic schemes. Some properties of bilinear
maps are found that they can be used to construct efficient cryptographic schemes.
Later on, diverse types of digital signatures and encryption schemes were proposed,
such as the identity-based cryptography. Two important bilinear pairings used in
public key cryptography are Weil pairing [BF01] and Tate pairing [BLS04a, FMR99].
Moreover, PKC primitives rely on cyclic groups which can be either additive or
multiplicative. A difference between two groups is that the elliptic curve requires
a shorter element length to achieve the same security of traditional multiplicative
groups over the finite field.
The size of parameters plays a crucial role in RFID protocols so that we need to
reduce the length to the minimum. ECC has been adopted in many public key based
RFID authentication protocols [LIM, vDR11, BSSV11] and we give the definition
of bilinear maps as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let G1 and G2 be two additive cyclic groups and GT be a mul-
tiplicative cyclic groups of same large prime order p. P,Q are two generators of
G1 and G2, respectively. The map ê : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear mapping and
(P,Q, p,G1,G2,GT , ê) is a bilinear group. Specifically, we say that a bilinear group
is symmetric if ê : G × G → GT , where G = G1 = G2. Some properties of bilinear
maps are as follows:
• Bilinearity: For all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2 and for all a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have the equation
ê(aP, bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: For all P ∈ G1, Q ∈ G2, if P,Q are respectively a generator
of G1 and G2, we have ê(P,Q) 6= 1 is a generator of GT .
• Efficiency: There is an efficient algorithm to calculate ê(P,Q) for all P ∈ G1,
Q ∈ G2.
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2.3.6 Digital Signatures
The notion of digital signatures was envisioned by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] in
1976. In public key cryptography, the signer who holds the private key can generate
a signature of a message by a one-way trapdoor function. A receiver can check the
validity of a signature via the signer’s public key. A digital signature is used to be
a proof of the authorship of a message. The signature unforgeability makes digi-
tal signatures to be an potential solution of RFID authentication. Unfortunately,
traditional digital signatures described as in Definition 2.4 cannot provide the confi-
dentiality that unauthorized people are allowed to verify the signature and identify
the tag. A signature cannot be stored in a tag and transmitted directly during the
tag authentication either. In Chapter 5, we show that a traditional digital signature
scheme can be integrated in a hybrid RFID protocol.
Definition 2.4. A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms: KeyGen,
Sign and Verify.
• KeyGen: It takes as input a security parameter k, outputs a pair of private and
public keys (sk, pk), where
(sk, pk)← KeyGen(k).
• Sign: It takes as input a message m and a private key sk, outputs a signature σ,
where
σ ← Sign(m, sk).
• Verify: It takes as input a message m, a signature σ and the signer’s public key
pk, outputs 1 if the signature is valid, otherwise outputs 0.
{1, 0} ← Verify(m,σ, pk).
2.4 Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we introduce some complexity assumptions used in this thesis. Note
that definitions in this section are described in elliptic curves.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Assumption. Let P be a generator
of additive cyclic group G of order p. Given a tuple < P, aP, bP >, where a, b $← Z∗p,
the ECHD problem is to output abP ∈ G. We say that the (ε, t)-ECDH assumption
holds in group G, if no t-time algorithm A can solve the ECDH problem in G with
advantage at least ε.
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Elliptic Curve k+1 Exponent (k+1-Exponent) Assumption. Let P be a gen-
erator of additive cyclic group G of order p. Given k+1 values< P, aP, a2P, . . . , akP >,
where k is an integer and a
$← Z∗p, the elliptic curve k + 1 exponent problem is to
compute ak+1P . We say that the (ε, t)-k+ 1Exponent assumption holds in group G,
if no t-time algorithm A can solve the k+ 1Exponent problem in G with advantage
at least ε.
Oracle Diffie-Hellman Assumption (ODH) [ABR01]. Let P be a generator
of additive cyclic group G of order p. Given aP, bP , a function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
and an oracle O = H(bX), where X 6= aP , the advantage of an adversary A in
violating the ODH assumption is
AdvodhA,H =
∣∣Pr [a, b : AO(aP, bP,H(abP )) = 1]− Pr [a, b : AO(aP, bP, t) = 1]∣∣ ,
where t ∈ {0, 1}l. We say that the ODH assumption holds, if AdvodhA,H is negligible.
Chapter 3
Wide Strong Private RFID Authen-
tication
RFID tag privacy is an important issue to RFID authentication protocols. To
date, there have been several attempts to achieve wide-strong privacy by using
zero-knowledge protocols. Unfortunately, most of them are vulnerable to strong ad-
versaries. In this chapter, we firstly take as an example a recent ECC-based RFID
authentication scheme with ID-verifier transfer protocol which was claimed to be
secure against many attacks and satisfies essential security requirements of RFID
systems. We then demonstrate that the protocol suffers from several attacks, in
contrast to its claims. To solve the problems, we propose a new protocol which is
provably secure in the desired security model. We also show an example of extract-
ing a formal privacy model from security requirements. Some techniques to solve
similar problems are introduced and two concrete constructions of wide-strong pri-
vate authentication protocols are given. Finally, the formal privacy analysis shows
the proposed zero-knowledge based protocols offer wide-strong privacy. The security
analysis in Section 3.2 was presented in [LMS+15] and the wide-strong private RFID
authentication scheme was proposed in [LMS+13].
3.1 Introduction
RFID has been widely adopted to the identification of objects. The RFID technol-
ogy has many advantages compared with the barcode based approaches. In practice,
RFID systems have many applications, such as Internet of Things (IoT), supply
chain, warehouse management and car tracking. However, RFID tags have very
limited computation and storage resources and are usually not tamper-resistant.
Thus, an attacker could physically access a tag and collect its internal state. Also,
the communication between a tag and a reader is in a wireless environment. An at-
tacker can identify a compromised tag by using the collected information. Therefore,
we have to prevent a tag’s privacy even the secret of the tag has been leaked.
A typical RFID system comprises RFID readers, RFID tags and a backend
server. Usually, the communication channel between a backend server and a reader
can be secured by traditional security techniques, while the channel between a reader
and a tag poses a challenge due to the low computation and storage capacity of tags.
This is one reason that many research works on RFID focus on the tag privacy pro-
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tection. Moreover, privacy models are needed to evaluate the privacy of a proposed
protocol. Vaudenay [Vau07] introduced the strong privacy model which captures
a number of RFID privacy cases, which are corresponding to eight classes with re-
spect to eight different privacy levels from weak to strong. The strongest level is the
wide-strong privacy. Later, Ng, Susilo, Mu and Safavi-Nain [NSMSN08] refined the
Vaudenay’s model and claimed that wide-strong privacy was possible. Based on the
Bohli-Pashalidis’ model [BP09, BP11] and Vaudenay’s model, Hermans, Pashalidis,
Vercautern and Preneel [HPVP11] proposed a new practical RFID privacy model
which relies on the indistinguishability of tags.
Wide-strong privacy is achievable by using asymmetric key cryptography [Vau07,
NSMSN08]. ECC is feasible to be implemented on RFID tags [HWF08, LSBV08,
KSLE09] as it requires relatively affordable computational operations. An impor-
tant contribution of ECC-based protocols is to enhance the security of the protocol.
Normally, asymmetric key based protocols can achieve higher security level than
symmetric-key based protocols.
ECC-based RFID protocols can be constructed with either encryption schemes
or signature schemes. Vaudenay [Vau07] proved that any indistinguishability against
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) secure public key encryption scheme can pro-
vide narrow-strong security. Later, Hermans, Pashalidis, Vercauteren, and Preneel
[HPVP11] claimed that wide-strong privacy requires the underlying public key en-
cryption scheme is indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA2) secure. In fact, a wide-strong private RFID authentication protocol
equals an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme. A concrete construction which is
wide-strong secure was proposed by Deursen and Radomirovi [vDR11]. The pro-
posed protocol is obtained from Cramer-Shoup encryption [CS98] that the efficiency
needs to be improved.
The digital signature is an alternative cryptographic primitive in PKC. However,
a traditional digital signature is hard to preserve the tag’s privacy as a signature is
publicly verifiable. That is, anyone can trace a tag by checking the validity of the
signature. Fortunately, digital signatures, such as strong designated verifier signa-
tures [JSI96], can be obtained by applying IND-CCA2 encryption schemes. Thus, it
is possible to construct a wide-strong private identification protocol based on strong
designated verifier signature schemes. Many ECC-based RFID authentication pro-
tocols [TB06, LBV08, LBV09, LBSV10b, BSSV11, PH12] were proposed. However,
most of them have been broken later in [FHV10, LBV08, vDR09, vDR10, BCI08a].
Recently, Liao and Hsiao [LH13] proposed an interesting ECC-based RFID au-
thentication scheme integrated with ID-verifier transfer protocol for IoT. The proto-
col provides mutual authentication between sever (verifier) and tag (prover). They
described the adversary model and security issues and claimed that their scheme
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is secure against various types of attacks, such as forward security and ID-verifier
confidentiality.
Related Work. Lee, Batina and Verbauwhede [LBV08] proposed the first ECC-
based RFID authentication protocol called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (ECDLP) based Randomized Access Control (EC-RAC). The protocol is based
on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Indeed, the authors
adopt the Schnorr identification scheme [Sch89] as a building block. Due to the lin-
earity of the protocol construction, the protocol was broken in both [vDR08] and
[BCI08a]. Later, the second version (EC-RACII) was proposed in [LBV09]. The
authors claimed that EC-RACII is untraceable against a strong adversary. How-
ever, Deursen [vDR09, vDR10] pointed out that it is vulnerable under the conven-
tional man-in-the-middle attack. The third version (EC-RACIII) [LBSV10b] was
presented by Lee, Batina Singelée and Verbauwhede in 2010. In this chapter, they
proposed two schemes: one was claimed as wide-strong privacy-preserving and the
other was considered as wide-weak privacy-preserving. Although the protocols use a
non-linear function to solve problems in EC-RAC and EC-RACII, Fan, Hermans and
Vercauteren [FHV10] show that the proposed scheme is still insecure under the man-
in-the-middle attack. The latest version EC-RACIV proposed in [LBSV10b] has also
been broken later on. A summary of attacks to all versions of EC-RAC protocols
was presented in [vDR10]. Finally, Deursen [vDR11] introduced a strong attack
named insider attack. Generally, an attacker uses the knowledge of a compromised
tag to violate the privacy or the security of other tags. Recently, an ECC-based
mutual authentication protocol secure against wide-strong attackers was proposed
by Peeters, Hermans and Fan [PHF13].
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 3.2, we review Liao and Hsiao’s protocol and shows attacks against the
protocol. We propose the repaired protocol in Section 3.3 and we analyse the privacy
of the proposed protocol in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 introduces a wide-strong privacy
model and Section 3.6 present two wide-strong private protocols. A formal privacy
analysis of the proposed protocols is given in Section 3.7. Section 3.8 concludes the
chapter.
3.2 Liao and Hsiao’s Protocol
In this section, we firstly review Liao and Hsiao’s protocol [LH13] and its security
requirements. Note that notions described in this section only applied in Liao and
Hsiao’s protocol and the repaired protocol. Then, we show attacks against the
proposed protocol and give solutions with the security proof.
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Server {ZT (= xTP ), xT , xS, P} Tag{ZT , xT , PS, P}
r2
$← Zn, R2 = r2P
R2−−−−−−−→
r1
$← Zn, R1 = r1P
TKT1 = r1R2, TKT2 = r1PS
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2
AuthT ,R1←−−−−−−−
TKS1 = r2R1, TKS2 = xSR1
ZT = AuthT − TKS1 − TKS2
if ZT exists on the database
then Tag is authentic
AuthS = xTR1 + r2ZT
AuthS−−−−−−−→
check r1ZT + xTR2
?
= AuthS
if holds, the server is authentic
Figure 3.2: Liao and Hsiao’s proposed ECC-based protocol.
3.2.1 Description
F (q): the finite field over q, where q is a prime.
G: an elliptic curve with prime order n.
(a, b): the parameters of G over F (q).
P : a generator of G.
n: the order of generator P .
h: cofactor, such that h = #F (q)/n.
Figure 3.1: Notion of symbols.
Liao and Hsiao’s protocol consists of two phases: namely setup phase and au-
thentication phase. In the setup phase, the server generates elliptic curve domain
parameters D = {q, a, b, P, n, h} and initiate tags. The notion of symbols are repre-
sented as in Figure 3.1. First, the server randomly chooses his private key xS
$← Zn
and sets the corresponding public key PS as PS = xSP . Then, the server ran-
domly picks xT
$← Zn and sets the tag’s public/private key pair as (xTP, xT ). ZT ,
where ZT = xTP , is also called the tag’s ID-verifier. Finally, the server adds the
record {ZT , xT} of the tag into the database and stores {ZT , xT , PS, D} into the
tag’s memory.
The proposed protocol has three passes during the authentication phase. The
protocol is depicted as in Figure 3.2. Firstly, the server randomly chooses a nonce
r2
$← Zn and computes R2 = r2P . R2 is issued to the tag as a challenge. Upon
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receiving the challenge, the tag randomly picks a nonce r1
$← Zn and computes
R1 = r1P . Then, it calculates two temporary Diffie-Hellman keys TKT1 and TKT2,
where TKT1 = r1R2, TKT2 = r1PS. At last, the tag uses the temporary keys to
encrypt its ID-verifier ZT as
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2,
and sends AuthT to the server as a response. After the server receives the tag’s
response, it computes the temporary keys TKS1 = r2R1 and TKS2 = xSR1 and
decrypts as
ZT = AuthT − TKS1 − TKS2.
If ZT appears in the database, the tag authentication is successful. Then, the server
replies to the tag
AuthS = xTR1 + r2ZT .
The server is authentic if the following equation holds.
r1ZT + xTR2 = AuthS.
3.2.2 Security Assumptions
Liao and Hsiao made some assumptions in order to analyse the security of their
proposed protocol. Under the following assumptions, Liao and Hsiao claimed that
the protocol is secure against location tracking attack and provides forward security.
• A1: r1 is fresh in different sessions.
• A2: r2 is fresh in different sessions.
• A3: xS is known to the reader only.
• A4: ZT and xT are known to the tag and the server only.
• A5: The tag is corruptible where common parameters and PS can be known to
the attacker.
To capture the operations defined in [LH13], we define the following oracles
which are employed in the privacy experiment. Clearly, privacy models in this
section only interpret security assumptions and requirements defined above.
• SetupTag(ID) → T : Taking as input a tag’s identity ID, the oracle generates a
new tag T and registers it to the database.
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Experiment ExpprivateA,S [s, k]:
• Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm SetupServer [LH13] to generate
public parameters params and returns to the adversary A. It initializes the
server S.
• Learning Phase: A can query SetupTag, SendTag, SendReader and Corrupt-
Com oracles to C and outputs T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn}.
• Extract Phase: A outputs an ID-verifier Z∗T .
Exp outputs success if Z∗T ∈ T .
Figure 3.3: Privacy experiment of tag ID-verifier confidentiality and anonymity.
• SendTag(T,m) → m′: Taking as input a tag T and a message m, the oracle
outputs the tag’s response m′.
• SendReader(π,m)→ m′: Taking as input a session π and a message m′, the oracle
sends m to the reader in session π and outputs the reader’s response m′. If π is
not activated, it outputs ⊥.
• Launch(T ) → π: Taking as input a tag T , the oracle invokes SendTag and
SendReader to output a complete session π.
• CorruptCom(T ) → ComPara: Taking as input a tag T , the oracle outputs T ’s
inside common parameters ComPara.
• CorruptTag(T ) → sk: Taking as input a tag T , the oracle outputs T ’s secret
information. Note that the oracle destructs the tag and T cannot be involved in
the future communications.
The experiment ExpprivateA,S [s, k] depicted in Figure 3.3 represents an adversary
A who attempts to break a tag’s confidentiality and anonymity. In the experiment,
A can issue s oracle queries based on k tags to the challenger and then outputs an
identifier Z∗T . A succeeds if Z∗T is in the database.
Definition 3.1. An RFID authentication protocol is confidential and anonymous if
any A who succeeds in ExpprivateA,S [s, k] has advantage
Pr[success← ExpprivateA,S [s, k]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in k.
The experiment ExpforwardA,S [s, k] depicted in Figure 3.4 represents an adversary
A who attempts to break a tag’s forward security. In the experiment, A can issue
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Experiment ExpforwardA,S [s, k]:
• Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm SetupServer to generate public
parameters params and returns to the adversary A. It initializes the server
S.
• Learning Phase: A can query SetupTag, Launch and CorruptTag oracles to
C and outputs T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tn} and sessions Σ = {π1, π2, . . . , πn}.
• Challenge Phase:
– A chooses a target tag T ∗ ∈ T and queries CorruptTag(T ∗) to obtain T ∗’s
secret information sk∗.
– A can query oracles as in the learning phase.
• Guess: A outputs a session π∗ ∈ Σ.
Exp outputs success if T ∗ ∈ π∗.
Figure 3.4: Experiment of tag forward security.
s oracle queries based on k tags to the challenger and then outputs a session π∗. A
succeeds if π∗ is a session between the target tag and the server.
Definition 3.2. An RFID authentication protocol is forward secure if any A who
succeeds in ExpforwardA,S [s, k] has advantage
Pr[success← ExpforwardA,S [s, k]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in k.
3.2.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that Liao and Hsiao’s protocol is not secure against location
tracking attack and hence, it does not provide forward security without changing
the security assumptions.
3.2.3.1 Attack against Forward Security
Theorem 3.1. In Liao and Hsiao’s protocol, given the secret key xT of target tag
T , an attacker is able to break the forward security with advantage Pr[Ē] = 1 − 1
n
,
where n is a domain parameter in D.
Proof. Suppose the tag T ’s secret key xT is leaked to an attacker as SR5 in [LH13],
the attacker breaks the forward security as follows.
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= R1 +R2. (3.1)
If this holds, it means that the communication is between the server and tag T . We
show the correctness of equation (1) as below.
x−1T AuthS = x
−1
T (xTR1 + r2ZT )
= x−1T (xTR1 + r2xTP )
= x−1T xT (R1 +R2)
= R1 +R2.
Assume there is a past communication record {Auth′S, Auth′T , R′1, R′2} of tag T ′,
where the tag’s keys are {Z ′T , x′T}. Let R = R1 + R2 and R′ = R′1 + R′2, the event
E is that the above test fails. It occurs when we have
AuthS 6= Auth′S ∧ xT 6= x′T ∧R = R′.




2 are random elements, R and R
′ can be considered as two
random values. We have the probability of E occurs is 1
n
, which is negligible. Hence,
the attacker succeeds in the attack with high probability
Pr[Ē] = 1− 1
n
.
3.2.3.2 Attack against ID-Verifier Confidentiality
The authors claimed that the ID-verifier of a tag is anonymous to anyone except the
server and tag. However, we show that the attacker can extract the tag’s ID-verifier
without using any secret of the tag. Then, it is easy to trace the location of the tag
with the ID-verifiera.
Theorem 3.2. In Liao and Hsiao’s protocol, given common parameters {P, PS},
the attacker is able to extract a tag T ’s ID-verifier ZT .
Proof. According to A5 in Section 3.2, we assume that the attacker knows {P, PS}.
Then, the attacker can reveal any tag’s ID-verifier described as follows (depicted in
Figure 3.5).
aWe note that this attack has also been independently pointed out by Peeters and Hermans
very recently [PH13].
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Step 1: The attacker randomly chooses k
$← Zn and computes
R2 = kP − PS.
Then, he sends R2 to a tag. Since k is a random number, R2 is also a random
element that the tag cannot realise any difference.
Step 2: Upon receiving R2, the tag computes as follows,
r1
$← Zn, R1 = r1P,
TKT1 = r1R2, TKT2 = r1PS,
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2.
Then, it sends {AuthT , R1} to the server.
Step 3: Upon receiving the response {AuthT , R1} form the tag T , the attacker can
calculate T ’s ID-verifier ZT by computing
ZT = AuthT − kR1. (3.2)
Equation (3.2) is correct:
AuthT − kR1 = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2 − kR1
= ZT + r1R2 + r1PS − kR1
= ZT + r1(kP − PS) + r1PS − kr1P
= ZT .
3.3 The Revised Protocol
Liao and Hsiao’s protocol [LH13] is insecure because the same random number r1
is applied twice to generate tag’s response. It is vulnerable since we can do the
linear transformation to extract some information. The attack against ID-verifier
confidentiality introduced in Section 3.2.3.2 is an example due to such situation.
To resist this attack, we provide two solutions in this section. The tag corruption
is a powerful active attack where it can disclose the tag’s secret keys. Our attack
against forward security exploits the secret keys of the tag to trace the tag’s past
communications. The repaired protocol, which resists the proposed attacks is de-
picted in Figure 3.6. Note that the repaired protocol intends to show the method of
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Attacker {P, PS} Tag{ZT , xT , PS, P}
k
$← Zn, R2 = kP − PS
R2−−−−−−−→
r1
$← Zn, R1 = r1P
TKT1 = r1R2, TKT2 = r1PS
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2
AuthT ,R1←−−−−−−−
Extract ZT = AuthT − kR1
Figure 3.5: Attack against ID-verifier confidentiality.
fixing protocols, while it is not a strong private protocol. Section 3.6 presents two
constructions of wide-strong private RFID authentication protocols.
3.3.1 Revised Attack against ID-verifier Confidentiality
There are two approaches with different natures to repair the protocol. Note that
solutions in this section provide the general idea against similar linear attacks. Al-
though the efficiency can be improved, the protocol has to be fully re-designed.
Therefore, we prefer not to do it, as we want to keep the main feature of original
protocol.
3.3.1.1 Double Random Numbers Based solution
To avoid the attack of ID-verifier confidentiality, a tag can simply chooses two dif-
ferent random numbers r1, r
′
1
$← Zn instead of using r1 only. The tag computes:





TKT1 = r1R2, TKT2 = r
′
1PS,
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2.
Then, the tag responds {AuthT , R1, R′1} to the server. On the server side, it calcu-
lates TKS2 as TKS2 = xSR
′
1.
This solution does not require any additional hardware implementations. Nev-
ertheless, it needs to compute one more group element during the authentication.
It also requires more memory to store R′1 and communication requirements are in-
creased.
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Server {ZT (= xTP ), xT , xS, P} Tag{ZT , xT , PS, P}
r2
$← Zn, R2 = r2P
R2−−−−−−→
r1
$← Zn, R1 = r1P
TKT2 = r1PS
TKT1 = H(TKT2, 0)R2
AuthT = ZT + TKT1 + TKT2
AuthT ,R1←−−−−−−
TKS2 = xSR1
TKS1 = H(TKS2, 0)R2
ZT = AuthT − TKS1 − TKS2
if ZT exists on the database
then Tag is authentic
TK ′S1 = H(TKS2, 1)R2




TK ′T1 = H(TKT2, 1)R2
if r1ZT + TK
′
T1 + xTR2 = AuthS
then Server is authentic
Figure 3.6: Repaired Protocol.
3.3.1.2 Non-linear Function Based Solution
Non-linear function is a tool to prevent attackers from performing linear transfor-
mation. For instance, we may employ a hash function. Let a hash function H be
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zn, where G is an elliptic curve group. We firstly compute TKT2 as in
protocol and then slightly modify the calculation of TKT1 as TKT1 = H(TKT2, 0)R2.
In this approach, it avoids the reuse of random number r1 and it is against the attack
described as in Section 3.2.3.2.
3.3.2 Revised Attack against Forward Security
The adversary attacks the forward security using the secret keys of a tag. It is due
to that the server generates a response by using the tag’s secret keys only. Moreover,
in Liao and Hsiao’s protocol, the tag’s secret keys are long-term keys in order to
satisfy the availability property. Once the tag is compromised, its previous locations
are traceable as described in Section 3.2.3.1. Our solution is that the server uses
both its private key xS and the tag’s private key xT to generate the response to tag.
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For example, AuthS could be computed as
AuthS = xTR1 +H(TKS2, 1)R2 + r2ZT .
Correspondingly, the tag verifies the servers response by checking
r1ZT +H(TKT2, 1)R2 + xTR2
?
= AuthS.
3.4 Privacy Analysis of Repaired Protocol
Theorem 3.3. Our protocol provides tag ID-verifier confidentiality and anonymity
if ECDH problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (ε, qH , t)-win the experiment
ExpprivateA,S [s, k]. Let A has an advantage ε′ to solve the ECDH problem.Given an
instance (P, aP, bP ), we can construct an algorithm B to find the solution abP of
ECDH problem using the adversary A. B interacts with A through the following
oracles queries.
• Setup: B selects P as a generator of the additive cyclic group G. Let the public
key of the server be PS = aP and the private key of the reader be xS = a,
which is unknown to B. B maintains the lists LH = {< TKT2, v, {0, 1} >},
LS = {< T, π, w, r, z >} and a database of tags T = {< ID, T, ZT , x >}, which
are initially empty.
• H Query: A issues H query on input (TKT2i, ci) at most qH times. B outputs
vi if < TKT2i, vi, ci > is in the list LH . Otherwise, B picks vi
$← Z∗n and sets
H(TKT2i, ci) = vi. Then, B outputs vi and adds < TKT2i, vi, ci > into the list
LH .
• SetupTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag’s identity IDi. B ignores
the query if IDi exists. Otherwise, B randomly chooses xi
$← Z∗n and computes
ZT i = xiaP . B sets ComParai = (PS, P,H) as Ti’s common parameters. Then,
B creates a new tag and sets (ZT i, xia) as its public and private key pair, where
xia is unknown to B. B outputs the tag Ti and adds < IDi, Ti, ZT i, xi > into the
database T .
• CorruptCom Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag Ti. If Ti is not in
T , B creates a new tag by running SetupTag Query. B then outputs the tag’s
common parameters ComParai.
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• SendTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag Ti and a message R2i.
B outputs ⊥ If Ti /∈ T . Otherwise, B retrieves the referenced tag Ti’s public key
Zi and xi computes as follows.
– Randomly selects ri
$← Z∗n and computes R1i = riP + bP .
– Let H(r1iPS, 0) = vi, B randomly picks wi





where R2i = r2iP . Note that B does not need to compute ab, vi, r2i, we only
assume that there is such a relationship.
– Computes AuthT i = Zg + wiP + riaP and sets m
′




If R2i is not generated by B, it adds < Ti, πi, wi, ri, · > into the list LS, otherwise
B sets zi = r2i and adds < Ti, πi, wi, ri, zi > into LS. Then, B outputs m′i. We
show that the simulation is perfect as
AuthT i = Zg + wiP + riaP




R2i + (ri + b)aP
= Zg + TKT1i + TKT2i
• SentReader Query: A issues the oracle query on input a session πi and a message
mi = (AuthT i, R1i, R2i). B outputs ⊥ if (R2i, ·) is not in the list LS or R2i is not
generated by B. Otherwise, B responds as follows.
– If πi is in the list LS, B retrieves< IDi, Ti, ZT i, xi > from T and< Ti, πi, wi, ri, zi >
from LS. Let H(r1iPS, 1) = vi, B sets r1i = ri + b, r2i = zi and vi = xi(wi−ab)r2i .
Then, B computes
AuthSi = rixiaP + xiwiP + r2iZT i.
B sets m′i = AuthSi and outputs m′i.
– If (AuthT i, R1i) is not in the list LS, B rejects the request.
Eventually, A outputs an ID-verifier Z∗T . If Z∗T ∈ T , A succeeds and B can utilize
it to solve ECDH problem. Since A has to query hash oracle in the experiment,
there is at least one query (TKT1i, 0) to the Hash query is correct. B retrieves TKT1i
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from the list LH and computes abP = TKT1i− riP , where ri ∈ LS, to be a solution
of the given ECDH problem.
The simulation fails if B rejects a valid session in a SendReader query. It occurs
when (AuthT i, R1i) /∈ LS. It implies that A outputs AuthT i, such that
ZT i = AuthT i − TKT2i − viR2i
and ZT i ∈ T . Since ZT i is a randomly generated and unknown to B, AuthT i is a
random guess or A can solve ECDH problem. Let the event E be the simulation
fails. We have the negligible probability Pr[E] ≤ ε′ + k
n
, where k is the number of
tags in T .
Theorem 3.4. Our repaired protocol provides the forward security if ECDH problem
is hard.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (ε, qH , t)-win the experiment
ExpforwardA,S [s, k]. Let A has an advantage ε′ to solve the ECDH problem.Given an
instance (P, aP, bP ), we can construct an algorithm B to find the solution abP of
ECDH problem using the adversary A. B interacts with A through the following
oracles queries. Note that we give the simulation of oracles, the adversary shall use
oracle calls in different phases of the experiment.
• Setup: B selects P as a generator of the additive cyclic group G. Let the public
key of the server be PS = aP and the private key of the reader be xS = a,
which is unknown to B. B maintains the lists LH = {< TKT2, v, {0, 1} >},
Σ = {< π, ri >} and a database of tags T = {< ID, T, sk >}, which are initially
empty.
• H Query: A issues H query on input (TKT2i, ci) at most qH times. B outputs
vi if < TKT2i, vi, ci > is in the list LH . Otherwise, B picks vi
$← Z∗n and sets
H(TKT2i, ci) = vi. Then, B outputs vi and adds < TKT2i, vi, ci > into the list
LH .
• SetupTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag’s identity IDi. B ignores
the query if IDi exists. Otherwise, B randomly chooses xT i
$← Z∗n and computes
ZT i = xT iP . B sets ski = (xT i, ZT i) as Ti’s secret information. Then, B outputs
the tag Ti and adds < IDi, Ti, ski > into the database T .
• CorruptTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag Ti. If Ti is not in T ,
B creates a new tag by running SetupTag Query. B then outputs the Ti’s secret
information ski.
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• Launch Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag Ti, B outputs ⊥ if Ti is
corrupted, otherwise B randomly selects ri, r2i, wi, vi
$← Z∗n. Let v′i = wi−abr2i , B
computes
R1i = riP + bP, R2i = r2iP,
AuthT i = ZT i + riaP + wiP,
AuthSi = xT iR1i + viR2i + r2iZT i.
B sets πi = (Ti, R1i, R2i, AuthT i, AuthSi) and adds < ·, vi, 1 > into the list LH ,
< πi, ri > into the list Σ.
Eventually, A outputs a session π∗ and a target tag T ∗. If π∗ ∈ Σ and T ∗ ∈ π∗,
A succeeds and B can utilize it to solve ECDH problem. Since A has to query hash
oracle in the experiment, there is at least one query (TKT1i, 0) to the Hash query
is correct. B retrieves TKT1i from the list LH and computes abP = TKT1i − riP ,
where ri ∈ Σ, to be a solution of the given ECDH problem.
The simulation fails if A queries a correct item (TKS2i, 0) to the hash oracle. It
implies that A can either solve the ECDH problem or output a correct guess. Let the
event E be the simulation fails. We have the negligible probability Pr[E] ≤ ε′ + qH
n
,
where qH is the number of hash oracle calls.
3.5 Wide-Strong Privacy Model
We now review a privacy model defined in [HPVP11]. The oracles defined in the
model are as follows.
• CreateTag(ID)→ Ti: Taking as input a tag’s identifier ID, the oracle sets up and
registers a new tag to server. Then, it outputs the reference Ti of the tag.
• Launch() → π,m: It launches a new session π and returns the first message m
sent by the reader.
• DrawTag(Ti, Tj) → vtag: Taking as input a pair of tag references (Ti, Tj), it
outputs vtag which is a virtual tag reference linked to either Ti or Tj according
to the value of g, where g ∈ {0, 1}. The oracle outputs ⊥, if Ti or Tj is already
drawn.
• Free(vtag): Taking as input a virtual tag vtag, it retrieves the tuple (vtag, Ti, Tj)
and moves (Ti, Tj) to the set of free tags and resets Ti’s (if g = 0) or Tj’s (if g = 1)
volatile memory.
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• SendTag(vtag,m)→ m′: Taking as input a virtual tag vtag and a message m, the
oracle retrieves (vtag, Ti, Tj) and sends m to the tag Ti (if g = 0) or Tj (if g = 1).
It outputs the tag’s response m′.
• SendReader(π,m) → m′: Taking as input an instance π and a message m, the
oracle sends m to the reader in session π and outputs the reader’s response m′.
If the session π is not activated, the oracle outputs ⊥.
• Result(π) → c: Taking as input an instance π, the oracle outputs the result c of
the authentication if π exists, otherwise outputs ⊥.
• Corrupt(Ti)→ s: Taking as input a reference Ti of the tag, the oracle outputs the
state s of the tag if Ti is not drawn, otherwise outputs ⊥.
The model defined eight different classes of privacy and adversary. In each class,
the adversary is restricted by the capability of oracle access. The strongest adversary
in the model is the wide-strong adversary who can access the all above oracles as
many times as he needs in polynomial time. The privacy experiment Expws−privateA,S
for the wide-strong adversary is as follows:
1. Setup: The system S sets up the system depending on the security parameter
k and chooses a random bit g ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Learning: The adversary A can interact with S in polynomial time and queries
all above oracles.
3. Guess: The adversary outputs a bit g′. If g′ = g, the experiment outputs 1, 0
otherwise.
We say that the adversary A wins the wide-strong privacy game if and only if
the experiment outputs 1.
Definition 3.3. A RFID authentication protocol is privacy-preserving if there is no
adversary A who wins the wide-strong privacy game in polynomial time t with the
advantage AdvA at least ε, where
AdvA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Expws−privacyA,S = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ε.
3.6 Proposed Protocols
Many ECC-based RFID identification protocols employ Diffie-Hellman keys to pre-
serve the privacy of the tag. Usually, there are two approaches to generate the
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Diffie-Hellman key: 1) The tag uses its private key and the nonce(s) to compute
with the reader’s public key (e.g., [BSSV11, LBV08, LBV09]); 2) The tag chooses a
random number to compute with the reader’s public key (e.g., [PH12]). However, a
strong adversary can compromise the tag and obtain the tag’s private key. Hence,
the two ways provide the equal level of privacy protection under the strong attack.
In this chapter, we adopt the second approach.
Clearly, a tag’s response should not be transferable to another valid response
even if the tag’s private key is known to the adversary. In our protocols, we protect
the tag’s private key by using two random values. Given a valid tag’s response,
anyone who does not have the tag’s temporary key or the reader’s private key cannot
output a new valid tag’s response.
3.6.1 Protocol 1
Our protocol is a variant of the Schnorr identification protocol [Sch89]. The identi-
fication process consists of two passes where the reader initiates the session. Prior
to identifying the tag, both of the reader and the tag are required to store particular
states. Let G is an additive group with the prime order p and P is a generator of
the group. The public/private key pairs of the tag and the reader are (X = xP, x)
and (Y = yP, y), respectively, where x, y
$← Z∗p. Initially, the back-end server inserts
the tag’s public key X into the database DB as the tag’s identifier. The server sets
the tuple (x, Y, P ) as the tag’s state and stores it into the tag. The reader receives
its pair of public/private keys and it is allowed to access the database.
To identify a tag, the reader randomly chooses C ∈ G and sends C as a challenge
to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag firstly picks a random number
r
$← Z∗p and computes R = rP . Let H : G×G×G→ Z∗p be a cryptographic hash
function. The tag generates a signing message
v = H(R, rY, C),
where rY is a temporary Diffie-Hellman key. The signing message is computable
if and only if either the tag’s choice r or the reader’s private key y is known. It is
significant to preserve the tag’s privacy. Then the tag computes
s = xv + r (mod p),
and sends (R, s) to the reader. On receiving the tag’s response, the reader extracts
the tag’s identity as
v′ = H(R, yR,C), X ′ = (sP −R)v′−1.
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Reader(y,X) Tag(x, Y )
Choose c
$← Z∗p, C = cP
C−−−−−−−−→
r
$← Z∗p, R = rP
v = H(R, rY,C)
s = xv + r (mod p)
R,s←−−−−−−−−
Compute v′ = H(R, yR,C)
X ′ = (sP −R)v′−1
check if X ′ is in the database
Figure 3.7: Basic protocol.
If X ′ exists in the database, the tag is identified, otherwise it is rejected. The
proposed basic RFID identification protocol is depicted as in Figure 3.7.
The reader can extract the tag’s signature after a successful tag authentication.
Given yR and C, anyone who has the tag’s public key X can verify the validity
of the signature (R, s). It is an important difference between the encryption based
protocols and the zero-knowledge based protocols.
3.6.2 Protocol 2
RFID tags are resource-constrained devices which have limited gates to implement
protocols. The increase of the tag’s gates costs more in production. In terms of
the hardware implementation of our basic protocol, the tag is required to do the
modular in both of the prime field and the binary field. Although the modular is an
efficient operation, it consumes large number of gates for the hardware implementa-
tion [OF09, Sha08]. Unfortunately, most of RFID identification protocols which are
based on public key cryptography need modular calculations in both of the prime
field and the binary field.
In this section, we propose an optimized protocol and show that the number
of required gates are reduced. As a feature, there is no modular operation in the
prime filed required to the tag. Instead, only modular calculations in the binary
field is needed. The optimized protocol also consists of two passes where the reader
initiates the session. Let G be an additive group with the prime order q and ê be a
bilinear pairing, where ê : G×G→ GT . P1 and P2 are two generators of the group
G. The public/private key pairs of the tag and the reader are (xP2, X = ê(P1, xP2))
and (y, Y = yP2), respectively, where x, y
$← Z∗p. The back-end server inserts the
entry of the tag into the databse and stores the tuple (xP2, Y, P1, P2) into the tag.
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Reader(X = ê(P1, xP2), y, Y = yP2) Tag(xP2, Y )
Choose c
$← Z∗p, C = cP2
C−−−−−−−−→
r
$← Z∗p, R = rP1
v = H(R, rY,C)
S = vxP2 + rP2
R,S←−−−−−−−−






check if X ′ is in the database
Figure 3.8: Optimized protocol.
The reader receives its pair of public/private keys and it is allowed to access the
database.
To identify a tag, the reader randomly selects C
$← G and sends C as a challenge
to the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag chooses a random number r
$← Z∗p
and computes R = rP1. Then, the tag generate a signing message v as in the basic
protocol, where v = H(R, rY, C). The tag computes
S = vxP2 + rP2,
and sends (R, S) to the reader. On receiving the tag’s response, the reader extracts
the tag’s identity as






If X ′ exists in the database, the tag is identified, otherwise it is rejected. The
optimized RFID identification protocol is depicted as in Figure 3.8.
3.7 Privacy Analysis
We analyse the privacy of proposed protocols and show that they are wide-strong
private in model [HPVP11].
Theorem 3.5. The proposed basic RFID authentication protocol is private against
wide-strong attack if the ECDH problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (ε, qh, t)-distinguish the ‘left’
and ‘right’ world in the wide-strong privacy experiment. LetA has an advantage ε′ to
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solve the ECDH problem. We can construct an algorithm B run by the challenger
to solve the ECDH problem using the adversary A. Given the ECDH instance
(P, aP, bP ), algorithm B aims to output abP . On behalf of the system S, B interacts
with the adversary A as follows.
• Setup: B sets P as the generator of the additive cyclic group G. Let the public
key of the reader be Y = aP and the private key of the reader be y = a, which
is unknown to B. B maintains the lists Lh = {< R, rY, C, v >}, LRef = {<
vtag, Ti, Tj >}, LS = {< T, π, z >} and a database of tags T = {< ID, T,X, x >
}, which are initially empty. B tosses a coin and sets g = 0 or g = 1, where
Pr[g = 0] = Pr[g = 1] = 1
2
. The virtual tag reference vtag is an incremental
counter starts from 0.
• H Query: A issues hE query on input (Ri, riY,Ci) at most qh times. B outputs vi
if (Ri, riY,Ci) is in the list Lh. Otherwise, B randomly selects vi
$← Z∗p and sets
H(Ri, riY,Ci) = vi. Then, B outputs vi and adds < Ri, riY,Ci, vi > into the list
Lh.
• CreateTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag identity IDi. If IDi
is not in T , B sets up a new tag Ti and generates the tag’s pubic/private key
pair (xi, Xi), where xi
$← Z∗p, Xi = xiP . B outputs the reference Ti and adds
< IDi, Ti, Xi, xi > into the database T . If IDi exists, B ignores the query.
• DrawTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a pair of tag references (Ti, Tj).
If any of the issued tags is not free, which is currently referenced, the oracle
outputs ⊥. If g = 0, B references vtag to Ti, Tj otherwise. B outputs vtag and
adds < vtag, Ti, Tj > into the list LRef .
• Free Query: A issues the oracle query on input a reference vtag. If vtag is in the
list LRef , B deletes the entry < vtag, Ti, Tj > and erases the volatile memory of
the referenced tag, which is Ti or Tj.
• Corrupt Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag reference Ti. If Ti is not
in T , B firstly creates a new tag by using CreateTag Query. B then outputs the
tag’s secret key xi.
• SendTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input vtag and a message Ci. If the
entry < vtag, Ti, Tj > is not in the list LRef , B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B retrieves
the the referenced tag Tg’s secret key xg and computes as follows.
– Randomly selects zi
$← Z∗p and let ri = b+zi. Then, B computes Ri = bP+ziP .
– B randomly picks wi
$← Z∗p and lets vi = wi − bxg .
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– Computes si = xgwi + zi and sets mi = (Ri, si), πi = (Ci,mi).
B outputs mi and adds < Ti, πi, zi > into the list LS. We show that the simulation
is perfect as




) + (b+ zi)
= xgvi + ri.
• SendReader Query: Since there is no reply message from the reader, B ignores the
query to this oracle.
• Result Query: A issues the oracle query on input a session πi. B responses as
follows.
– If πi is in the list LS, B accepts the session and outputs 1.
– If πi,is not in the list LS, B looks up the list Lh. If < Ri, ·, Ci, vi > is not in Lh,
B outputs 0 and rejects the session.
– B Computes Xi = (siP − Ri)v−1i and verifies it by checking if Xi in the the
database T . B outputs 1 if it exists, 0 otherwise.
Eventually, the adversary has to output a bit g′ ∈ {0, 1} in the guess phase.
That is, to determine which world (‘left’ or ‘right’) the simulation has encountered.
If the adversary successfully outputs g′ = g, he wins the experiment and B can use
it to solve the ECDH problem. Since A has to query the hash oracle to determine
which tag is referenced during the experiment, there is at least one query input
(Ri, riY, ci) to the Hash Query is correct. B retrieves riY from the list Lh and
computes abP = riY − ziY , where zi ∈ LS, to be a solution of the given ECDH
problem.
The simulation fails when B rejects a valid session. It occurs when A issued a
valid session π to Result while < Ri, ·, Ci, vi > is not in the list Lh. A valid session
which is not generated by B implies that the adversary could find the Diffie-Hellman
key riY or guess the correct si. Let the event E be that the simulation fails. We
have the negligible probability Pr[E] ≤ ε + n
q
, where n is the number of tags in
T .
Theorem 3.6. The proposed optimized RFID identification protocol is private against
the wide-strong adversary if the ECDH problem is hard.
Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A who can (ε, qh, t)-distinguish the ‘left’
and ‘right’ world in the wide-strong privacy experiment. Let A has an advantage
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ε′ to solve the ECDH problem. Given an instance (P, aP, bP ), we can construct an
algorithm B to find the solution abP of ECDH problem using the adversary A. B
interacts with the adversary A as follows.
• Setup: B selects k, where k $← Z∗p and sets P1, P2, where P1 = kP, P2 = P , as
two generators of the additive cyclic group G. Let the public key of the reader be
Y = aP and the private key of the reader be y = a, which is unknown to B. B
maintains the lists Lh = {< R, rY, C, v >}, LRef = {< vtag, Ti, Tj >}, LS = {<
T, π, z >} and a database of tags T = {< ID, T,X, xP >}, which are initially
empty. B tosses a coin and sets g = 0 or g = 1, where Pr[g = 0] = Pr[g = 1] = 1
2
.
The virtual tag reference vtag is an incremental counter starts from 0.
• H Query: A issues hE query on input (Ri, riY,Ci) at most qh times. B outputs vi if
(Ri, riY,Ci) is in the list Lh. Otherwise, B picks vi
$← Z∗p and sets H(Ri, riY,Ci) =
vi. Then, B outputs vi and adds < Ri, riY,Ci, vi > into the list Lh.
• CreateTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag’s identity IDi. B ignores
the query if IDi exists. Otherwise, B randomly chooses xi
$← Z∗p and computes
Xi = ê(kP, xiP ). Then, B creates a new tag and sets (Xi, xiP ) as its public and
private key pair. B outputs the reference Ti and adds < IDi, Ti, Xi, xiP > into
the database T .
• DrawTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input a pair of tag references (Ti, Tj).
If any of the issued tags is not free, the oracle outputs ⊥. Depending on the value
of g, B references vtag to Ti (if g = 0) or Tj (if g = 1). B outputs vtag and adds
< vtag, Ti, Tj > into the list LRef .
• Free Query: A issues the oracle query on input a reference vtag. If vtag is in the
list LRef , B removes the entry < vtag, Ti, Tj > and erases the volatile memory of
the referenced tag.
• Corrupt Query: A issues the oracle query on input a tag reference Ti. If Ti is not
in T , B creates a new tag by running CreateTag Query. B then outputs the tag’s
secret key xiP .
• SendTag Query: A issues the oracle query on input vtag and a message Ci. B
outputs ⊥ If < vtag, Ti, Tj > is not in the list LRef . Otherwise, B retrieves the
the referenced tag Tg’s secret key xgP and randomly selects zi, wi
$← Z∗p. Then,
B computes
Ri = kbP + zikP, Si = wixgP + ziP,
and sets mi = (Ri, Si), πi = (Ci,mi). B outputs mi and adds < Ti, πi, zi > into
the list LS.
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• SendReader Query: Since there is no reply message from the reader, B ignores the
query to this oracle.
• Result Query: A issues the oracle query on input a session πi. B outputs 1 if πi
is in the list LS, otherwise B outputs 0 if < Ri, ·, Ci, vi > is not in the list Lh. If
< Ri, ·, Ci, vi > exists, B computes Xi = ( ê(P1,Si)ê(Ri,P2))
v−1i and outputs 1 if Xi appears
in T , 0 otherwise.
Eventually, if the adversary outputs a guess g′, where g′ = g, B has at least
one correct value of riY in the list Lh. B can find the solution of ECDH problem
as abP = riY − ziY , where zi ∈ LS. The simulation fails when B outputs a false
rejection with the negligible probability at most ε + n
q
, where n is the number of
tags in T .
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated attacks against Liao and Hsiao’s protocol and
offered different solutions to the issues. Then, a concrete repaired protocol was
presented and it was proven secure. Based on Liao and Hsiao’s security requirements,
Section 3.2.2 gave an example of translating formal privacy models. After that, a
wide-strong privacy model is given and we proposed two novel zero-knowledge based
RFID authentication protocols. As a feature, a reader can obtain a tag’s signature
after a successful tag authentication. In addition, the optimized protocol eliminates
modular computations over the prime field. Finally, two proposed protocols were
proven secure against wide-strong adversaries.
Chapter 4
Secure RFID Ownership Transfer
An RFID tag could change hands many times during its lifetime. In a retail chain,
the ownership of the tag is instituted by the supplier who initially owns the tag.
In the view of a buyer, the validity of the current tag ownership and the original-
ity of supplier are most important. In typical RFID ownership transfer protocols,
the knowledge of the tag’s autIn our scheme,hentication key proves the ownership.
However, it is insufficient against an active attacker, since tags are usually lack of
tamper-proof protections. Ownership transfer relies on a successful verification of
tag’s supplier and current ownership. In this chapter, we formally define the secu-
rity model of ownership transfer protocols and propose a secure ownership transfer
protocol, which was originally proposed in [LMSV13]. In our scheme, the current
owner provides a new owner with the evidence of transfer and a proof of tag origin.
Key management becomes easy in our system, since one asymmetric verification key
of the owner can be used to verify multiple tags that belong to the owner.
4.1 Introduction
RFID has exhibited many practical applications such as serving as identity of an
object in supply chains, supermarkets and hospitals. A tag attached to a product
has a unique identifier stored in a back-end database. In practice, a product (with
a tag) is owned by a user. Often, the product needs to change hands due to selling
or buying. This process is referred to as ownership transfer.
In the lifetime of a tag, its ownership is likely to be transferred from one owner
to another. An ownership transfer protocol runs between the current owner and the
new owner. Generally speaking, the protocol is considered in two phases, namely
ownership verification and ownership transfer. A new owner firstly verifies the cur-
rent ownership of the tag. If the current ownership is confirmed, he can request the
ownership transfer. After a successful ownership transfer, the current owner who
becomes the previous owner of the tag can no longer access the tag and the new
owner who becomes the current owner of the tag can prove the ownership of the
tag. According to the current ownership of the tag, a user can be a previous owner,
current owner or new owner of the tag.
The security of RFID ownership transfer protocols is considered in three as-
pects: the secure ownership, exclusive ownership and secure ownership transfer
[vDMRV09]. The first two properties are related to the phase of the ownership
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verification. Informally, they guarantee that the actual owner always has the own-
ership of a tag and no others can simultaneously obtain the ownership. The criteria
of secure ownership transfer evaluates the phase of the tag ownership transfer. A
new user who is unauthorized by the current owner cannot gain the ownership of
the tag. A secure ownership transfer protocol should satisfy all these requirements.
The traditional RFID ownership transfer protocols are based on the lightweight
symmetric-key authentication schemes. The back-end server and a tag share a pre-
defined symmetric-key and the tag’s identity. The tag’s ownership is checked by
implementing the authentication protocol. However, most (passive) tags are not
tamper-resistant, so that adversaries can launch active attacks. It is possible to
physically corrupt or clone a tag and obtain the internal state. Once the internal
state is leaked, the adversary can control the tag as the real owner. Therefore, it
can prove the ownership and even transfer the tag to others.
Motivation. The aim of this chapter is to propose a secure RFID ownership trans-
fer protocol. In most previous RFID ownership transfer protocols, the proof of
ownership relies on the knowledge of the tag’s authentication key. If the user can
provide a valid secret key, the verifier accepts its ownership of the tag. However, it
is insufficient against the attacker who compromises the tag. In practice, we call the
party who currently owns the tag a seller and the party who receives the ownership
a buyer. The symmetric authentication key shared between the seller and the tag
provides no identity information about the seller. Anyone who has the key is able
to prove the ownership and transfer it to other parties. It may injure the rights of
the seller and the buyer. As a buyer, it usually concerns the origin of the product
and the validity of the seller. He expects to check them during a purchase. The
key management in large RFID system is also an issue. A tag normally requires a
unique key for proving the ownership. The buyer has to obtain a large number of
keys to check ownerships of tags. It not only requires a secure channel in commu-
nication, but it is hard to maintain the records of these transactions. It would be
desirable that one verification key can do the job. With this key, anyone can verify
the ownership of tags that belong to the owner.
We look into an RFID system, where a supplier obtains products from a manu-
facturer. The supplier authorizes the manufacturer, via a warrant, to make specific
products. After the products are ready for the supplier, the manufacturer setups
RFID tags and attaches them to products, respectively. When a buyer purchases
the product from the supplier, the ownership transfer is required. The buyer checks
the information of the supplier and the product prior to making a payment. Once
the deal is complete, the buyer owns the tag and the supplier can no longer claim
ownership. Meanwhile, the seller provides the undeniable transfer proof which in-
cludes the information of seller, buyer and tag. The buyer can also resell the product
CHAPTER 4. SECURE RFID OWNERSHIP TRANSFER 43
in the future. One aim in this chapter is to construct an ownership transfer scheme
in this scenario.
Symmetric-key based protocols are insufficient to reach a strong security level for
ownership transfer protocols. It is a challenge to resist an active attack. We assume
that the tag authentication can be done using a traditional RFID authentication
protocol, while we only focus on the ownership transfer protocol. An owner is
usually a powerful entity which can perform public key cryptographic algorithms
for ownership transfer, which does not rely on the computation power of the tag.
Related Work. Saito, Imamoto and Sakurai [SIS05] introduced an ownership
transfer protocol using two approaches. Both provide the privacy and security
protection of the current owner and the new owner. One is based on the three-
party model and the other is on two-party model. Since the schemes are based on
symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms, the secret key of tag is pre-shared with the
owner. In the three-party model, the second key is shared between the TTP and
the tag. In ownership transfer, the TTP helps the new owner to update the tag’s
new secret. While the online TTP is required during the ownership transfer. Once
the tag is compromised, the shared secret key between the tag and the TTP is also
disclosed.
Independently, Molnar, Soppera and Wagner [MSW05] proposed an ownership
transfer protocol of RFID tags. The protocol addresses the privacy problems of
ownership transfer through the pseudonym. The proposed scheme employs a tree
based key structure to enable the time-limited delegation for temporarily ownership
transfer. It is that the current owner can temporarily delegate the ownership of
the tag to another party. After a period of time, the ownership is returned to the
original owner without the agreement of the delegatee. However, the scheme needs a
counter which is in the non-volatile memory to count the number of authentications.
A Trusted Center (TC) who controls all the secret of the tags assists the readers to
authenticate the tag. Unfortunately, most TTP-based ownership transfer protocols
[FA07, KYWG10, OTYT06, MSW05] suffer from the similar issues as in [SIS05].
Several security properties of ownership transfer protocols were introduced by
Ng, Susilo, Mu and Safavi-Naini [NSMSN11], where they introduced four new prop-
erties: tag assurance, current ownership proof, undeniable ownership transfer and
owner initiation. The proposed scheme satisfies most security properties of owner-
ship transfer while only some hash calculations are required on the tag. Elkhiyaoui,
Blass and Molva [EBM11] presented the problem of issuer verification during the
ownership transfer. In this chapter, the privacy and security of ownership trans-
fer protocols are formally defined and the proposed scheme achieves the constant
time authentication. The scheme prevents the attacker from injecting fake tags in
the supply chains. The origin of the tag is verified prior to the transfer. Abyaneh
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[Aby12] shows that forward and backward privacy are broken if the attacker was an
owner of the tag. Additionally, the definition of the security model does not allow
the adversary to rewrite the tag’s content. It may be vulnerable against some active
attacks.
A scalable authentication protocol which supports the ownership transfer was
proposed in [FMTRCRDF11b]. The protocol provides the controlled delegation
without using the non-volatile memory to store a counter. The feature of desyn-
chronization engages the protocol runs without the TTP. It employs a table which
consists of two hash chains to identify a tag. While, the cost of storage on the server
is questionable when the maximum size of the hash chains increased. Meanwhile, it
also suffers form the denial-of-service attack.
Deursen, Mauw, Radomirović and Vullers [vDMRV09] introduced a formal def-
inition of secure ownership transfer in RFID systems. They described two roles:
the tag owner and the tag holder. Basically, both of them can pass the ownership
test but only the owner is engaged to transfer the ownership. It was claimed that
the tag owner and holder are coincide in the notion of secure ownership. However,
the holder of the tag may not be the owner in decentralized systems. Since the
security of ownership is based on the authentication of the tag, most symmetric-key
ownership transfer protocols [Son08, SIS05, MSW05, RRG09] assume that the tag
is incorruptible. In [NSMSN11] and [EBM11], a tag is allowed to be compromised.
Nevertheless, the content of the tag cannot be rewritten after the adversary disclosed
the key.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 4.2, we introduce a new system model of RFID tag ownership transfer.
The proposed secure ownership transfer protocol is given in Section 4.3. We define
the adversary and security models of ownership transfer protocols in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 presents the formal security proof of the proposed scheme. Finally,
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.2 System Model
In this section, we formally define ownership transfer protocols using the retail chain
as an instance.
4.2.1 Entities
• Tag Ti: An object is attached by one tag T . The tag has a small memory which
stores the current state si of the tag. Ti is a low-cost device which can at most
calculate the hash function F .
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• Manufacturer Mi: The manufacturer is the one who makes the products for
suppliers. One manufacturer can cooperate with many different suppliers while
the product must be authorized by the specific supplier.
• Supplier Si: The supplier is the one who sells the products to customers. It
handles the first ownership transfer of the tag. The supplier authorizes the manu-
facturer to produce expected number of products meanwhile S provides a unique
warrant for each product.
• Previous Onwer O(ti,k−1): The previous owner O(ti,k−1) is the one who previously
owns the tag Ti at the time k − 1. It provides the proof of transfer Σ(t,k−1,k) to
the current owner.
• Current Owner O(ti,k): The current owner O(ti,k) is the one who currently owns
the tag Ti at the time k. It maintains a database which stores the states of tags
and authenticates tags though a reader Rk. The current owner can prove the
current ownership σ(ti,k) of the tag and show the valid transfer obtained from the
previous owner. O(ti,k) is allowed to transfer the current ownership of Ti to the
new owner.
• New Owner O(ti,k+1): The new owner O(ti,k+1) is the one who is a potential
owner of the tag Ti. Prior to accepting the ownership of tag Ti, the new owner
verifies the tag’s supplier S, the previous transfer proof Σ(t,k−1,k) and the current
ownership σ(ti,k). It provides an evidence of the acceptance once the transfer is
completed.
The supplier can be considered as a special owner of tag and the manufacturer
is an agent of particular supplier. The previous owner, current owner and new
owner are roles which are changeable in different periods of the tag ownership. That
means the new owner becomes a current owner or previous owner once he receives
or transfers the tag ownership, respectively.
4.2.2 RFID Ownership Transfer Systems
In our system model, we do not employ the centralized server which is normally a
TTP. Instead, we adopt the two-party mode where each party maintains an isolated
database and readers. A party who engages in the ownership transfer is an owner of
a tag. From now on, we refer to an owner as an entity which is supported by RFID
readers and a back-end database. While one owner has a public/private key pair
where the public key is known to anyone. In the model, we only need the secure
communication channel during the authentication key exchange. Since the proposed
scheme applies symmetric-key based tag authentication, it is impossible to securely











Figure 4.1: Ownership transfer systems
update the key with shared secret [KZP11]. The key update of the protocol should
be performed outside the control range of the previous owner.
The ownership transfer system is described in Figure 4.1. Different from the
previous models, we consider the ownership of the tag as a chain. To handle an
ownership transfer, the information of tag’s supplier, previous owner, current owner
and new owner are all required. Nevertheless, only the current owner needs to
provide its secret.
In the model, the ownership transfer stems from the supplier. Let one owner
be a level. Level 0 is the supplier of the tag. The manufacturer generates the proof
of ownership under the supplier’s warrant and stores it on the tag. Anyone who
has the supplier’s public key can verify the ownership of the product. In this level,
the supplier simultaneously plays the role of the previous owner since the product
is brand new. Then, it transfers the ownership to a new owner who is in level 1.
Owner 1 accepts the ownership from the supplier and takes the role of the current
owner. At this time, the supplier transferred the current ownership but remains the
role of supplier and previous owner of the tag. Following the process, the ownership
of the tag is generally in the k-th level.
A complete ownership transfer process has two phases: ownership verification
and ownership transfer. In the ownership verification phase, the buyer checks the
supplier of the tag, previous authenticated transfer proof and the validity of current
ownership. Only if all the verifications are successful, two owners play the game
of the ownership transfer. In the completion of an ownership transfer, the seller
outputs a new authenticated transfer proof and the buyer outputs a proof of new
ownership.
4.2.3 Ownership Transfer Protocols
An RFID ownership transfer protocol consists of seven algorithms: system setup
(Setup), key generation (KeyGen), tag initiation (TagInit), authentication (Auth),
ownership transfer (Transfer), ownership prove (OwnerProve) and ownership verifi-
cation (OwnerVerify). The seven algorithms in RFID ownership transfer protocols
are defined as follows.
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• params ← Setup(λ): Taking as input a security parameter λ, outputs a set of
public parameters params.
• (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(params): Taking as input the system parameters params,
outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
• (c, σ(t,0))← TagInit(T, pks, sks, pkm, skm): Taking as input a tag T , a pair (pks, sks)
of supplier’s public/private keys and a pair (pkm, skm) of manufacturer’s pub-
lic/private keys, outputs the tag’s initial state c and ownership proof σ(t,0). It
runs between a manufacturer and a supplier.
• Info ← Auth(T,O(t,k)): Taking as input a tag T and the current owner O(t,k),
outputs a set of information Info of tag. It runs between the current owner and
the tag.
• Σ(t,k,k+1) ← Transfer(IDt, pks, pkk−1, pkk, skk+1,Σ(t,k−1,k)): Taking as input a tag’s
identity IDt, the public key pks of supplier, a pair of public/private key (pkk, skk)
of current owner and a new owner’s public key pkk+1, outputs an authenticated
transfer proof Σ(t,k,k+1). It is run by the current owner.
• σ(t,k) ← OwnerProve(IDt, skk,Σ(t,k−1,k), σ(t,k−1)): Taking as input a tag’s iden-
tity IDt, a private key skk of current owner and an authenticated transfer proof
Σ(t,k−1,k), outputs a proof σ(t,k) of ownership. It is run by the current owner.
• {true, false} ← OwnerVerify(IDt, pks, pkk−1, pkk, σ(t,k)): Taking as input a tag’s
identity IDt, the supplier’s verification key pks, the previous owner’s verifica-
tion key pkk−1 and the current owner’s verification key pkk and a proof σ(t,k) of
ownership, outputs true if the proof is valid, outputs false otherwise.
Without loss of generality, we describe the Auth algorithm in the protocol. Also,
it is unnecessary to the security of ownership transfer protocols. In this chapter,
Auth is assumed to be a privacy-preserving authentication protocol. The interaction
of one ownership transfer is depicted as in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Proposed Protocol
The mathematical preliminaries and concrete construction of the proposed scheme
are presented in the section.
4.3.1 Construction
• Setup: Select a symmetric bilinear pairing ê : G × G → GT , where the order of
group G and GT are the same prime number p. Let P,U ∈ G be two generators.
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Figure 4.2: Ownership transfer protocol.
H1 : G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H2 : G×G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p and F : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
are collision-resistant cryptographic hash functions. Sets the public parameters
params = (G,GT , P, U, p, ê, H1, H2, F ).
• KeyGen: Randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p and sets the public/private key pair as
(pk, sk) = (xP, x).
• TagInit: Let the public/private key pairs of a manufacturer M and a supplier
respectively be (pkm, skm) = (xP, x) and (pks, sks) = (αP, α). Firstly, the manu-
facturer and the supplier interacts as in Figure 4.3. The manufacturer generates
an ownership proof σ0 for the supplier. It randomly chooses an authentication
key y from the key space S and sets the tag state c = (y, F (σ(t,0)). The supplier
is the owner O(t,0).
• Auth: It is a general symmetric-key based authentication protocol. The current
owner O(t,k) interacts the tag T using a pre-shared symmetric authentication key
y. Once the authentication protocol outputs 1, the owner collects the tag’s infor-
mation info which includes the tag’s identity IDt, ownership proof σ(t,k), etc.
• Transfer: To transfer the ownership, the current owner O(t,k) interacts with the
new owner O(t,k+1). If the current owner is a supplier, it follows the description as
in Figure 4.4. Otherwise, it follows the description as in Figure 4.5. Assume that
the identity of tags and public information of two owners are mutually known.
• OwnerProve: To generate a proof of ownership, the current owner O(t,k) retrieves
the proof Σ(t,k−1,k) = (s(t,k−1,k), R(t,k−1,k)) of authenticated transfer and the own-
ership poof σ(t,k−1) of owner O(t,k−1). Computes s(t,k) = s(t,k−1,k) + skk, where skk
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e(t,0) = H2(rP, xP, IDt)





s = αe(t,0) + r
s−−−−−−−→
sm = s+ x,
σ(t,0) = (u(t,0), v(t,0), w(t,0))
= (smU, rP, xP )
Figure 4.3: Ownership initiation.





e(t,0,1) = H2(R(t,0,1), βP, IDt)






$← Z∗p, st = αet + rt
et = H1(rtP, IDt)




= αetP + rtP + Y
Σ(t,0,1) = (s(t,0,1), R(t,0,1))
Figure 4.4: Transfer from supplier to new owner.
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O(t,k)(skk, pkk, pks,Σ(t,k−1,k)) O(t,k+1)(skk+1, pkk+1, pks)
r(t,k,k+1)
$← Z∗p
et = H1(v(t,k), IDt)
r = r(t,k,k+1) + s(t,k−1,k)
R(t,k,k+1) = rP − etpks − v(t,k)
R(t,k,k+1)−−−−−→
Y = e(t,k,k+1)pkk +R(t,k,k+1),









= etpks + v(t,k) + Y
Σ(t,k,k+1) = (s(t,k,k+1), R(t,k,k+1))
Figure 4.5: General transfer from current owner to new owner on level k.
is the private key of O(t,k), and sets the proof
σ(t,k) = (u(t,k), v(t,k), w(t,k)) = (s(t,k)U, v(t,k−1), R(t,k−1,k)).
In the case k = 1, set v(t,1) = rtP , where rtP is from Figure 4.4.
• OwnerVerify: On input a proof σ(t,k) = (u(t,k), v(t,k), w(t,k)) of tag T , there are three
cases. The verifier checks as follows
– Case 1 (k = 0):
ê(t,0) = H2(v(t,0), w(t,0), IDt), ê(P, u(t,0))
?
= ê(e(t,0)pks + v(t,0) + w(t,0), U).
– Case 2 (k = 1):
êt = H1(v(t,1), IDt), ê(t,0,1) = H2(w(t,1), pk1, IDt),
ê(P, u1)
?
= ê(pk1 + (et + e(t,0,1))pks + v(t,1) + w(t,1), U).
– Case 3 (k > 1):
êt = H1(v(t,k), IDt), ê(t,k−1,k) = H2(w(t,k), pkk, IDt),
ê(P, u(t,k))
?
= ê(etpks + pkk + e(t,k−1,k)pkk−1 + v(t,k) + w(t,k), U).
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Outputs true if any equation holds, otherwise outputs false.
Correctness. Without loss of generality, we show the correctness of our RFID
ownership transfer protocol in Case 3 as follows:
ê(P, u(t,k)) = ê(P, (s(t,k−1,k) + skk)U)
= ê(P, (skk−1e(t,k−1,k) + r + skk)U)
= ê(e(t,k−1,k)pkk−1 + rP + pkk, U)
= ê(etpks + rtP + e(t,k−1,k)pkk−1 + rP + pkk − etpks − rtP,U)
= ê(etpks + pkk + e(t,k−1,k)pkk−1 + v(t,k) + w(t,k), U).
4.4 Security Models of Ownership Transfer Pro-
tocols
The security of a RFID ownership transfer protocol usually relies on the underlin-
ing authentication protocols. It is extremely hard to provide strong security if a
symmetric-key authentication protocol is employed. Typically, the security model
of symmetric-key based ownership transfer protocols does not provide corruption
oracle which outputs the state of a tag. Once the key is exposed, the security of
the tag is completely compromised. Elkhiyaoui, Blass and Molva [EBM11] recently
presented a ROTIV protocol secure against the key corruption. It applies the public
key cryptography in the authentication while the tag is only required to compute a
hash function. However, the proposed security model cannot capture the adversary
who can rewrite the content of a tag. It is possible when an adversary gains the
key of tag. In this section, we enhance the security models of ownership transfer
protocols. A general assumption is that owners are not able to launch collusion
attacks in an ownership transfer [NSMSN11].
4.4.1 Adversaries and Oracles
The ability of the adversary is essentially restricted by the actions that he is allowed
to carry out. In security models, we specify the actions of adversary via the oracle
queries. We now define the oracles which are used in the security models of ownership
transfer protocols in this chapter.
Definition 4.1 (Oracles). The adversary plays with a challenger by given public
information of the system and the following oracle calls.
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• (O, pk)← SetupOwner(ID): Taking as input an identity ID, it creates an owner
O and runs the algorithm KeyGen to output a public key pk.
• T ← TagInit(IDt): Creates a tag T with the identity IDt and sets the authentica-
tion key y. It runs the algorithm TagInit and outputs the tag T .
• (IDt, σ(t,k)) ← Auth(T,Ok): Taking as input a current owner Ok and a tag T , it
outputs the identity IDt of tag and its ownership proof σ(t,k) if T is valid, outputs
⊥ otherwise.
• c ← CorruptTag(T ): Taking as input a tag T , and outputs the complete internal
state c of T . Note that the oracle does not destroy the tag T and the tag is available
in the future oracle calls.
• sk ← CorruptOwner(ID): Taking as input an owner’s identity ID, and outputs
the private key sk of the owner.
• {0, 1} ← Rewrite(T, c′, y): Taking as input a tag T , a new state c′ and an au-
thentication key y, it rewrites the state by c′ and outputs 1 if the key is valid, 0
otherwise.
• σ(t,k) ← OwnerProve(T, IDs, IDk−1, IDk): Taking as input a tag T , an identity
IDs of supplier, an identity IDk−1 of previous owner and an identity IDk of
current owner, it outputs an ownership proof σ(t,k) of the tag.
• Σ(t,k,k+1) ← Transfer(T, IDk, IDk+1): Taking as input a tag T , an identity IDk of
current owner and an identity IDk+1 of new owner, it outputs an authenticated
ownership transfer proof Σ(t,k,k+1) of the tag.
Definition 4.2 (Type I and Type II adversary). The adversary is defined by the
oracle calls and the goal of the experiment.
• Type I Adversary(AI): is allowed to query above oracles except the CorruptOwner.
It aims to output a valid proof of authenticated transfer which cannot be detected
during the transfer.
• Type II Adversary(AII): is allowed to query all above oracles. It aims to output a
valid proof of ownership of the target tag which cannot be detected in the ownership
verification.
4.4.2 Security Models
We define the security models of ownership transfer protocols in this section. Each
model captures the capability of different adversaries. A security model is defined
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Experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n]:
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithm Setup to generate public parame-
ters params and returns to AI . It initiates a supplier S∗.
• Phase 1(Learning):
– AI can query all above oracles except CorruptOwner to C.
– Outputs two sets T = {T1, . . . , Tn} and O = {O1, . . . , Or}, which are
created tags and owners.
• Phase 2(Forge):
– AI submits a target tag T∗ ∈ T , current owner O∗k and new owner O∗k+1 to
C, such that (O∗k, O∗k+1) ∈ O ∪ {S∗}.
– AI queries oracles Auth, CorruptTag, Rewrite, Transfer and OwnerProof to
C.
– AI outputs a proof Σ∗ of authenticated ownership transfer.




∗, σ∗)), such that Σ∗ 8 Transfer(ID∗t , ID∗k, ID∗k+1).
Figure 4.6: Type I security experiment of the ownership transfer protocols.
as an experiment which plays between the adversary and the challenger. We denote
that the security parameters as r, s and n, which are respectively the number of
owner initiations, the number of oracle calls and the number of tag initiations. There
are two experiments defined in our security model. An RFID ownership transfer
protocol is secure iff it is secure in both experiments. The security models defined
in this section are suitable to ownership transfer protocols in the two-party model.
4.4.2.1 Security Against Type I Attack
Type I adversary is a person who attempts to forge a valid proof of authenticated
transfer. AI interacts with the challenger via oracle calls and outputs a proof of
transfer. It is described as in experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n] in Figure 4.6.
Definition 4.3. An ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type
I attack, if any AI who succeeds in ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n] has advantage
Pr[success← ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in λ.
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Experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n]:
• Setup:The challenger runs the algorithm Setup to generate public parameters
params and returns to AII . It initiates a supplier S∗.
• Phase 1(Learning):
– AII can query all above oracles to C.
– Outputs two sets T = {T1, . . . , Tn} and O = {O1, . . . , Or}, which are
created tags and owners.
• Phase 2(Forge):
– AII submits a target tag T∗ ∈ T , previous owner O∗k−1 and current owner
O∗k to C, such that (O∗k−1,O∗k) ∈ O ∪ {S∗}.
– AII queries oracles Auth, CorruptTag, Rewrite, Transfer and OwnerProve to
C.
– AII outputs a proof σ∗ of ownership.
Exp outputs success if it satisfies the restrictions as follows,
1. true← OwnershipVerify(ID∗t , pk∗s , pk∗k−1, pk∗k, σ∗),
2. σ∗ 8 OwnerProve(ID∗t , ID∗s , ID∗k−1, ID∗k),
3. sk∗k 8 CorruptOwner(ID∗k) ∨ (Σ∗ 8 Transfer(ID∗t , ID∗k−1, ID∗k) ∧ sk∗k−1 8
CorruptOwner(ID∗k−1)).
Figure 4.7: Type II security experiment of the ownership transfer protocols.
4.4.2.2 Security Against Type II Attack
The Type II adversary acts as a person who attempts to forge a valid proof of
ownership. AII interacts with the challenger C via oracle calls and outputs a proof
of ownership at the end of the experiment. The experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n] is
defined as in Figure 5.7.
Definition 4.4. An ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type
II attack, if any AII who succeeds in ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n] has advantage
Pr[success← ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in λ.
Lemma 4.1. If an ownership transfer protocol is secure against the Type II attack,
it is secure against the Type I attack.
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Proof. Suppose that there is a Type I adversaryAI who breaks the ownership transfer
protocol with a non-negligible advantage ε. We can construct the algorithm B to
win the experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [r, s, n]. B selects an current owner whose private key
is known. It can easily run the algorithm OwnerProve to output a valid proof. That
is, the adversary has similar probability to break the ownership transfer protocol in
Type II attack. Hence, If an ownership transfer protocol is secure against the Type
II attack, it is also secure against the Type I attack.
4.5 Security Analysis
An ownership transfer protocol is secure if it is against two types of attacks defined
in Section 4.4.2. Without loss of generality, we analyse the security of proposed
protocol on the k-th level. According to Lemma 4.1, we only show the security
proof of the proposed protocol in Type II experiment.
Theorem 4.1. The proposed ownership transfer protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against
the Type II attack if the ECDH assumption is held.
Proof. Assume that there is an Type II adversary AII who can (r, s, n, ε)-break our
ownership transfer protocol. We can construct an algorithm B to solve the ECDH
problem. The algorithm B is given a ECDH instance (P, aP, bP ) and aims to output
abP . B sets up the Type II security experiment and interacts with AII . It answers
the oracles queries as follows.
• Setup: B sets g and U = aP as two generators of a group G. It gives public
parameter params to the adversary. Let F : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l be a public hash
function and S be a space of symmetric keys. B sets the supplier’s public key
pks = bP and manufacturer’s public key pkm = xP , where b, x are unknown to
B. B maintains a database D = {< IDt, ID, σ = (u, v, w), c = (y, F (σ)), rtP >},
a list LH1 = {< m = (R, ID), n >} and LH2 = {< m = (R,U, ID), z >} which
are initially empty. B adds the supplier < IDs, bP, 1, coin = 0 > into the list
LO = {< ID, pk, r, coin >}.
• H1 Query: On input query a message mi, where mi = (Ri, IDi), B outputs ni if
< mi, ni > appears in the list LH1. Otherwise, B randomly chooses ni
$← Z∗P and
sets H(mi) = ni. It outputs ni and adds the item < mi, ni > into the list LH1.
• H2 Query: On input query a message mi, where mi = (Ri, pki, IDi), B outputs zi
if < mi, zi > appears in the list LH2. Otherwise, B randomly selects zi
$← Z∗P and
sets H(mi) = zi. It outputs zi and adds the item < mi, zi > into the list LH2.
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• SetupOwner: On input query identity IDi, B outputs pki if IDi is in the list LO.
Otherwise, B tosses a coin and outputs,
coini = 0 : pki = ribP
coini = 1 : pki = riP
,
where ri
$← Z∗p, the probability is Pr[coin = 0] = ρ and Pr[coin = 1] = 1 − ρ.
Then, B adds < IDi, pki, ri, coini > into the list LO
• TagInit: On input query identity IDti , B outputs Ti if IDti is in the Database
D. Otherwise, B sets the supplier to be the owner of the tag. It randomly
chooses yi ∈ S and zi, si ∈ Z∗p. B calculates Ri = siP + zipks − pkm and sets
σ(ti,0) = (si, Ri, pkm) and H2(mi) = zi, where mi = (Ri, pkm, IDti). Then, B
computes the hash F (σ(ti,0)) and sets ci = (yi, F (σ(ti,0))). It outputs Ti and adds
< IDti , IDs, σ(ti,0), ci, · > into the database D and adds < mi, zi > into the list
LH2.
• Auth: On input query a tag Ti and an owner Ok, B submits the query to Auth
algorithm and returns the output (IDti , σ(ti,k)) if Ti is authenticated, otherwise
outputs ⊥.
• CorruptTag: On input query tag Ti, B finds the IDti from the database D and
outputs ci if < IDti , IDi, σi, ci > is in the database D. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
• CorruptOwner: On input query owner’s identity IDi, B looks up the list LO. If
< IDi, pki, ri, coin = 1 > appears in the list, B outputs ski = ri, outputs ⊥
otherwise.
• Rewrite: On input query tag Ti, a new state c′i and a key yi, B checks if the item
< IDti , ·, ·, ci = (yi, ·) > is in the database D. If it appears, B sets ci = c′i and
outputs 1, otherwise rejects and outputs 0.
• OwnerProve: On input query tag Ti, an identity IDk−1 of the previous owner and
an identity IDk of the current owner, B retrieves the key pairs (pkk−1, skk−1) and
(pkk, skk) from the list LO. If IDk−1 = IDs, B firstly issues the oracle query
Transfer(IDs, IDk, Ti). Depending on the value of coini, B computes as follows,
– Case 1 (coink−1 = 1∧ coink = 1): Taking as input private keys (skk−1, skk) and
the tag’s identity IDti , B runs the algorithm Transfer and OnwerProve.
– Case 2 (coink−1 = 0 ∨ coink = 0): We show the response in case of coink−1 =
0 ∧ coink = 0. The other two cases are similar and we ignore here. Firstly, B
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retrieves rtiP from the database D and sets v(ti,k) = rtiP . B randomly picks
si, zi
$← Z∗p and computes
Ri = siP − nipks − pkk − zipkk−1 − v(ti,k),
where < m′i = (v(ti,k), IDti), ni = H1(m
′
i) > appears in the list LH1. Then, B
sets mi = (Ri, pkk, IDti), H2(mi) = zi, w(ti,k) = Ri, u(ti,k) = siU . It adds the
item < mi, zi > into the list LH2.
Finally, B outputs σ(ti,k) = (u(ti,k), v(ti,k), w(ti,k)) and replaces the item< IDti , ·, ·, ·,
· > as < IDti , IDk, σ(ti,k), ci = (yi, F (σ(ti,k)), rtiP ) >.
• Transfer: On input query an identity IDk of current owner, an identity IDk+1
of new owner, and a tag Ti, B looks up the list LO and retrieves the item <
IDk, pkk, rk, coink >.
– If IDk = IDs, B randomly selects ni, si ∈ Z∗p and computes rtiP = siP −nipks,
such that H(m′i) = ni, m
′
i = (rtiP, IDti). It sets the item < IDti , ·, ·, ·, rtiP >
in D and adds < mi, ni > into the list LH1.
– If coink = 1, B outputs an authenticated transfer proof by running Transfer
algorithm.
– Otherwise, B randomly selects si, zi ∈ Z∗p, Rj
$← G and computes
Ri = siP − nipks − zipkk − v(t,k),
where < m′i = (v(ti,k), IDti), ni = H1(m
′
i) > appears in the list LH1. Then
B sets mi = (Ri, pkk+1, IDti), H2(mi) = zi, Σ(ti,k,k+1) = (si, Ri). It outputs
Σ(ti,k,k+1) and adds < mi, zi > into the list LH2.
• Forge: At the end of the experiment, AII succeeds if and only if he outputs a


















sk∗k 8 CorruptOwner(ID∗k) ∨ (Σ∗(t∗,k−1,k) 8 Transfer(ID∗t , ID∗k−1, ID∗k)∧
sk∗k−1 8 CorruptOwner(ID∗K−1))
and
σ∗(t∗,k) 8 OwnerProve(ID∗t , ID∗s , ID∗k−1, ID∗k).
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According to the forking lemma, B then uses the same random tape and a different





















i 6= z∗′i . Assume that items < ID∗k, pk∗k, r∗k, 1 >










(u∗(t∗,k) − u∗′(t∗,k)) ,
as the solution of ECDH problem. If we consider a different hash function H ′1,
such that H1(m
∗










i 6= n∗′i , B can similarly solve the ECDH
problem.
Probability. If AII (r, s, n, ε)-breaks our ownership transfer protocol, B can use
AII to solve the ECDH problem. We analyze the events E1 and E2 for B needed to
succeed as follows.
• E1: AII does not output ⊥ as a result of any of CorruptOwner queries.
• E2: AII outputs a valid forgery of ownership proof σ∗(t∗,k) and coink−1 = 0 appears
in LO.
B succeeds if both of E1 and E2 occurs. Let AII queries CorruptOwner at most s
times, we have,







In this chapter, we defined a new secure model of ownership transfer protocols. It
enhances the existing security models. We provided a definition of RFID ownership
transfer and proposed a secure ownership transfer protocol. It achieves a single
verification key to all the tags from an owner. The protocol satisfies all the security
requirements. A formal proof of our proposed protocol was given.
Chapter 5
Shared RFID Ownership Transfer
The ownership of an object can be represented by the ownership of the RFID tag
attached to the object. An ownership could be shared among different parties and
should be transferable. Although many RFID ownership transfer protocols were
proposed, a shared ownership transfer protocol remains a daunting task with ab-
sence of a trusted party. The challenge is also due to the physical restrictions of
(passive) tags, which usually have a small non-volatile memory of several hundred
bits; therefore asymmetric cryptography is not feasible. In this chapter, we introduce
the first shared ownership transfer protocol, which was proposed in [LMSV15b], in
the two-party system model. It requires merely hashing computations and has a
constant key size. We provide a formal definition of the security model of a shared
ownership transfer and prove that our protocol is secure.
5.1 Introduction
In practice, an RFID tag could be owned by two parties. As an example, two
people jointly own (and hence, share the ownership of) a car with an RFID tag.
Either of them can show the partial ownership of the car, but neither of them
can sell the car without the agreement of the other, since he/she is not enti-
tled to sell the car solely based on his/her will, without the other party’s con-
sent. Unfortunately, traditional RFID ownership transfer (ROT) protocols (e.g.,
[FMTRCRDF11a, EBM11, NSMSN11, FA07, LK06b]) does not capture this kind of
application. We call an RFID ownership transfer protocol, which supports multiple
owners as a shared RFID ownership transfer (SROT) protocol.
Intuitionally, an SROT protocol consists of two phases, namely ownership veri-
fication and ownership transfer. In the first phase, the current owners jointly prove
their ownership of the tag and the potential (new) owners verify the ownership proof.
If the verification outputs true, subsequently they request an ownership transfer in
the second phase. Upon the completion of a successful transfer, the current owners
become previous owners and cannot interpret any further communications of the tag
anymore. The new owners become current owners of the tag. The SROT protocol
provides forward secrecy, which means that the current owners cannot recover the
previous communication flows.
SROT protocols should possess three properties: secure ownership, exclusive
ownership and secure ownership transfer [vDMRV09]. These properties are also
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considered in ROT, but the attackers of SROT protocols are more powerful than
the attackers of ROT protocols, where a dishonest subgroup of current owners can
launch collusion attacks.
Passive RFID tags have a very limited computational power. Usually, a tag
can only cope with symmetric-key cryptography. The size of non-volatile memory
of a tag is normally only several hundred bits; therefore it is not possible to store
cryptographic keys for each owner. The power of tag is also not sufficient to support
a large memory. Furthermore, passive tags are not tamper-resistant. An attacker
can physically disclose the tag and read/write its internal state.
Related Work. Saito, Imamoto and Sakurai [SIS05] proposed an RFID ownership
transfer protocol in the two-party model, where the protocol assumes the current
owner and the new owner play an ownership transfer game with the tag. The
communication between owner and tag is assumed in a backward channel [WSRE03].
However, this assumption is questionable in that the adversary can eavesdrop the
channel in a sufficient short range [SIS05].
Another two-party ownership transfer protocol, based on [SM08], was introduced
by Song [Son08]. The protocol intends to satisfy privacy and security requirements
of ownership transfer. It reduces the cost of the tag’s computation and the tag’s
non-volatile memory. Unfortunately, several attacks were found [vDR08, RRG09,
PLHCT+10]. In addition, once a tag is compromised, its privacy and security are
totally broken.
An ownership transfer protocol using both symmetric and asymmetric cryptog-
raphy was put forth by Elkhiyaoui, Blass and Molva [EBM11]. Each owner has a
public/private key pair and a symmetric-key which is shared with the tag. During
a tag authentication process, the private key is used to decrypt the ciphertext re-
ceived from the tag. The tag will be accepted if the related plaintext matches that
on the database. A feature of this scheme is that the tag does not have to deal
with asymmetric computations. However, the privacy of the tag is vulnerable if the
adversary is one of the previous owners [Aby12].
Kapoor, Zhou and Piramuthu [KZP11] presented a solution for shared ownership
transfer with a TTP. A group of owners share the same authentication key with the
tag and the tag also shares a key, which is unknown to the owners, with the TTP.
During the period of ownership transfer, the TTP needs to interact with the tag and
update the tag key for a group of new owners. It is insecure against the corruption
attack described in Section 5.2. The authors also proposed an ownership sharing
protocol in the two-party model. Current owners share the ownership of the tag
with the new owners so that both current owners and new owners can access the tag
after a “transfer”. Since the owners share the same authentication key, a subgroup
of owners can launch a collusion attack against other owners.
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Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
We illustrate some significant issues related to shared tag ownership transfer in
Section 5.2. The notions and cryptographic tools used in this chapter are described
in Section 5.3. The system model and the definition of SROT protocols are presented
in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we describe the concrete construction of our protocol.
A security model of SROT protocol is given in Section 5.6, followed by the security
proof in Section 5.7. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Problem Statement
The ownership transfer protocols for RFID systems can be modelled using either a
TTP-based model or two-party model [SIS05]. In the TTP based model, the solution
is trivial, since the proof of ownership can be provided by the TTP, who can even
transfer the ownership to new owners on behalf of current owners. However, this
system model requires the availability of a TTP, which can interact with the owner
and the tag, during the ownership transfer (e.g., [MSW05, KP12]). This model is
undesired due to the scalability problem, because a TTP may need to simultaneously
participate in a number of ownership transfers. To eliminate this problem, we adopt
an extended two-party model. In this model, there are two types of owners, namely
the current owner and the new owner. Specifically, it does not require the presence
of TTP and supports multiple current/new owners.
In symmetric-key based single-owner ownership transfer protocols, the owner
shares an authentication key with the tag. In a multi-owner scenario, each valid
owner also shares an authentication key with the tag, while we found some new
security issues:
1. Collusion attack A trivial solution for multi-owner ownership transfer is that
owners share the same key with the tag. However, a dishonest owner can use
the knowledge of the key to change the secret of the tag without the agreement
of other owners, therefore, he can claim that he is the only owner of the tag.
We consider that at most n− 1 dishonest owners could launch such an attack,
where n is the number of owners.
2. Key size: To resist the collusion attack in the extended two-party model, each
owner can share a separate key with the tag. However, the number of keys to
be stored on the tag could become a burden to the tag.
3. Computational capability: An alternative solution to collusion attacks is to
adopt public key cryptography, which allows the keys to be accumulated into
a constant size. Unfortunately, it is too heavy for passive tags.
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IDt: identity of tag T .
IDi: identity of owner Oi.
IDct,i: identity of ith current owner of tag T .
IDnt,i: identity of ith new owner of tag T .
Oct,i: ith current owner of tag T .
Ont,i: ith new owner of tag T .
Oct : a set of current owners of tag T .
Ont : a set of new owners of tag T .
Nd,j: label of a node of a Merkle tree, where d is the
level of the node, j is the index from left to right.
Li,j: label of a leaf of a Merkle tree, where i is the index
of the leaf’s parent, j means the left/right child.
||: concatenation of two bit strings.
{0, 1}l: a space of bit strings where each element is l bits.
Oracle.Sign(m, ID): Sign oracle in [BLS04b] on input message m with a
specified identity ID.
Table 5.1: Notations of symbols.
4. Corruption attack Most (passive) tags are not tamper-resistant. A powerful
attacker can read the state of a tag [SSAQ02, Wei00]. It is particularly a
problem if only symmetric-key cryptography is applied.
5.3 Preliminaries
In our proposed protocol, we apply the BLS signature scheme [BLS04b] as a tool.
A brief description of the BLS signature is as follows.
• BLS.KeyGen: Randomly select x $← Z∗p and compute xP , where P is a generator
of a cyclic additive group G. The public/private key pair is (pk, sk) = (xP, x).
• BLS.Sig: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute signature σ = xH(m), where H
is a full-domain hash function defined in the BLS scheme.




The notations used in this chapter are depicted in Table 5.1.
5.4 System Model
In this section, we present the formal definition of SROT protocols in the extended
two-party model.
A shared RFID ownership transfer scheme defines the following components:
Tags, Previous Owners, Current Owners and New Owners. According to the knowledge
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of the tag’s secret, an owner can be considered as a previous owner, current owner
or new owner in different periods.
• Tags Ti: A low-cost device which has a small storage and restricted computational
capability. A tag stores its current state si in a non-volatile memory and can
handle hashing.
• Previous Owners Opt : O
p
t is a set of previous owners of the tag Ti. A previous
owner is one who previously had a partial ownership of the tag or its full ownership
if there is only one owner.
• Current Owners Oct : Oct is a set of current owners of the tag Ti. Each current
owner shares the same long-term authentication key K which allows Oct,i to gen-
erate temporary keys and prove its partial ownership and authenticate tag Ti. All
current owners can cooperatively transfer the full ownership to a new owner.
• New Owners Ont : Ont is a set of new owners who intend to obtain the full own-
ership of tag Ti from the current owners. A new owner O
n
t,i challenges all current
owners to get the proof of ownership of Ti and requires the full ownership transfer.
A new owner can update the long-term key once the transfer is completed.
A shared ownership transfer is run among the target tag, the current owners and
the new owners. Current owners initiate a tag with the agreement of a shared state.
A new owner sends the ownership transfer request and checks the current ownership
prior to playing the transfer. Since owners are normally powerful roles, a secure com-
munication channel is supported during the communication between owners. Our
scheme consists of nine algorithms: system setup (Setup), key generation (KeyGen),
tag initiation (TagInit), temporary key generation (TKGen), partial ownership prove
(PartProve), full ownership prove (FullProve), ownership verify (Verify), ownership
transfer (Transfer) and key update (KeyUpd). Current owners, new owners and the
tag run the above algorithms as described in Figure 5.1. The definition of these
algorithms are depicted as follows.
• Setup(λ) → params: On input a system security parameter λ, the algorithm
outputs a set of public system parameters params.
• KeyGen(params, IDt,Oct) → (K,Ku, {ski}, {Ai}): On input public system pa-
rameters params, an identity IDt of a tag and a set of current owners Oct , the
algorithm outputs a long-term authentication key K, an update key Ku, a set of
private keys {ski} and a set of auxiliary parameters {Ai} of proof of ownership.
It is run by the current owners.
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• TagInit(T,K,Ku, IDt)→ s: On input a tag T , a long-term authentication key K,
an update key Ku and an identity IDt of T , the algorithm outputs and stores the
state s on tag T . It is run by the current owners.
• TKGen(T,Oct,i, K,Ai)→ (L′i,1, KT ): On input a tag T , a current owner Oct,i, a long-
term authentication key K and auxiliary parameters Ai, the algorithm outputs a
pair (L′i,1, KT ), where KT is a temporary authentication key. It is run by the tag
and a current owner.
• PartProve(T,Oct,i,On, K, IDt, ski, Ai) → σ: On input a tag T , a current owner
Oct,i, a set of new owners On, a long-term authentication key K, a tag’s identity
IDt, a private key ski and auxiliary parameters Ai, the algorithm outputs a proof
σ of partial ownership of T . It is run by a tag, a current owner and the new
owners.
• FullProve(T,Oct ,On, K, IDt, {ski}, {Ai})→ Σ: On input a tag T , a set of current
owners Oct , a set of new owners On, a long-term authentication key K, an identity
IDt of T , a set of private keys {ski} and a set of auxiliary parameters {Ai}, the
algorithm outputs a full ownership proof Σ of the tag. It is run by a tag, the
current owners and the new owners.
• Verify(T,On, σ, IDt) → {0, 1}: On input a tag T , a proof σ of partial ownership
of T , a set of new owners On, an identity IDt of tag, the algorithm outputs 1 if
the proof is valid, outputs 0 otherwise. It is run by a tag and the new owners.
• Transfer(T,Oct ,On, K,Ku, {ski}, {Ai}) → (R,Ont ): On input a tag T , a set of
current owners Oct , a set of new owners On, a long-term authentication key K,
an update key Ku, a set of private keys {ski} and a set of auxiliary parameters
{Ai} of the proof of ownership, the algorithm outputs a record of full ownership
transfer R and transfers the ownership to new owners Ont . It is run by a tag, the
curent owners and new owners.
• KeyUpd(T,Oct , K,Ku, {ski}, {Ai}) → (K ′,K ′u, {sk′i}, {A′i}): On input a tag T , a
set of current owners Oct , a long-term authentication key K, an update key Ku,
a set of private keys {ski} and a set of auxiliary parameters {Ai} of the proof
of ownership, the algorithm outputs a new long-term authentication key K ′, a
new update key K ′u, a new set of private keys {sk′i} and a new set of auxiliary
parameters {A′i} of proof of ownership. It is run by a tag and the current owners.
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Figure 5.1: Ownership transfer scheme.
5.5 Proposed Protocol
The concrete construction of our protocol is presented in this section. The con-
struction in Section 5.5.1 shows the situation where there are only two owners for a
single tag, while our protocol is extendible to a current owner group which contains
1, 2, · · · , n owners.
5.5.1 Constructions
• Setup: Select two cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and H2 :
G2 × N × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. H : {0, 1}∗ → G1 is a hash function defined in the
BLS signature scheme. Let ê be a bilinear map such that ê : G1 × G2 → GT . P
is a random generator of group G2. The public system parameters params are
(H1, H2, H,G1,G2,GT , ê, P ).
• KeyGen: To simplify the algorithm, we show the key generation for two owners.
Each current owner Oct,i randomly chooses a key Ki, where Ki ∈ {0, 1}l, and run
the algorithm BLS.KeyGen to generate a key pair (aiP, ai), where ai ∈ Z∗p. Sets
the private key ski as (Ki, ai) and the verification key vki = aiP . O
c
t,i computes
two leaves Li,1 and Li,2, such that
Li,1 = H1(Ki), Li,2 = H2(vki, No, IDt),
where No ∈ N is the number of current owners and IDt is the identity of tag. Oct,i




= H2(vki, No, IDt).






Figure 5.2: Two-owner Merkle tree of tag’s long-term authentication key.
If the equation holds, the owner accepts the tuple, otherwise reject. Then, Oct,i
builds a Merkle tree M depicted in Figure 5.2, where K = H1(N1,1||N1,2), and
computes an update key Ku = L1,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ LNo,1. Let Pi be the sibling path
of Li,1 and set auxiliary parameter Ai = (vki, No,Pi,M). It outputs a tuple
(K,Ku, {ski}, {Ai}). Although Figure 5.2 shows a key construction for two own-
ers, the algorithm can generate a key for any number of owners. Depending on
the value of No, there are two cases:
– No = 2
n, n ∈ N: Each owner generates a Merkle tree on input a set of leaves
{(Li,1, Li,2)}, where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2n.
– 2n < No < 2
n+1, n ∈ N: Each owner generates the common leaves as follows
Li,1 = H1(IDt), Li,2 = H2(P,No, IDt),
where i = No + 1, · · · , 2n+1. We call such a pair of common leaves (Li,1, Li,2)
as an ownership pad. Note that there is no owner occupies an ownership pad.
• TagInit: Set the tag’s state s = (K,Ku, IDt) and store s in the tag. Any current
owner can initiate the tag while other owners need to verify the state. If any
owner complains that s is not as expected, the initialization should be run again.
• TKGen: To generate a temporary authentication key KT , a current owner sends an
encrypted sibling path to tag T . If the provided sibling path Pi = {Li,1, Li,2, N1,j, K},
where j = 1 or j = 2, is valid, the tag challenges a random number to the owner.
Then, the current owner creates and responds a new key KT to the tag. T accepts
the key if the response is authenticated. The algorithm outputs a pair (L′i,1, KT ).
Details are depicted in Figure 5.3.
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Oct,i(K,Ai) T (K)
n1 = Li,1 ⊕K, n2 = Li,2 ⊕K




= H1(H1(n1 ⊕K||n2 ⊕K)||n3 ⊕K)
r
$← {0, 1}l, m = r ⊕K, L′i,2 = n2 ⊕K
m←−−−−−−−−−−−





m′ = L′i,1 ⊕K
σ = H1(m′||r||KT )
m′,σ−−−−−−−−−−−→




Set KT = K
′
Figure 5.3: Temporary key generation.







σ = (L′i,1, vki, Vi, No, IDt)
σ−−−−−→
Store σ
Figure 5.4: Partial ownership proof.
• PartProve: To prove a partial ownership of a tag, a new owner Oni challenges a
current owner Oct,i. There are two phases in partial ownership proof. In phase 1,
Oct,i runs the algorithm TKGen with target tag T and outputs (L
′
i,1, KT ). KT is a
one-time authentication key which is erased from the tag after the next successful
tag authentication. In phase 2, upon receiving a challenge m, Oct,i generates a
signature by using BLS.Sign. The algorithm outputs a partial ownership proof
σ. Details are depicted as in Figure 5.4.
• FullProve: To prove the full ownership of the tag, all owners individually prove
the partial ownership by running PartProve algorithm.
• Verify: To verify a proof of partial ownership of a tag, the new owner firstly
checks the validity of the signature. If it is valid, the new owner computes the key
KT and uses it to authenticate the tag. The partial ownership is accepted if the
authentication succeeds and outputs 1; otherwise rejects and outputs 0. Details of
partial ownership verification is described in Figure 5.5. If the new owner requests
to check the full ownership, he should verify all the partial ownerships. If proofs
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On(m, vki, Vi, L
′















Figure 5.5: Partial ownership verification.
Oct,i(Ki,Pi,K′,K′u) T (K,Ku,Kv , U)
n1 = Ki ⊕K, n2 = Li,2 ⊕K
n3 = N1,j ⊕K, s1 = K′ ⊕K
s2 = K′u ⊕K, σ = H1(s2||K′)
n1,n2,n3,s1,s2,σ−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Li,1 = H1(n1 ⊕K)
K′ = s1 ⊕K, K′u = s2 ⊕K










set U = U ⊕ Li,1
If U = Ku,
set K = K′, Ku = K′u, U,Kv = 0
Keep both (K,K′)
Figure 5.6: Key update protocol.
are valid, new owners accept and output 1, otherwise reject and output 0.
• Transfer: To transfer the full ownership to new owners, current owners run the
algorithm KeyUpd on input (K,Ku, {Ki}, {Ai}) and collect outputs (K ′, K ′u,
{K ′i}, {A′i}). Then each current owner Oct,i securely transfers a tuple (K ′, K ′u,
K ′i, A
′
i) to new owners. We denote R is a record of full ownership transfer, where
R = (K ′, K ′u, {K ′i}, {A′i}).
• KeyUpd: To update a long-term authentication key of a tag, all current owners
need to respectively interact with the tag. During the key update, we assume
that a communication between the tag and an owner is in an isolated environment
so that no other current owners can eavesdrop the communication flows. First,
current owners generate a new long-term authentication key K ′ and an update key
K ′u by running the algorithm KeyGen. Then, they run the key update algorithm
as shown in Figure 5.6.
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A current owner maintains both the old key K and the new key K ′ since: 1)
it allows the current owner to authenticate the tag during the period when other
owners have not agreed the update and 2) it can also resist the desynchronized
attack.
5.5.2 Discussion
In the temporary key generation, a current owner should present a valid sibling path
to the tag. For n owners, a tag only needs to do blog2 nc+ 1 hashing computations
in the path checking. At the initiation, a tag stores two keys, namely a long-term
authentication key K and an update key Ku. During the protocol execution, a
tag stores two more keys Kv and U . Hence, there are at most four keys, which
could be 128-bit [Sha08] each, stored in a non-volatile memory. Table 5.2 shows the
computaional cost and the key size of proposed protocol.
We generate a public/private key pair in algorithm KeyGen, while an owner could
use the same public/private key pair for all his tags. Hence, a record of ownership
transfer does not contain the private key of owner. The applied BLS signature
scheme is substitutable by any other secure digital signature schemes.
The ownership transfer can be cancelled if any owner denies the request. It is
unnecessary to let all owners simultaneously transfer the ownership. Instead they
could handle the transfer separately in any sequence.
Table 5.2: Storage and computational cost on tags.
H: hash computation; l: length of a bit-string.
Number of Temp. Key Part. Ownership Key Key
Owners Generation Verification Updating Size
1 Owner 3H 1H 4H 2l
n Owners blog2 nc+ 3H 1H blog2 nc+ 4H 2l
5.6 Security Models of Shared Ownership Trans-
fer Protocols
The security challenges of SROT protocols are different from the security challenges
of traditional ownership transfer protocols, where each tag has a single owner at
one time. A significant security concern beyond the normal (single-owner) RFID
ownership transfer protocol is the collusion attack. That is, the attack is mounted
by a subset of current owners. Since each owner possesses a part of the secret of tag,
we argue that the collusion attack is stronger than attacks which are attempted by
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adversaries who are not current owners. Thus, we only consider the collusion-style
attacks in this section.
5.6.1 Adversaries and Oracles
We define a set of oracles and two collusion-style adversaries who respectively aim at
two different goals. In the particular attack, the ability of an adversary is regarded
as the actions executed by oracle calls.
Definition 5.1 (Oracles). The adversary plays with a challenger by given public
information of the system and the following oracles.
• SetupOwner(IDo) → O: Taking as input an owner’s identity IDo, it creates an
owner O.
• TagInit(IDt, {IDoi })→ ({(vki, ski)}, T ): Taking as input a tag’s identity IDt and
a set of identities {IDoi } of current owners, it runs the algorithm KeyGen to output
a set of key pairs {(vki, ski)}, and run the algorithm TagInit to output the tag T .
• TKGen(IDt, IDo)→ (L′i,1, KT ): Taking as input a tag’s identity IDt and a current
owner IDo, it outputs a pair (L′i,1, KT ) and stores the temporary authentication
key KT into the tag.
• CorruptTag(IDt) → s: Taking as input a tag T ’s identity IDt, it outputs the
complete internal state s of the tag. Note that the oracle does not destroy the tag
and the tag is available in future communications.
• CorruptOwner(IDo, IDt)→ (sk,A): Taking as input an owner’s identity IDo and
a tag’s identity IDt, it outputs the private key sk and the auxiliary parameters A
of owner of tag T .
• PartProve(IDo, IDt,mi) → σ: Taking as input an owner’s identity IDo, a tag’s
identity IDt and a challenge mi, it outputs a partial ownership proof σ of the tag.
• KeyUpd(IDti) → {0, 1}: Taking as input a tag’s identity IDti, it updates the keys
of the tag and the keys of tag’s current owners.
• Transfer(IDt, {IDc}, {IDn}) → {IDn}: Taking as input a tag’s identity IDt, a
set of identities {IDc} of current owners and a set of identities {IDn} of new
owners, it transfers the full ownership of tag T to new owners.
Definition 5.2 (Type I and Type II adversary). The adversary is defined by the
oracle calls and the goal of the experiment.
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• Type I Adversary(AI): is allowed to query all above oracles except PartProve. This
adversary is assumed that it has passed the full ownership verification. It aims at
transferring the full ownership of the tag to new owners without agreement of all
current owners.
• Type II Adversary(AII): is allowed to query all above oracles except Transfer. It
aims at outputting a partial ownership proof of a target tag that it cannot be
detected during the ownership verification.
5.6.2 Security Models
The security model of shared ownership transfer protocols is similar to the security
model of conventional ownership transfer protocols defined in [LMSV13]. The main
difference between the two models is that the adversary of our security model can
launch collusion attacks when some of current owners might be dishonest. There
are two security models defined in two different experiments, respectively. In an
experiment, the ability of a particular adversary is captured by a set of oracle calls
and rules of interactions. Each experiment is played between the adversary and the
challenger where the adversary issues oracle queries and challenger outputs simula-
tion of oracles. We denote the security parameters r, s, n and S, such that r is the
number of owner initiations, s is the number of oracle calls, n is the number of tag
initiations and S is the shared RFID ownership transfer system. The security of a
SROT protocol is evaluated under both experiments and we say it is insecure if any
adversary succeeds in either experiment. Notice that the experiments in this section
are defined for the protocols which do not employ trusted third parties.
5.6.2.1 Security Against Type I Attack
Type I adversary is a person who attempts to cooperate with at most n− 1 current
owners to transfer the full ownership of a tag without agreement of at least one
honest owner. AI interacts with the challenger via oracle calls and outputs a record
R∗ of the transfer. AI succeeds if the record is valid. The details are described as
experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n] in Figure 5.7.
Definition 5.3. An SROT protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type I attack,
if any PPT adversary AI who succeeds in the experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n] has
advantage
Pr[success← ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in λ.
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Experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [λ, r, s, n]:
• Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm Setup to generate public param-
eters params and returns to AI .
• Phase 1(Learning):
– AI can query oracles SetupOwner, TagInit, TKGen, CorruptTag, Corrup-
tOwner, KeyUdp and Transfer to the challenger.
– AI outputs two sets T = {T1, . . . , Tn} and O = {O1, . . . , Or}, which are
tags and owners.
• Phase 2(Forge):
– AI submits a target tag T ∗ ∈ T, a set of current owners Oc∗t of T ∗.
– AI queries oracles TKGen, CorruptTag, CorruptOwner, KeyUdp and Transfer
to C.
– AI outputs a record R∗ of full ownership transfer.
Exp outputs success if it satisfies the following conditions:
• Transfer(T ∗,Oc∗t ,On∗) 9 (On∗t , R∗)
• ∃ Oc∗t,i ∈ Oc∗t , s.t. CorruptOwner(ID∗i , T ∗) 9 (sk∗i , A∗i )
• KeyUpd(T ∗,On∗t , K∗, K∗u, {sk∗i }, {A∗i })→ (K∗′, K∗′u , {sk∗′i }, {A∗′i })
Figure 5.7: Type I security experiment of shared ownership transfer protocols.
5.6.2.2 Security Against Type II Attack
Type II adversary is a person who attempts to cooperate with at most n− 1 current
owners to prove partial ownership of a tag. AII interacts with the challenger via
oracle calls and outputs a partial proof σ∗ of ownership of target tag. AII succeeds
if the proof is valid. The details are described as in experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n]
in Figure 5.8.
Definition 5.4. An SROT protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type II attack,
if any PPT adversary AII who succeeds in the experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n] has
advantage
Pr[success← ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n]] ≤ ε,
where ε is negligible in λ.
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Experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [λ, r, s, n]:
• Setup: The challenger C runs the algorithm Setup to generate public param-
eters params and returns to AII .
• Phase 1(Learning):
– AII can query oracles SetupOwner, TagInit, TKGen, CorruptTag, Corrup-
tOwner, KeyUdp and PartProve to the challenger.
– AII outputs two sets T = {T1, . . . , Tn} and O = {O1, . . . , Or}, which are
tags and owners.
• Phase 2(Forge):
– AII submits a target tag T ∗ ∈ T, a set of current owners Oc∗t of T ∗.
– AII queries oracles TKGen, CorruptTag, CorruptOwner, KeyUdp and Part-
Prove to C.
– AII outputs ID∗i ’s partial proof σ∗ of ownership.
Exp outputs success if it satisfies the following conditions:
• ∃ Oc∗t,i ∈ Oc∗t , s.t. CorruptOwner(IDo∗i , IDt∗i ) 9 (sk∗i , A∗i )
• PartProve(IDo∗i , IDt∗i ,m∗i ) 9 σ∗
• Verify(T ∗,On∗, σ∗, IDt∗i )→ 1
Figure 5.8: Type II security experiment of shared ownership transfer protocols.
5.7 Security Analysis
A SROT protocol is secure if it is against two types of attacks defined in Section 5.6.
We analyse the security of our proposed protocol in both of above two experiments.
Without loss of generality, the security proofs in this section is in the case where
the number of shared owners is k, such that k ≥ 2.
Theorem 5.1. Our SROT protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type I attack if
the hash function H1 is preimege resistant.
Proof. Suppose that there is a Type I adversary AI who can (r, s, n, ε)-break our
shared ownership transfer protocol in experiment ExpsecureAI ,S [r, s, n]. We can con-
struct an algorithm B, which is run by the challenger, to break the preimege secu-
rity of underlying hash function H1 of the protocol. B sets up the Type I security
experiment and interacts with AI . It answers the oracle queries as follows.
• Setup: B sets g as a generator of a group G2. Let two hash functions be H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and H2 : G2 × N× {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. It gives public parameters
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params to the adversary. B maintains a database D = {< IDo, IDt, c, sk, A >},
which is initially empty.
• SetupOwner: On input query an identity IDoi , B creates an owner Oi if the item
< IDoi , ·, ·, ·, · > is not in the database D and adds < IDoi , ·, ·, ·, · > into the
database.
• TagInit: On input query a tag’s identity IDti and a set of identities {IDoi } of
owners, B runs the algorithm KeyGen to output (Ki, Kui , {ski}, {Ai}) and sets
the tag’s state as ci = (Ki, Kui). It adds items {< IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai >} in to
the database D.
• TKGen: On input query a tag’s identity IDti and an owner’s identity IDoi , if
the item < IDoi , ID
t
i , ·, ·, · > does not exist on the database, B returns ⊥, oth-
erwise retrieves the item. B randomly chooses L′i,1 ∈ {0, 1}l and computes
KT = H1(L
′
i,1||Li,2). B sets the tag’s state ci = (Ki, Kui , KT ) and returns




i , ci, ski, Ai > in D.
• CorruptTag: On input query a tag’s identity IDti , B retrieves the item < IDoi , IDti ,
ci, ski, Ai > if it appears in the database. Otherwise, B firstly runs the algorithm
TagInit. It returns ci to the adversary.
• CorruptOwner: On input query an owner’s identity IDoi and a tag’s identity IDti ,
B returns ⊥ if < IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai > is not in database, otherwise, B retrieves
it and returns (ski, Ai) to adversary.
• KeyUpd: On input query a tag’s identity IDti , if IDti does not exist on the
database, B returns 0. Otherwise, B retrieves all items such that < ·, IDti , ·, ·, · >
from D. Then, it runs the algorithm KeyUdp to output new keys (K ′, K ′, {K ′i},
{A′i}). B updates the items and returns 1.
• Transfer: On input query a tag’s identity IDti , a set of identities {IDci} of current
owner and a set of identities IDo of owners, B retrieves items < IDci , IDti , ·, ·, · >
and sets the full ownership transfer record Ri = (Ki, Kui ,
{ski}, {Ai}), then deletes all such items. B runs the algorithm TagInit on input
new owners’ identities {IDoi } and tag’s identity IDti and sets {IDni } = {IDoi }. B
returns (Ri, {IDni }) to the adversary.
• Forge: In the end of the experiment, the adversary AI succeeds if he outputs
a target tag’s full ownership transfer record R∗ = (K∗, U∗, {sk∗i }, {A∗i }) which
satisfies the conditions:
1. Transfer(T ∗,Oc∗t ,On∗) 9 (On∗t , R∗);
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2. ∃Oc∗t,i ∈ Oc∗t , s.t.CorruptOwner(ID∗i , T ∗) 9 (sk∗i , A∗i );
3. KeyUpd(T ∗,On∗t , K∗, K∗u, {sk∗i }, {A∗i })→ (K∗′, K∗′u , {sk∗′i }, {A∗′i }).
Then, B can use AI to find the preimage of hash function H1 since AI success
implies that he outputs a preimage K∗i ∈ sk∗i , such that H1(K∗i ) = L∗i,1, L∗i,1 ∈ A∗i .
It is contradicted with the preimage resistant assumption of H1. Therefore, the
proposed protocol is secure against the Type I attack.
Theorem 5.2. Our SROT protocol is (r, s, n, ε)-secure against the Type II attack if
the BLS signature is secure and the Merkle-tree lemma holds.
Proof. Suppose that there is a Type II adversary AII who can (r, s, n, ε)-break our
shared ownership transfer protocol in experiment ExpsecureAII ,S [r, s, n]. We can con-
struct an algorithm B, which is run by the challenger, to forge a valid instance of
the BLS signature or to output a valid sibling path of the Merkle tree, such that it
does not appear in the tree. B sets up the Type II security experiment and interacts
with AII . It simulates and answers oracle queries as follows.
• Setup: B sets the simulation parameters as in the simulation of the BLS signature
in [BLS04b]. Then, B chooses two hash functions, such that H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l,
H2 : G2 × N × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l. It gives public parameters to the adversary
and maintains a database D = {< IDo, IDt, c, sk, A, coin = {0, 1} >}, which is
initially empty.
• SetupOwner: On input query an identity IDoi , if IDoi does not appear in the
database D, B creates an owner Oi and adds the item < IDoi , ·, ·, ·, ·, · > into D.
Otherwise, B ignores the request.
• TagInit: On input query a tag’s identity IDti and a set of current identities
{IDoi } of current owners, B randomly picks an index i ∈ n, where n is the
number of submitted current owners. For the ith owner, B firstly runs the al-
gorithm Oracle.Setup to output a public/private key pair (vki, ski). Then, B fol-
lows the algorithm KeyGen, except the public/private key generation, to output
(Ki, Kui , {ski}, {Ai}). B sets the tag’s state ci = (Ki, Kui), coini = 0, and adds
{< IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai, 0 >} into D. For other n−1 owners, B runs the algorithm
KeyGen to output (Kj, Kuj , {skj}, {Aj}) and sets the tag’s state cj = ci, coinj = 1,
where j ∈ n, j 6= i. It adds items such that {< IDoj , IDtj, cj, skj, Aj, 1 >} into the
database D.
• TKGen: On input query a tag’s identity IDti and an owner’s identity IDoi , if
the item < IDoi , ID
t
i , ·, ·, ·, · > does not in D, B returns ⊥, otherwise retrieves
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the item. B then randomly picks L′i,1 ∈ {0, 1}l and computes KT = H1(L′i,1||Li,2).
Then, B sets the tag’s state ci = (Ki, Kui , KT ) and returns (L′i,1, KT ) to adversary
and updates < IDoi , ID
t
i , ci, ·, ·, · > in D.
• CorruptTag: On input query a tag’s identity IDti , if IDti is not in D, B runs the
algorithm TagInit first. Then, B retrieves the item < IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai, coini
> and returns ci to the adversary.
• CorruptOwner: On input query an owner’s identity IDoi and a tag’s identity IDti ,
B returns ⊥ if < IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai, coini > does not appear in the database D.
If coini = 0, B aborts the simulation and returns ⊥, otherwise, B retrieves the
item and returns (ski, Ai) to adversary.
• KeyUpd: On input query a tag’s identity IDti , if IDti does not exist on the
database, B returns 0. Otherwise, B retrieves all items such that < ·, IDti , ·, ·, ·,
· > from D. Then, it runs the algorithm KeyUdp to output new keys (K ′, K ′, {K ′i
}, {A′i}). B updates the items and returns 1.
• PartProve: On input query an owner’s identity IDoi , a tag’s identity IDti and a
challenge mi, B retrieves < IDoi , IDti , ci, ski, Ai, coini > if it appears in D. If
coin = 1, B runs the algorithm BLS.Sign to output a signature Vi, otherwise, B
submits (mi, ID
o
i ) to the oracle Oracle.Sign and obtains an output signature Vi.
Then, B calls the oracle TKGen to get (L′i,1, KT ). It sets σi = (L′i,1, vki, Vi, No, IDti)
as a partial ownership proof of IDoi and returns it to adversary.
• Forge: At the end of the experiment, the adversary AII succeeds if he can output








i ) which satisfies
the conditions:
1. ∃Oc∗t,i ∈ Oc∗t , s.t.CorruptOwner(IDo∗i , IDt∗i ) 9 (sk∗i , A∗i );




i ) 9 σ∗;
3. Verify(T ∗,On∗, σ∗, IDt∗i )→ 1.
Then, B can use AII to output a sibling path of Merkle tree M∗ since a valid
forgery of K∗T implies that AII can output a valid sibling path to convince the tag.
Otherwise, it can output a valid forgery of BLS signature and solve its underlying










i , 0 > in
the database. It is contradicted with the Merkle-tree lemma [HHPS11] and the
security of BLS signature. Hence, the proposed protocol is secure against the
Type II attack.
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5.8 Conclusion
A shared ownership transfer protocol in the extended two-party system model has
been proposed assuming the absence of a TTP. Our protocol only requires a tag to
store keys with a constant size in order to prove the ownership of a group of owners.
We provided the formal definition of shared ownership transfer and proved that our
protocol is secure against various attacks including collusion attacks.
Chapter 6
Authorized RFID Authentication
In a traditional RFID application, the system is considered to be controlled by a
single party who maintains all the secret information. However, in some practical
scenarios, RFID tags, readers and servers could be operated by different parties.
Although the private information should not be shared, the system should allow
a valid tag to be authenticated by a legal reader. The challenge in designing the
system is preserving the tag and the reader’s privacy. In this chapter, we propose
a novel concept of authorized RFID authentication (ARA), which was presented in
[LMS+14]. The proposed protocols allow the tag to be merely identifiable by an
authorized reader and the server cannot reveal the tag’s identity during the reader-
server interaction. We provide a formal definition of privacy and security models of
authorized authentication protocols under the strong and weak notions and propose
three provably secure protocols.
6.1 Introduction
A typical RFID system is established by a single party who initiates the secret keys.
To identify a tag, a reader communicates with the tag and sends the tag’s response
to the back-end server. The server checks the tag’s identity by using the shared keys
and informs the reader whether the tag is valid.
Many RFID authentication protocols [SM08, Tsu06, JW05, HB01] have been
proposed to preserve the tag privacy in conventional systems. These protocols as-
sume that a reader and a server are held by a single entity. However, in some
practical scenarios, we found that tag, reader and server are relatively independent,
and hence, the existing solutions of RFID authentication protocols are deemed to
be impractical. Consider the following scenario.
In an privileged membership club, there are sole facilities provided for their
members exclusively, such as restaurant, massage and sauna. Each of these facilities
is operated by different business owners, who are paid by the owner of the club,
who is also taking membership fees from its members. Hence, these facilities will
allow exclusive club members only to access them and enjoy the service provided.
In order to provide this benefit to the members, the club issues a membership
card that is used to identify each member’s identity. Nevertheless, to ensure the
privacy of each member, the member would like to ensure that his/her identity
will remain private whenever he/she is enjoying those services. Otherwise, these
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facilities will not be attractive to the members, if they have to sacrifice their privacy
to trade for the facilities offered. In addition, the facilities are also expected to
prevent the sensitive customer information from being exposed to the club, even
though the members are indeed paying the membership fee to the club. The current
solution may sound feasible to be implemented with an RFID system. Nevertheless,
the requirement to maintain both privacy and accountability at the same time is
seemingly contradictory.
The challenge in designing authentication protocols for the above scenario is the
tag and the reader’s privacy. A strong tag privacy prevents a tag being linked in two
different sessions even if the tag is completely corrupted. Most previous protocols
consider the tag untraceability under the assumption that the server is honest and
the reader can authenticate all the tags. However, it is suitable to our scenario
where the server and the reader are relatively independent. The adversary who
plays as an authorized reader can attempt to disclose a tag which is not intended to
be identifiable. The reader’s privacy is considered as whether the back-end server
can reveal the tag’s identity during the protocol run. Specifically, the tag is merely
identifiable by the authorized reader rather than the server; otherwise the server can
obtain the merchant’s (reader) client information and trace the tag. Unfortunately,
to the best of our knowledge, existing protocols ignore this requirement and there
is no protocol that cater the reader’s privacy. Therefore, we need new models to
evaluate a protocol’s privacy and a novel protocol is desired.
Tag impersonation is one of crucial security problems of authentication proto-
cols. Normally, it is hard to resist this attack if the tag is compromised. However,
in our system, the untrusted server can cheat the reader without corrupting the tag
by using the tag’s shared secret. Hence, the protocol needs to prevent abuse of the
shared information by the server.
Related Work. Vaudenay [Vau07] proposed a strong privacy model which is con-
sidered as the most complete one. The privacy of an RFID tag authentication
protocol is classified in several levels which are strong, destructive, forward and
weak. Each level is with respect to a different adversary with a set of oracle calls. A
strong adversary is allowed to corrupt a tag and continues future interactions with
the compromised tag.
Another strong privacy model was introduced by Juels and Weis [JW07]. The
model is based on the IND-CCA2 experiment and the adversary of the experiment
aims to distinguish two different tags. Later, Hermans, Pashalidis, Vercautern and
Preneel [HPVP11] proposed a new practical RFID privacy model. They defined the
“left” and “right” world that an adversary needs to decide which world is simulated
in the experiment. Many other RFID privacy models (e.g., [CCEG10, BLdMT09,
NSMSN08, DLYZ10]) are also presented in the literature.
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Nithyanand, Tsudik and Uzun [NTU10, NTU11] considered the reader revoca-
tion problem in the public key infrastructure based RFID system. This problem
is prominent as the (passive) tag could not check the time information during the
protocol execution. The proposed solution requires a tag to equip a date display
and a user checks during the certificate verification.
Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 6.2, we define the system model and Section 6.3 describes the concrete
constructions of three ARA protocols. We introduce the privacy and security mod-
els in Section 6.4 and provide the formal privacy and security proof of proposed
protocols in Section 6.5. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2 System Model
In this section, we describe the entities of the ARA system and the formal definition
of ARA protocols. The system defines the following entities: Tags, Readers and
Servers.
• Tag Ti: Has a small storage and is not temper-resistant. It stores the keys in
a non-volatile memory and requires capabilities to perform hash computations
and ECC computations depends on the protocols. It can be considered as a
membership card held by the member who initiates the tag’s secret key.
• Reader Ri: A powerful device which is authorized by a server to authenticate a
group of tags with the given period key. Ri is controlled by a merchant who has
an individual back-end server.
• Server Si: Si provides the membership registration for customers and aids the
reader to authenticate a tag. The server can authorize the reader to authenticate
a group of tags and revoke the reader when it is no longer qualified.
The ARA protocol is executed by tag, reader and server. In the system, a server
creates a tag and publishes a set of public information, such as the public key of
the server. The member initiates the tag with the server’s information and the
keys which are chosen by himself. The public key of the tag is given to the server
when the card is activated, while the private key is unknown to the server. To
authorize a reader, the server generates a period key for the reader. During the tag
authentication, the reader needs to cooperate with the server. However, the server
cannot discover the identity of the tag which is involved in the session. To revoke a
reader, the server can let the reader’s period key expire.
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Our protocol consists of four algorithms: server key generation (ServerKeyGen),
tag key generation (TagKeyGen), reader authorization (ReaderAuth) and tag authen-
tication (Auth). The definition of algorithms are depicted as follows.
• ServerKeyGen(k)→ (PK, SK): Taking as input a security parameter k, it gener-
ates the server’s public/private key pair (PK, SK).
• TagKeyGen(T, k) → (pk, sk): Taking as input a security parameter k for the tag
T , it outputs T ’s public key pk and private key sk.
• ReaderAuth({pki},TR, sk, R) → (rsk, rpk): Taking as input a set of public keys
{pki} of tags TR, the server’s private key SK and a reader R, it outputs a secret
rsk and the reader’s period key rpk. rpk is given to the reader and rsk is given to
the server. For each run of this algorithm, the reader’s current keys are revoked.
• Auth(sk, PK, rsk, rpk)→ {T,⊥}: The tag takes as input a private key sk and a
server’s public key PK, a reader takes as input a period key rpk and the server
takes as input a secret rsk, it outputs T if the tag is authenticated, ⊥ otherwise.
6.3 Proposed Protocols
The concrete constructions of proposed ARA protocols are presented in this section.
The protocol in Section 6.3.1 is based on symmetric-key cryptography and it achieves
basic requirements of ARA protocols. Section 6.3.2 shows the drawbacks of protocol
1 and describe an ECC-based solution which the server handles most computations
of the protocol execution. Optionally, Section 6.3.3 introduces a protocol which
only requires constant communication cost during the authentication and provides
the false output detection. As an overview, Table 6.1 summarizes the security and
privacy properties of three protocols along with communication cost, computational
efficiency and tag capabilities.
We define three cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, H3, where H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}l, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G and employ the pairing group
(P,Q, p, ê,G,GT ). G is an additive cyclic group and GT is a multiplicative group of
the same prime order p. P,Q are two generators of group G. The map ê : G×G→
GT is a symmetric bilinear mapping.
6.3.1 Protocol 1
Our proposed protocol 1 is based on symmetric-key cryptography. It only requires
a tag to compute hash values. The protocol achieves basic privacy requirements of
ARA protocols with a relaxed condition. The protocol is presented in Figure 6.1.
CHAPTER 6. AUTHORIZED RFID AUTHENTICATION 82
Forward Backward Reader Tag Unfo- Constant Constant Tag
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× H,PK
Table 6.1: Comparison of proposed protocols and tag capabilities.√
: the protocol achieves this property; ×: the protocol cannot provide this property; :
the protocol achieves this property without tag corruption operations; H: requires hash
computations; PK: requires ECC computations. Note that tag unforgeability is against
a malicious server who cannot corrupt tags.
Tag T Reader R Server S
(x) (TR, γ) (R, γ, {(xi, Ti) : Ti ∈ TR})
s,γ←−−−−−−− s ∈ {0, 1}l
a ∈ {0, 1}l
C = H1(x, a, s, γ)
a,C−−−−−−−→
a,s−−−−−−−−−−−→∀Ti ∈ TR, computes
C′i = H1(xi, a, s, γ)
Outputs Ti if
{(Ti,C′i):Ti∈TR}←−−−−−−−−−−−
C ∈ {(Ti, C′i) : Ti ∈ TR}
Figure 6.1: Authorized RFID authentication protocol 1.
• ServerKeyGen: The server generates a key space K.
• TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ K and sets (pk, sk) = (·, x). The
secret key sk is stored in the tag and given to the server.
• ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags TR, the
server randomly chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}l, and sets (rpk, rsk) = (γ, γ).
• Auth:To authenticate a tag, the tag, reader and server interact as follows
1. The reader randomly chooses s ∈ {0, 1}l and send (s, γ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (s, γ), the tag selects a ∈ {0, 1}l and sends the reader the
response (a, C), where C = H1(x, a, s, γ).
3. Upon receiving the tag’s response C, the reader sends (a, s) to the server.
4. Upon receiving (a, s), the server retrieves (TR, γ). For each Ti ∈ TR, the
server computes C ′ = H1(xi, a, s, γ) then sends the reader a set {(Ti, C ′i) :
Ti ∈ TR}.
5. Finally, the reader outputs Ti if C ∈ {(Ti, C ′i) : Ti ∈ TR}.
6.3.2 Protocol 2
In the ARA system model, tag, reader and server are relatively independent. The
key of a tag is expected to be unknown by the server since the server could abuse
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the key to forge the tag. It is difficult to prevent forging a tag by the server from
using symmetric-key based protocols. A trivial solution may be that the tag sends
a signed nonce to the reader. However, in this case, the tag’s response is publicly
verifiable that an adversary can identify the tag by exhaustive public key search.
Thus, the tag’s identity needs to be concealed and only an authorized reader is
entitled to reveal. We then present Protocol 2 with ECC to tackle this issue. The
protocol is presented in Figure 6.2.
• ServerKeyGen: The server randomly picks α ∈ Z∗p, and sets the public/private key
pair (PK, SK) = (αP, α).
• TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p, and computes the tag’s public
and private keys (pk, sk) = (xP, x). (P, sk, pk, PK) are stored in the tag and pk
is given to the server.
• ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags TR, the
server randomly chooses γ ∈ Z∗p, and sets (rpk, rsk) as
rpk = {γ, (Ti, xiP ) : Ti ∈ TR}, rsk = (γ, α).
The server stores (R, rsk,TR) and sends rpk to the reader R.
• Auth: To authenticate a tag, the tag, reader and server communicate as follows.
1. The reader randomly selects B ∈ G and sends (B, γ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (B, γ) from the reader, the tag randomly chooses r ∈ Z∗p,
and computes (w, s, C1, C2, C3). It sends (C1, C2, C3) as the response to the
reader. Note that C1 is to assist reader identify a tag and hide the value s,
otherwise the tag’s response is publicly verifiable.
3. Upon receiving (C1, C2, C3), the reader forwards (B,C3) to the server.
4. Upon receiving the message (B,C3) from the reader R, for each Ti ∈ TR, the
server computes (w′, vi, Ui). Then the server replies {(Ti, vi, Ui) : Ti ∈ TR}.
5. Finally, the reader outputs Ti if C1 = Ui and ê(C2, (xi + vi)P ) = ê(P, P ),
otherwise rejects.
6.3.3 Protocol 3
ARA protocol 2 engages the reader to perform constant computations during the
tag authentication. Instead, the server needs to send the reader a set of possible
values for tag identification. In some scenarios where the communication bandwith
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Tag T Reader R Server S
(P, x, xP, αP ) ({γ, (Ti, xiP ) : Ti ∈ TR}) (γ, α,TR, {xiP})
B,γ←−−−−−−− B ∈ G
r ∈ Z∗p
w = H2(αrP )














{(Ti,vi,Ui):Ti∈TR}←−−−−−−−−−−− Ui = H2(vi)
C1=Ui and
ê (C2, (xi + vi)P ) = ê (P, P )
Figure 6.2: Authorized RFID authentication protocol 2.
is limited, it is desired to reduce the size of the set. Hence, we introduce a third
protocol which only transfers one group element from the server to the reader.
Additionally, we consider a new attack that the server may cheat a reader by replying
a random value which is called false output. Then, the reader could not successfully
authenticate a tag even the tag is valid. This attack cannot be detected in neither
protocol 1 nor protocol 2. Fortunately, our protocol 3 below shows that it is able to
determine whether the received value is a false output. The protocol is depicted as
in Figure 6.3
• ServerKeyGen: The server picks α, where α ∈ Z∗p, and sets the public key PK =
αQ and the private key SK = α.
• TagKeyGen: The member randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗p and computes the tag’s public
and private keys (pk, sk) = (xQ, xP ). (P, sk, PK) are stored in the tag and pk is
given to the server.
• ReaderAuth: To authorize the reader R to identify a specified set of tags TR,
the server randomly chooses a secret γ ∈ Z∗p, and computes γP . For each tag
Ti ∈ TR, the server computes αγxiQ and sets the reader’s period key rpk =
{γP, (Ti, αxiγQ) : Ti ∈ TR} and the secret rsk = (γ, α). The server stores
(R, rsk,TR) and sends rpk to the reader R.
• Auth: To authenticate a tag, the following steps are implemented.
1. The reader randomly selects B ∈ G and sends (B, γP ) to the tag.
2. Upon receiving (B, γP ) from the reader, the tag chooses two random num-
bers r, s ∈ Z∗p, and computes a tuple (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5). It sends the tuple
to the reader as a response.
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Tag T Reader R Server S
(xP, αQ) ({γP, (Ti, αxiγQ) : Ti ∈ TR}) (αQ, γ, γP )
B,γP←−−−−− B ∈ G
r, s ∈ Z∗p
C1 = xrsP





























Figure 6.3: Authorized RFID authentication protocol 3.
3. Upon receiving the response, the reader checks ê(C2, C4)
?
= ê(P,A).
If it holds, the reader forwards (B,C3, C4, C5) to the server.
4. Upon receiving the message (B,C3, C4, C5) from the reader R, the server
retrieves (γ, γP ) and check ê(C3, A
′)
?
= ê(αQ,C5). If it holds, the server
calculates and sends V = γC3 to the reader.
5. Finally, the reader authenticate the tag according to the server’s response.
Firstly, the checks the equation ê(V, P )
?
= ê(C3, γP ). If the equation does not
hold, the reader outputs false. After that, the reader computes ê(V,C1) and
checks whether there exists a pair (Ti, αxiγQ) ∈ rpk, such that ê (V,C1) =
ê (αxiγQ,C2). The reader outputs Ti if the above equation holds, otherwise
rejects.
6.3.4 Efficiency
We compare the efficiency in Table 6.2. In Protocol 2, C1 is used for the reader to
quickly identify the tag, and C2 is for identity verification. The main computational
cost of reader is dominated by computing viP and ê(C2, xiP + viP ) for the veri-
fication, where ê(P, P ) can be pre-computed. This protocol requires the server to
compute all potential hash values for the reader. The communication cost therefore
is all vi for each tag in TR. The server can send all hash values in sequence to
eliminate sending Ti. In protocol 3, the communication cost and the computational
cost of server is constant-size and independent of the size of TR. The price to pay of
this protocol is a liner computation cost on the reader. The reader needs to identify
the potential tag one by one until the correct one is found. The computation time
therefore is linear in n for |TR| = n.
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Note that Protocol 2 is suitable for computationally weak readers without band-
width limitation, while Protocol 3 fits for scenarios of limited bandwidth.
Reader Computation Communication Server Computation
Protocols Cost Cost Cost
Protocol 2 G+ê 2n|Zp| G + 2nH2
Protocol 3 (n+ 1)ê |G| G + ê
Table 6.2: Efficiency comparison between Protocol 2 and Protocol 3.
6.4 Privacy and Security Models
In this section, we consider the privacy and security models of authorized authen-
tication protocols. We assume that the communication channel between the reader
and the server is secure.
6.4.1 Adversaries and Oracles
We define a set of oracles and four attacks which respectively aim at different goals.
In the particular attack, the ability of an adversary is regarded as the actions exe-
cuted by oracle calls.
Definition 6.1 (Oracles). The adversary plays with the challenger by given public
information of the system and the following oracles.
• TagCorrupt(T )→ sk: On input a tag T , it outputs the tag’s private key sk.
• ReaderAuth(TR)→ rpk: On input a set of tags TR, it outputs the reader’s period
key rpk.
• SendTag(T,m, π)→ m′: On input a tag T , a message m and a session π, it sends
the message m to the tag and receives the tag’s response m′.
• SendServer(m)→ m′: On input a message m, it sends the message m to the server
and receives the response m′.
• Challenge(m∗, T ∗)→ C∗: On input a message m∗ and a target tag T ∗ which is not
issued to ReaderAuth oracle, it flips a coin b and outputs a response C∗ regarding
to the tag T ∗ (if b = 1) or a random tag T ∗′ (if b = 0). This oracle can be called
at most once of a game.
Definition 6.2 (Strong and weak adversaries). We define four types of attacks as
follows.
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• Forward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader who attempts to trace
the tags’ previous communications after it has been authorized by the server.
• Backward attack: The adversary plays as a malicious reader who attempts to trace
the tags’ future communications after it has been revoked by the server.
• Outside attack: The adversary plays as a dishonest server who attempts to discover
the tag which is authenticating by the reader.
• Impersonation attack: The adversary plays as an impersonator who is not the tag
holder attempts to impersonate the tag which is not compromised without being
detected.
A strong adversary can access all above oracles and launch all above attacks
while a weak adversary cannot access the TagCorrypt(·) oracle.
6.4.2 Privacy and Security Models
Forward Privacy. The forward privacy game allows the adversary A to launch the
forward attack. In the ARA system, a reader R may be authorized to authenticate
a tag T in a certain period P of time. However, R shall not be able to interpret T ’s
sessions prior to P since R is unauthorized to authenticate T outside the time P . In
the forward privacy game, A is given the reader’s current period key and attempts
to decide whether the tag which can be authenticated currently was involved in the
previous interactions.
The forward privacy game is defined in two phases, which are Forward Phase and
Backward Phase. A plays with the challenger as follows.
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen and TagKeyGen to gen-
erate the server and tags’ public/private keys (PK, SK) and {(pki, ski)}, respec-
tively. The challenger gives public keys to A.
• Forward Phase: The challenger sets the reader’s period key and A can query
Challenge(·) for the challenge. A interacts with the challenger through the oracles
which can be accessed by the classified type of A.
• Backward Phase: The challenger refreshes the reader’s period key and A interacts
with the challenger through the oracles which can be accessed by the classified
type of A.
• Guess: A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 6.3. An authorized authentication scheme provides forward privacy if
there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 1
2
+ ε, where
ε is negligible in k.
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Backward Privacy. The backward privacy game allows the adversary A to launch
the backward attack. It is different from the forward attack that a reader R attempts
to trace the tag after R has been revoked. In the backward privacy game, A is given
the reader’s current period key to authenticate the tags, while A needs to decide
whether a tag involves in the future interactions after the reader was revoked.
The backward privacy game is defined in two phases, which are Forward Phase
and Backward Phase. A plays with the challenger as follows.
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen and TagKeyGen to gen-
erate the server and tags’ public/private keys (PK, SK) and {(pki, ski)}, respec-
tively. The challenger gives public keys to A.
• Forward Phase: The challenger sets the reader’s period key and A interacts with
the challenger through the oracles which can be accessed by the classified type of
A.
• Backward Phase: The challenger refreshes the reader’s period key and A can query
Challenge(·) for the challenge. A interacts with the challenger through the oracles
which can be accessed by the classified type of A.
• Guess: AF outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 6.4. An authorized authentication scheme provides backward unlinkabil-
ity if there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 1
2
+ ε,
where ε is negligible in k.
Reader Privacy. The reader privacy game allows the adversary A to launch the
outside attack. Conventionally, the reader and the server are mutually trusted in
RFID systems. However, the reader’s privacy is needed to be considered in ARA
protocols. For instance, the server may intend to learn the identity of the tag which
is authenticating by the reader. Since the reader and the server are operated by
different parties, the reader/tag interaction should be invisible to the server. In the
reader privacy game, A is given the secret of the server and attempts to distinguish
the tags during the server/reader interactions. A interacts with the challenger as
follows.
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen, TagKeyGen and Reader-
Auth to respectively generate the server’s public and private keys (PK, SK), tag’s
public and private keys (pk, sk) and reader’s keys (rpk, rsk). The challenger gives
the server and tags’ public/private keys and the reader’s period key rpk to A.
• Query: The adversary is allowed to make queries to the oracle SendServer(·).
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• Challenge: The adversary outputs two tags T0 and T1 to the challenger. The
challenger randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let Mt be the output of SendTag(·)
with respect to the tag Tb and Ms be the corresponding query to SendServer(·).
The challenger sends Ms to the adversary.
• Guess: A outputs a bit b′ and wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 6.5. An authorized authentication scheme provides reader privacy if
there is no A who wins the above game with the probability Pr[b′ = b] ≥ 1
2
+ ε, where
ε is negligible in k. We say that it unconditionally preserves the reader privacy if
ε = 0.
Tag Unforgeability. The tag unforgeability is with respect to the security of the
protocol and the attacker is referred to a malicious sever. This game allows an
adversary A to launch the impersonation attack. Clearly, it is hard to prevent the
impersonation attack if the tag is corrupted. Symmetry-key based protocols are not
secure against this attack as a server obtains secret keys of tags during the system
setup. Hence, TagCorrupt(·) oracle cannot be queried during the game. A attempts
to forge a tag’s response to pass the authentication. It allows A to access the secret
of the server and the reader. A interacts with the challenger as follows.
• Setup: The challenger runs the algorithms ServerKeyGen, TagKeyGen and Read-
erAuth to respectively generate the server’s public and private keys (PK, SK),
tag’s public and private keys (pk, sk) and reader’s keys (rpk, rsk). The challenger
gives the server’s private key, tags’ public key and reader’s keys to A.
• Query: The adversary can query the oracle SendTag(·) to the challenger.
• Forgery: A outputs a valid session π which is not queried to the SendTag(·) oracle.
Definition 6.6. An authorized authentication scheme provides tag unforgeability
if there is no A who can outputs a valid forgery of the tag with the non-negligible
advantage ε in k.
6.5 Privacy and Security Analysis
6.5.1 New Complexity Assumptions
Definition 6.7 (EDBDH Assumption). Let (P, p, ê,G,GT ) be a pairing group. Given
(P, aP, bP, cP, tP ), the Extended Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is to de-
termine whether tP = abcP . We say that the EDBDH assumption holds, if no PPT
algorithm A can solve the problem with non-negligible advantage in k.
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Definition 6.8 (V-l-wDBDHI Assumption). Let (P,Q, p, ê,G,GT ) be a pairing
group. Given (P,Q, aP, a2P, · · · , alP, aQ, a2Q, · · · , alQ, tP ), the Various l-weak De-
cisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem is to determine whether tP =
a2l+1P . We say that the V-l-wDBDHI assumption holds, if no PPT algorithm A
can solve the problem with non-negligible advantage in k.
We show that the security of EDBDH assumption is related to the security of
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
Lemma 6.1. The EDBDH assumption holds if the DBDH assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose that there is a PPT algorithm A who can break the EDBDH as-
sumption. Given an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, tP ), A can output whether tP = abcP
in polynomial time with non-negligible advantage. It implies that A decides whether
ê(P, tP ) = ê(P, abcP ) which is a solution of DBDH problem. Therefore, if DBDH
problem is intractable then the EDBDH assumption holds.
To analyse the security of V-l-wDBDHI assumption, we show that its security
is similar to the security of l-weak Decisional Bilinear Deffie-Hellman Inversion (l-
wDBDHI) assumption. According Lemma 6.1, a solution of V-l-wDBDHI problem
also implies that the algorithm A can decide whether ê(P, tP ) = ê(P, a2l+1P ). Since
that l-wDBDHI is proved secure in the generic group model, the complexity of V-
l-wDBDHI can be bounded by using the similar proof of general Diffie-Hellman
Exponent problem [BBG05].
6.5.2 Privacy Proofs
Theorem 6.1. Our ARA protocol 1 provides forward privacy and backward privacy
against the weak adversary if H1 is pre-image resistant.
Proof. Suppose a weak adversary can distinguish the tags from their previous (resp.
future) interactions. Given an instance (a, b, γ, C), the adversary aims to determine
whether it associates with the tag T0 or T1. Due to the input a, b, γ are known
and C = H1(xb, a, b, γ), where b = 0 or b = 1, the adversary has to distinguish the
tag’s secret keys x0 and x1 which are unknown to adversary. This implies that the
adversary is able to compute xb (b = 0 or b = 1) since the weak adversary cannot
query the oracle TagCorrupt(·). It contradicts to the pre-image assumption of the
hash function H1. Therefore, the proposed protocol 1 preserves forward privacy
(resp. backward privacy) against the weak adversary.
Theorem 6.2. Our ARA protocol 2 provides forward privacy against the strong
adversary if the ODH assumption holds.
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Proof. Suppose a strong adversary A who can break the forward privacy of our pro-
tocol 2. We can construct an algorithm B to use A to violate the ODH assumption.
B is given an instance (aP, Pb, t), a hash function H2 and an oracle O, the goal is
to output a decision whether t = H2(abP ). B sets up the forward privacy game and
interacts with A as follows.
Setup: Let P be a generator of group G and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l be a cryptographic
hash function. B sets the servers public and private key pair (PK, SK) as (bP, b),
where b is unknown to B. B picks xi ∈ Z∗p, where i = 1, · · · , q, and sets the
tag Ti’s public and private keys (pk, sk) as (xiP, xi). Then, for each tag, B stores
(xi, P, xiP, bP ). B maintains the list LT = {< T, sk, pk >} and adds all tags <
Ti, xiP, xi > into LT .
Forward Phase: B randomly chooses γ ∈ Z∗p and provides the following oracles to A.
• TagCorrupt: A issues a tag corruption query on input a tag Ti. If Ti exists in the
list LT , B outputs xiP , xi, otherwise B outputs ⊥.
• ReaderAuth: A issues a reader registration query on input a set of tags TR. If any
Ti ∈ TR does not appear in LT , B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B sets
rpk = {γ, (Ti, xiP ) : Ti ∈ TR}
and outputs rpk.
• SendTag: A issues a tag Ti, a message mi = (Bi, γi), B retrieves < Ti, xiP, xi >
from the list LT . B randomly selects r ∈ Z∗p and computes




P, Ci,3 = riP.
B sets Ci = (Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3) and outputs Ci.
• SendServer: A issues a query on input a message mi = (Bi, Ci,3). For each tag
Ti ∈ TR, B looks up xiP from LT and queries the oracle O on input Ci,3. On
receiving O’s output H2(bCi,3), B computes
Vi = H2(H2(bCi,3), xiP,Bi, γ), Ui = H2(Vi),
and outputs {(Ti, Vi, Ui) : Ti ∈ TR}.
• Challenge: A issues a challenge query on input a message m∗ = (B∗, γ∗) and
a target tag T ∗ ∈ LT . B retrieves T ∗’s private key x∗ and randomly chooses
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coin ∈ {0, 1}. If coin = 1, B computes w∗ = t, otherwise w∗ = y, where y ∈ Z∗p.
Then B computes
s∗ = H2(w




P, C∗3 = aP.
B sets C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3) and outputs C∗.
Backward Phase: B randomly selects γ′ ∈ Z∗p. It provides the following oracles to A.
• TagCorrupt: Same as in forward phase.
• ReaderAuth: Same as in forward phase except that B replaces γ by γ′.
• SendTag: Same as in forward phase.
• SendServer: Same as in forward phase except that B replaces γ by γ′.
Guess: A outputs a guess coin′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if coin′ = coin. Then,
B concludes the game and outputs t = H2(abP ) if coin′ = 1, otherwise outputs
t 6= H2(abP ).
Theorem 6.3. Our ARA protocol 2 provides backward privacy against the strong
adversary if the ODH assumprion holds.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.2 (PT2). To
simplify the proof, we only show the differences from PT2. Given an ODH instance
(aP, bP, t), a hash function H2 and an oracle O, B can output whether t = H2(abP )
if ODH assumption is broken. We use the same Setup, Forward Phase and Backward
Phase of PT2, except that Challenge is provided in Backward Phase instead of Forward
Phase. Clearly, if the adversary A outputs a guess coin′ ∈ {0, 1}, B can conclude
that t = H2(abP ) (if coin
′ = 1) or t 6= H2(abP ) (if coin′ = 0).
Theorem 6.4. Our ARA protocol 2 unconditionally provides reader privacy.
Proof. We show that our protocol 2 unconditionally preserves the reader’s privacy
against the adversary A. During the challenge phase, A submits two tags T0, T1
to B. B randomly picks b ∈ {0, 1} and runs the tag authentication to obtain the
tag Tb’s response (C1, C2, C3). According to the protocol, we have C3 = rP and B
gives B,C3 to A. Since that B ∈ G, r ∈ Z∗p are random values, it obviously gives
no information about the corresponding tag Tb. A has no advantage to determine
whether Tb = T0 or Tb = T1. Therefore, we have that Protocol 2 unconditionally
provides the reader privacy.
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Theorem 6.5. Our ARA protocol 3 provides forward privacy against the strong
adversary if the V-l-wDBDHI assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose a strong adversary A who can break the forward privacy of our
protocol 3. We can construct an algorithm B to use A to solve the V-l-wDBDHI
problem. Let l = 3, B is given an instance (P,Q, aP, a2P, a3P, aQ, a2Q, a3Q, tP ),
the goal is to output a decision whether tP = a7P . B sets up the forward privacy
game and interacts with A as follows.
Setup: B sets P0 = aP,Q0 = aQ as two generators of group G and the server’s
public key PK = a2Q, private key SK = a, where a is unknown to B. B cre-
ates q tags for the game and randomly selects a tag Tc as a challenge tag. B picks
xi ∈ Z∗p, where i = 1, 2, · · · , q. For each tag Ti 6= Tc, B computes the tag’s pub-
lic/private keys (pki, ski) = (xiaQ, xiaP ). For the tag Tc, B sets the public/private
key pair as (pkc, skc) = (xca
3Q, xca
3P ). Then, B stores (P0, ski, a2Q) into the tag
Ti, where i = 1, 2, · · · , q. B maintains four lists LT = {< T, sk, pk, x >}, LH3 = {<
B,W,U, S, z, Z >} and LC = {< S, s >}, then adds all tags < Ti, ski, pki, xi > into
LT .
Forward Phase: B randomly selects k ∈ Z∗p and sets P
γ∗
0 = ka
2P and provides the
following oracles to A.
• H3 Oracle: A issues a hash query on input a messagemi, wheremi = (Bi,Wi, Ui, Si),
B outputs Zi if< Bi,Wi, Si, zi, Zi > exits. Otherwise, B checks whether Si appears
in the list LC . If it exists, B computes Zi = ziaQ, otherwise Zi = kzia3Q, where
zi ∈ Z∗p, and sets H3(Bi,Wi, Ui, Si) = Zi . Then, B adds < Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi >
into the list LH3 and outputs Zi.
• TagCorrupt: A issues a tag corruption query on input a tag Ti. If Ti does not
exist in the list LT , B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B retrieves < Ti, ski, pki, xi > and
returns ski.
• ReaderAuth: A issues a reader authorization query on input a set of tags TR.
If Tc ∈ TR, B aborts the simulation, otherwise, for each Ti ∈ TR, B retrieves
< Ti, ski, pki, xi > and computes kxia
3Q. Then B sets
rpk = {ka2P , (Ti, kxia3Q) : Ti ∈ TR}
and outputs rpk.
• SendTag: A issues a tag Ti, a messagemi = (Bi, γiP0), B retrieves< Ti, ski, pki, · >
from the list LT . B picks si ∈ Z∗p and adds < a
2
si
Q, si > in to the list LC . B ran-
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domly selects ri ∈ Z∗p and calculates
Ci,1 = risiski, Ci,2 = riaP,




tains the output Zi. Then, B issues (Bi, γiP0, 1riZi,
a2
si
Q) to H3 oracle and receives
the output Z ′i. B sets







m′i = (Ci,1, Ci,2, Ci,3, Ci,4, Ci,5) and outputs m
′
i.
• SendServer: A issues a query on input a message mi = (Bi, Ci,3, Ci,4, Ci,5). If
< Bi, γ
∗P0, Ci,4, Ci,3, zi, Zi > exists and ê(Ci,3, Zi) = ê(a








Then, B sets m′ = Vi and outputs m′.
• Challenge: A issues a challenge query on input a message m∗ = (B∗, γ∗P0) and a
target tag T ∗, such that T ∗ is not queried to the ReaderAuth oracle and T ∗ = Tc,
B flips a coin b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 1, B chooses u, v ∈ Z∗p and computes







If b = 0, B computes C∗1 = yuvaP , where y ∈ Z∗. B issues the H3 oracle call
on input (B∗, γ∗P,C∗1 , C
∗








aQ and B queries H3 oracle on input (B∗, γ∗P0, C∗4 , C∗3) then
obtains the output < B∗, γ∗P0, C
∗
3 , z












5). Finally, B outputs C∗.
Backward Phase: B randomly selects k′ ∈ Z∗p, and sets γ′P0 = k′P . It provides the
following oracles to A.
• H3 Oracle: A issues a hash query on input a message mi = (Bi,Wi, Ui, Si), B
outputs Zi if < Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi > exits. B computes Zi = zik′aQ, where
zi ∈ Z∗p, if Si does not exist in the list LC , otherwise, B computes Zi = ziaQ. B
sets H3(Bi,Wi, Ui, Si) = Zi and outputs Zi. It adds < Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi > into
the list LH3 and outputs Zi.
• TagCorrupt: Same as in forward phase.
• ReaderAuth: A issues a reader authorization query on input a set of tag TR. For
each Ti ∈ TR, B retrieves < Ti, ski, pki, xi > and computes Yi = xik′aQ if Ti 6= Tc,
CHAPTER 6. AUTHORIZED RFID AUTHENTICATION 95
otherwise computes Yi = xck
′a3Q. Then B sets rpk′ = {k′P, (Ti, Yi) : Ti ∈ TR}
and outputs rpk′.
• SendServer: A issues a query on input a message mi = (Bi, Ci,3, Ci,4, Ci,5). If
< Bi,WI , Ci,4, Ci,3, zi, Zi > exists and ê(Ci,3, Zi) = ê(a








B sets m′ = Vi and outputs m′.
• SendTag: Same as in forward phase.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b′=b. B concludes
the game and outputs tP = a7P if b′ = 1, otherwise outputs tP 6= a7P .
Theorem 6.6. Our ARA protocol 3 provides backward privacy if the V-l-wDBDHI
assumption holds.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.5 (PT5).
To simplify the proof, we only show the differences from PT5. Suppose a strong
adversary A who can break the backward privacy of our protocol. We can construct
an algorithm B to use A to violate the V-l-wDBDHI assumption. Given an instance
of V-l-wDBDHI and let l = 3, we use the same Setup of PT5. However, we swap the
simulation of Forward Phase and Backward Phase of PT5. The oracle Challenge(·) is
provided in the Backward Phase. Then, based on the output b′ ∈ {0, 1} of A, B can
conclude the game and output tP = a7P if b′ = 1 or tP 6= a7P .
Theorem 6.7. Our ARA protocol 3 provides reader privacy if the EDBDH assump-
tion holds.
Proof. Suppose that a strong adversary A who can break the reader privacy of our
protocol 3. We can construct an algorithm B to use A to solve the EDBDH problem.
B is given an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, tP ), it aims to determine whether tP ?= abcP .
B sets up the game and interacts with A as follows.
Setup: B sets P1 = aP,Q = cP as two generators of the group G. B creates q tags for
the game and selects a challenge tag Tc. B randomly chooses x1, · · · , xq, α, γ ∈ Z∗p
and computes xiQ, xiP1, αQ, γP1 and xiαγQ. B sets the server’s public/private keys
(PK, SK) = (αQ, α), tag Ti’s public/private keys (pk, sk) = (xiQ, xiP1) and the
reader’s period keys
(rpk, rsk) = ({P1, γP1, Ti, xiαγQ : i = 1, · · · , q} , (γ, α)) .
CHAPTER 6. AUTHORIZED RFID AUTHENTICATION 96
B gives generated public and private keys to the adversary A. B maintains a filled
list LT = {< T, sk, pk, x >} and LH3 = {< B,W,U, S, z, Z >}, which is initially
empty.
H3 Oracle: A issues a H3 hash query on input a message mi = (Bi,Wi, Ui, Si), if
Zi appears in the list LH3, B outputs Zi. For the query from Challenge oracle, B
chooses zi ∈ Z∗p and computes Zi = zicP if Ui exists in LH3 , otherwise computes
Zi = zibP . For other queries, B selects zi ∈ Z and computes Zi = ziP . B sets
H(Bi,Wi, Ui, Si) = Zi and adds < Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi > into the list LH3. B outputs
Zi.
Challenge: A issues a challenge query on tags T0, T1. B randomly chooses coin ∈
{0, 1} and retrieves xcoin for the tag Tcoin. B selects B ∈ G, u ∈ Z∗p and sets r = b,
s = cu. B computes






Then, B calls H3 query on input (B, γP1, C∗1 , C∗3) to obtain the output Zi and





3) to obtain the output Z
′




iP . Finally, B out-





Guess: A outputs a guess coin′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if coin′ = coin. Then,
B can conclude the game and outputs tP = abcP if coin′ = 1, otherwise output
tP 6= abcP .
6.5.3 Security Proofs
Theorem 6.8. Our ARA protocol 2 provides tag unforgeability if BB signature
[BB04] is secure.
Proof. In ARA protocol 2, a reader challenges the tag on a message m = (B, γ). The




where s = H2(H2(αrP ), xP,B, γ), as a BB signature of the signing message s under
the private key x. Although s is not sent to the reader, an adversary A has to forge
a BB signature to make a valid response. The security of ARA protocol 2 depends
on the security of BB signature and the latter is provably unforgeable if the private
key x is unknown. Hence, the protocol 2 provides tag unforgeability.
Theorem 6.9. Our ARA protocol 3 provides the tag unforgeability if the k+1-
Exponent assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A who can break the tag unforgeability of our protocol
3. We can construct an algorithm B to use A to solve the k+1-Exponent problem.
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B is given an instance (P, aP, a2P, a3P ) where k = 3, it aims to find a4P . B sets up
the game and interacts with A as follows.
Setup: B sets P1 = a2P and Q1 = aP as two generators of group G, where a is
unknown to B. B randomly picks α, γ ∈ Z∗p and computes αQ1, γP1. Let the tag
T ’s public key be XQ1 = a
3P , where x = a2 is unknown to B. Then, B computes
αγa3P , the server’s public/private key pair (PK, SK) = (αQ1, α), reader’s period
key pair (rpk, rsk) = ({γP1, T, αγa3P}, (γ, α)), and gives (PK, SK, rpk, rsk, xQ1)
to A. B maintains a list LH3 = {< B,W,U, S, z, Z >}, which is initially empty.
• H3 Oracle: A issues a hash query on input a message mi = (Bi,Wi, Ui, Si),
B outputs Zi if < Bi,Wi, Si, zi, Zi > exits. B selects zi ∈ Z∗p and computes
Zi = ziP if the query is submitted by the SendTag oracle, otherwise B computes
Zi = ziUi. B sets H(Bi,Wi, Ui, Si) = Zi and outputs Zi. Then, B adds <
Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi > into the list LH3.
• SendTag: A issues a message mi = (Bi, γiP ), B randomly chooses ri, si ∈ Z∗p
and computes Ci,1 = riP1, Si = siαa
3P . B submits a query (Bi, γiP,Ci,1, Si) to
the H3 oracle and obtains the output < Bi,Wi, Ui, Si, zi, Zi >. Then, B queries
H3 oracle on input (Bi, γiP,
zi
ri,si
P, Si) to H3 oracle and receives the output <




i >. B sets Ci as
Ci,1 = ria
2P, Ci,2 = risia








Finally, B outputs Ci.
Forgery: Eventually, A outputs a forgery C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 , C∗3 , C∗4 , C∗5) on message
m∗ = (B∗, γ∗P ) of the tag T . A wins the game if the pair (m∗, C∗) is valid and
the algorithm Auth accepts the tag T , where (m∗, C∗) is not an output of SendTag
query. B retrieves zi, zj from the list LH3, where ziP = H3(B∗, γ∗P,C∗1 , C∗3) and
zjP = H3(B
∗, γ∗P,C∗4 , C
∗





as the solution of the k+1-Exponent problem.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a novel concept of authorized RFID authentication
protocols. The reader’s privacy is considered as a new issue that it prevents the
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server disclosing the identity of the tag which is authenticated by the reader. Two
protocols were proposed based on the different efficiency requirements. We provided
the formal definition of privacy and security models of authorized authentication
protocols and proved that our protocols are secure against the various adversaries.
Chapter 7
Anonymous Yoking-Group Proofs
Yoking-proofs show an interesting application in RFID that a verifier can check
whether two tags are simultaneously scanned by a reader. We consider a scenario in
which multi-group of tags can be proved to be scanned simultaneously. Grouping-
proof, which is an extension of yoking-proofs, allows multiple tags to be proved
together, while existing protocols cannot support multiple groups. In this chapter,
we introduce a novel concept called “yoking-group proofs”, which was proposed
in [LMSV15a]. Additionally, we propose an anonymous yoking-proof protocol and
an anonymous yoking-group proof protocol and prove their security in Universal
Composability framework.
7.1 Introduction
A conventional RFID system usually assumes that a reader is authorized and the
the server is online. In some specific application, both the readers and the server
are also operated by a trusted party who initiates the tags. Moreover, a usual RFID
tag authentication can only check the validity of a single tag. These limitations
restrict the adoption of RFID in many applications. Consider that we need to prove
the simultaneous presence of tags, it is insufficient if the tags are authenticated
individually. Furthermore, if this task is delegated to an untrusted third party,
preventing tags’ privacy and security become a challenging task.
Juels [Jue04] introduced the notion of yoking-proofs which guarantee that two
tags have been scanned simultaneously. In the scenario, a verifier who maintains a
server and all secret information of the tags is considered as a TTP. Yoking-proofs
allow an untrusted party to control a reader which can connect to the verifier after
a proof is compiled. Two tags interact with the reader individually and assume that
the tags cannot be directly linked during the protocol run. The reader obtains a
proof at the end of the protocol and issues it to the verifier who can be either offline
or online.
The concept of yoking-proofs have been extended to grouping-proofs by Saito
and Sakurai [SS05] in 2005. Grouping-proof protocols allow multiple tags cooper-
atively generate a proof of simultaneous presence to the reader. During the proof,
any message from a tag shall be delivered by a reader to another tag. An important
task of a reader is to follow a specific logical structure to communicate with tags as
different structures may significantly influence the security of protocol.
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Tag anonymity is an essential consideration of most RFID authentication pro-
tocols [SM08, BM11, LWD08, LBSV10a, LBSV10b]. In grouping-proof protocols,
preventing the tag or group’s identity from leaking to an adversary is a challeng-
ing task if the protocol intends to employ symmetric-key cryptography. Usually, a
symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocol requires exhaustive key search
during the tag authentication. To check the validity of multiple tags without provid-
ing identities, efficiency problems will ensue as there are many possible combinations
of tags and each tag cannot be considered individually. Public key based protocols
[BLS+10, BLS+12, HP12] enable the verifier to verify arbitrary anonymous groups
without overwhelming computational cost. However, low-cost passive tags usually
cannot afford these protocols due to the extensive computation requirements and
therefore, we do not consider this type of solutions as it is rather expensive and
impractical.
Motivation. Although the grouping-proof can show the simultaneous presence of a
group of tags, in some scenarios, single grouping-proof is insufficient. For example,
a warehouse which stores a number of vehicles intends to prove the presence of all
goods to the owner. For each car, several tags are attached to core components,
such as the engine, brake and lock system. A prover should show the presence of
cars as well as their integrity. Swapping components between vehicles is prevented,
otherwise the product is no longer original. Unfortunately, the grouping-proof can
only show the presence of either all components or an individual car. Note that
each car is in a different group since it intends to be sold separately. In addition,
a car should be untraceable after it has been sold. Thus, the authentication should
be anonymous that an unauthorized third party cannot obtain the tags’ identity
during the protocol execution.
For another instance, a hospital employs an RFID system to manage medications
for inpatients. A medicine could be prescribed to different patients with various
instructions. It is important to keep the safety of medicines. Meanwhile, a nurse
needs to store a group of medicines (for an individual person) in a separate place,
such as a locker. However, both yoking-proof and grouping-proof provide only the
presence of a pair or a single group of tags. The information is insufficient to monitor
the storage for all patients.
In above scenarios, a protocol which provides untraceability and simultaneous
presence of multi-group is necessary. In this chapter, we propose a solution that it
not only supports a single group verification but also generates an anonymous proof
for multiple groups. Note that a trivial solution from grouping-proof protocols is
highly unlikely due to the lack of inter-group communication. In the literature,
grouping-proof protocols usually interact with the tags in a specific order which
constructs a logical structure. To the best of our knowledge, there are two main
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structures: ring and yoking-style. Ring-based protocols [BR05, BdMM08, DK09,
LLM+09, BM13] start from an initiator tag, then followed by the other tags and
complete the proof at the initiator. Regardless whether tags share a group key
or not, once an initiator has generated a proof, it cannot interact with initiators of
other groups. In other words, we need to significantly modify the protocol to achieve
the requirement. Existing protocols [SS05, LLMC08, CYH+08, HK09] which adopt
yoking-style proof generation can also hardly accomplish a multi-group proof. These
protocols usually employ a pallet tag to collect responses from a bunch of tags, then
generate a proof by collaborating with another tag. Eventually, the group proof is
formed similarly as in yoking proof. Therefore, to perform the multi-group proof,
an upper layer must be constructed.
Related Work. Two yoking-proofs were proposed in [Jue04], while the protocol
using minimalist MACs has been attacked by Saito and Sakurai [SS05]. Later on, a
tree-based protocol was introduced by Chien and Liu [CL09] that the computational
cost of identifying a tag is constant. However, the protocols requires that a reader
holds some shared secrets. Indeed, the protocol violates the rule of yoking-proofs
where a reader is assumed to be untrusted and cannot handle any secret. The
concept of anonymous grouping-proof was firstly presented by Bolotnyy and Robins
[BR05]. Unfortunately, the protocol statement is ambiguous that how to link tags
via their pseudonyms.
Huang and Ku [HK09] introduced a lightweight grouping-proof which employs
a pseudorandom number generator in passive tags, however, the proposal is inse-
cure as described in [CYWL11]. Burmester, Medeiros and Motta [BdMM08] pre-
sented two grouping-proof protocols which support the anonymity and forward secu-
rity. The protocols have been proved secure in universal composability framework,
while some flaws were illustrated later by Peris-Lopez, Orfila, Hernandez-Castro
and Lubbe [PLOHCvdL11]. Subsequently, some other anonymous grouping-proof
protocols were proposed in [PHER07, LNZ+13, BLS+10].
Recently, Burmester and Munilla [BM13] proposed an anonymous grouping-
proof protocol which prevents an adversary from linking two sessions of a target
group. The protocol considered that a group of tags is defined as in a logical ring.
A specific framework was described. It allows a reader to concurrently interact with
tags. The proof of simultaneous presence is generated by a tag labeled with index
1 and the proof is in constant size.
In grouping-proof, a reader is normally assumed as untrusted and the verifier is
offline. If an online server is available, the grouping-proof is not hard since the verifier
can setup a timer for a challenge. Even so, there are some protocols [LLMC08, DK09,
LLM+09] proposed for an online verifier. Note that, we only consider a system where
online verifier is unavailable.
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Organization of This Chapter. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 7.2, we describe an overview of our anonymous yoking-group proof system
and define the notations of symbols. Section 7.3 describes the security and privacy
models with some attacks. Section 7.4 proposes an anonymous yoking-proof. Section
7.5 gives the concrete constructions of our anonymous yoking-group proof protocol.
Section 7.6 proves the privacy and the security of proposed protocols. Finally, we
conclude the chapter in Section 7.7.
7.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we describe the overview of our anonymous yoking-group proofs and
the notions which are used throughout this chapter.
7.2.1 System Overview
The yoking-group proof system consists of three entities: RFID tags, reader and a
verifier.
• Tag Ti: A low-cost device which has a small storage and limited computational
capabilities. In this chapter, we only consider (passive) tags which cannot afford
the cost of public key cryptography. To construct a group, each tag is assigned
distinct keys and a unique sequential index starts from 1. We assume that the
keys of each tag refer to an unique identity and a tag is initiated by the verifier.
• Reader Ri: A powerful device which is controlled by an untrusted third party.
Tag and verifier’s secret information is unknown to Ri. The reader can maintain
links, deliver messages between tags and provide to the verifier a yoking-group
proof according to the collections.
• Verifier Vi: A TTP which maintains all the keys and identities of groups. If Vi is
not the owner of tags, it needs to share the same secret of tags with the owner
and Vi can initiate the system. Note that Vi is normally an offline party and a
yoking-group proof is verifiable at some time later.
In an anonymous yoking-group proof, a verifier V creates a group of tags where
each tag shares a part of secret keys with other tags. Each group has an individual
group identification key which indicates the group’s identity. Note that no individual
tag holds the key of a group, instead, the key is reconstructed during the protocol
run. In the protocol execution, a reader firstly interrogates all the tags and collects
their indexes. Then, the reader constructs a logical key structure based on the tag
indexes and interacts with tags in the specific order. Finally, the reader obtains a
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K: a space of bit strings where each element is k bits.
H(·): a cryptographic collision-resistant hash function
that H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k.
Ni: label of a node of a Merkle tree.
Σ: a yoking-proof of two tags.
ΣG a yoking-group proof of multiple groups.
KiN : a key of a node Ni.
KiI : an identification key of Ti.
KiA: an authentication key of Ti.
KiD: a decryption key of Ti.
||: concatenation of two bit-strings.
Table 7.1: Notations.
proof that multiple groups are presented simultaneously and issues the proof to the
verifier. However, the reader cannot extract any private information, such as a tag’s
identity and the group’s key.
7.2.2 Notations
To describe the concrete construction of our protocols, we give the notations in
Table 7.1.
7.3 Security and Privacy Models
In this section, we define the security requirements and assumptions. A yoking-
group proof can be considered as an extension of yoking-proof and grouping-proof,
thus the security requirements are basically close to the security definitions of them.
However, to estimate the security of an anonymous yoking-group proof protocol, it
is necessary to describe a new security model.
7.3.1 Adversaries and Attacks
A yoking-group proof algorithm proves that pre-defined groups of tags have been
simultaneously scanned. To evaluate the security of our protocol, we shall define
the capabilities of an adversary as follows.
Definition 7.1 (Adversary). We define three adversaries as follows.
• An adversary A is allowed to capture all the interactions between the interrogating
reader and participating tags.
• A can corrupt at most n− 1 tags where n is the number of tags. In this case, the
anonymity of compromised tags are ignored. Note that the corrupted tags are not
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destructive that they can be involved in the future communications.
• A is allowed to interact with both tags and a reader in any order and messages
can be altered by A in some manners.
In terms of security, A can launch various attacks on the protocol to output a
valid yoking-group proof. A has an ability to perform attacks based on the above
definition. Informally, we described the following attacks as examples.
Replay Attack: A responds a reader’s challenge to a target tag T by sending a
message σ which is T ’s previous response.
Impersonation Attack: A attempts to forge a valid response σ of the target tag T
without the knowledge of T ’s private key.
Collusion Attack: A intends to output a valid yoking-group proof with only a part
of legitimate groups. A is allowed to interact with all the tags, while at least
one tag is exclusive in each session. Then, A generates a proof according to
the collections.
Trace Attack: A attempts to trace groups of tags in distinct sessions. We assume
that target groups have the same quantity of tags, otherwise it is trivial to
distinguish groups.
7.3.2 Ideal Functionalities
The universal composability (UC) framework [Can01, Can06] supports composable
security even in complex systems. Most RFID applications are assumed to be de-
ployed in a large and scalable system, thus we apply the UC model to analyze
proposed protocols. In UC framework, it introduces models in ideal world which ex-
presses robust protocol execution and real world where a PPT adversary is allowed
to control adversarial parties and arranges the order of activation for parties. In the
UC model, it defines a simulator S which emulates the real protocol ρ execution and
translates runs of ρ with real world adversary A into runs of ρ which is executed
by ideal functionality F with ideal world adversary Â. An adversary of UC model
in both ideal world and real world shall interact with a PPT called environment Z
which distinguishes whether the interactions collected are from F and Â or from ρ
and A. To analyze the security of a protocol ρ, we say that ρ UC-realizes F if there
is no Z can distinguish between ideal and real world with non-negligible probability.
In UC framework, a protocol execution is captured by a session identifier sid
which is created by Z. In each protocol run, all parties use the same sid and
any input/output of the protocol is represented associated with sid. Specifically,
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Functionality Fayp
Upon receiving input Initiate at reader R: It ignores the request if R is compromised.
Otherwise, it generates a unique subsession identifier s and replaces any existing
init record by init(s,R), and then outputs init.
Upon receiving input Initiate at tag Ti: It ignores the request if Ti is compromised.
Otherwise, it generates a unique subsession identifier s′i and replaces any ex-
isting init records by init(s′i, Ti) and deletes any record link, and then outputs
init.
Upon receiving input Link (s′i, s
′
j) at tag Ti: If there are records init(s
′
j , Tj) or
link(s′j , Tj) and init(s
′
i, Ti), and then it deletes init(s
′
i, Ti), records and outputs
link(s′i, Ti).
Upon receiving input Prove(s, s′i, s
′
j): If there are records init(s,R), link(s
′
i, Ti) and




j), deletes all link records and outputs
proof.
Upon receiving input Impersonate(s, s′i, Tj): If there are records init(s,R), init(s
′
i, Ti)





j is a pseudo-subsession.
Upon receiving input Verify(proof) at verifier: If there exists a record proof ′(s, s′i, s
′
j)=
proof, and then it outputs valid, otherwise invalid.
Figure 7.1: Ideal functionality Fayp for anonymous yoking-proof.
The ideal functionality Fayp of anonymous yoking proof is depicted as in Figure 7.1
and the ideal functionality Faygp of anonymous yoking-group proof is depicted as in
Figure 7.2.
We describe parties and sessions involved in the protocol execution for both of
proposed protocols as follows.
Sessions. The entire life-time of a protocol is represented by a single session.
For each session sid, it consists of multiple subsessions which are initiated by protocol
parties. Particularly, a unique subsession identifier ssid is assigned when a protocol
party receives an input Initiate from Z. Note that all parities in different subsessions
share the same sid.
Parties. There are three types of parties: tag, reader and verifier. In each
subsession ssid, there are arbitrarily many of tags that different instances of type
tag are allowed. However, there is only one instance type of reader in a subsession.
As UC entities, such as Z and A, are not parties of a protocol, an adversary is
allowed to control multiple protocol parties.
Yoking-proof. A successful yoking proof in the real world implies that the
output of each tag contains the other tag’s input which is generated by a piece of
secret. An adversary is entitled to fully control the network and can selects involved
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partners. In the ideal world, the protocol execution is emulated by the calls of Link
and Prove activities.
Yoking-group proof. A successful yoking-group proof in the real world implies
that yoking proof of each pair of child nodes is successful, correctness of group secret
reconstruction and the output of one group involves the secrets of another group.
As above, the adversary can choose participating partners and control the network.
In the ideal world, the protocol execution is emulated by the calls of Link, Build and
Prove activities.
Anonymity. In the ideal functionality Fayp of anonymous yoking proof, it only
leaks a party’s type information which is “tag” or “reader”. In the ideal functionality
Faygp of anonymous yoking-group proof, it discloses the type information of involved
parties as well as the index when the party is type tag. Note that an index of a tag
indicates the position of a tag in a group other than the identity of a tag. Clearly,
the tags and readers are distinguishable as they proceed distinct tasks.
7.4 Building Block
A novel anonymous yoking-proof protocol is proposed in this section. It is an es-
sential building block of our yoking-group proofs described in Section 7.5. The
proposed yoking-proof is a lightweight symmetric-key based protocol which only re-
quires one hash computation to each tag. The untrusted third party who controls
the reader has an obligation to ensure the sequence of interactions and collects re-
sponses of tags without obtaining any privacy of target tags. Then, it compiles the
proof and submits it to the verifier who is referred to a TTP. During the reader-tag
communication, the TTP is unnecessary to be online and all proofs can be verified
latter.
Our protocol is described as in Figure 7.3 that any two legal tags are eligible
to be presented in the proof. For each tag, the TTP stores two keys in its non-
volatile memory, namely identification key KI and authentication key KA, such
that KI , KA ∈ K, where K is the defined key space. The protocol consists of two
rounds of challenge-response interactions that the proof process is initiated by the
reader R. Firstly, the reader randomly chooses a ∈ {0, 1}k, where k is a security
parameter, and sends a as a challenge to both of tags Tl and Tr. The nonce a
aims at resisting the replay attack which could be launched by an adversary who
attempts to impersonate the tag. Upon receiving the challenge, Tl selects a random
number bl ∈ {0, 1}k and computes (σl,∆l) that bl is considered as an ephemeral
key to protect the authentication key K lA. The tag Tr executes the same as Tl and
sends challenge (σr,∆r) to the reader. Then, the reader swaps two responses and
sends (σr,∆r), (σl,∆l) to Tl, Tr, respectively. Upon receiving the challenge, the tag
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Functionality Faygp
Upon receiving input Initiate at reader R: It ignores the request if R is com-
promised. Otherwise, it generates a unique subsession identifier s and
replaces any existing init record by init(s, R), and then outputs init.
Upon receiving input Initiate at tag Ti, where i ≥ 1: It ignores the request if
Ti is compromised. Otherwise, it generates a unique subsession identifier
s′i and replaces any existing init records by init(s
′
i, Ti, i) and deletes any
record link, and then outputs init.
Upon receiving input Link (s′i, s
′
j) at tag Ti: If there are records init(s
′
j, Tj, j)
or link(s′j, Tj, j) and init(s
′
i, Ti, i), then it deletes init(s
′
i, Ti, i), records and
outputs link(s′i, Ti, i).




k) at tag Tk: If there are records link(s
′
i, Ti, i),
link(s′j, Tj, j) and init(s
′
k, Tk, k), then it deletes init(s
′
k, Tk, k), records and
outputs build(s′k, Tk, k).






k) at tag Tk: If there are records
link(s′i, Ti, i), link(s
′
j, Tj, j), init(s
′
z, Tz, z) and init(s
′
k, Tk, k), then it deletes
init(s′k, Tk, k), records and outputs build(s
′
k, Tk, k).
Upon receiving input Prove(s, {s′m}), where m ≥ 1: If there is a record
init(s, R); for all s′i ∈ {s′m}, there exists build(s′i, Ti, i), then it records
proof(s, {s′m}), deletes all build records and outputs proof.
Upon receiving input Impersonate(s, {s′m} \ {s′j}, Tj): If there is a record
init(s, R); for all s′i ∈ {s′m} \ {s′j} and Tj is a tag controlled by an ad-
versary, then it records and outputs proof(s, ({s′m} \ {s′j})∪ {ps′j}), where
ps′j is a pseudo-subsession.
Upon receiving input Verify(proof) at verifier: If there exists a record
proof ′(s, {s′m})= proof, and then it outputs valid, otherwise invalid.
Figure 7.2: Ideal functionality Faygp for anonymous yoking-group proof
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Figure 7.3: Anonymous yoking-proof protocol.
generates a message m and encrypts the message by using the identification key
KI . At last, the reader compiles the responses received from two tags and generates
a yoking proof Σ. To verify the proof, the verifier who maintains pairs of keys








I ) and checks the proof as follows,
∆l
?
= H(σl ⊕K lA||a), σ′l
?




= H(σr ⊕KrA||a), σ′r
?
= KrI ⊕H(σr ⊕KrA||σl||∆l).
If and only if the above equations hold, the proof Σ is accepted, otherwise it is
rejected.
In this protocol, the identity of a tag is considered as a piece of sensitive infor-
mation which shall be prevented from disclosing to the reader. We assume that each




I) which indicates its unique identity in
the database and only the verifier can reveal the keys.
The proposed protocol also employs the timeout mechanism which guarantees
the interaction is completed in a small period of time. The tag and reader abort the
protocol if the response received later than the defined time window. To simplify the
description, we assume that there is a timeout for each round where the recipient is
awaiting any response. For the rest of this chapter, we will adopt the same definition.
7.5 Proposed Protocol
In this section, we demonstrate an anonymous yoking-group proof protocol which
allows an untrusted third party to prove that two groups of tags have been scanned
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simultaneously. Intuitively, the protocol guarantees plenty of tags have been pre-
sented during the protocol run. However, the further requirement of the protocol
is that the verifier needs to identify which groups of tags have been scanned other
than the validity of tags. The proposed protocol is based on the building block in-
troduced in Section 7.4. Although a tag may handle more computations during the
authentication, the minimum computational cost remains the same as in our yoking-
proof protocol. In addition, the computational cost to the verifier is irrelevant to
the number of tags.
7.5.1 Anonymous Yoking-Group Proof
An anonymous yoking-group protocol is described as in two phases: the grouping
phase and the yoking phase. To show the presence of distinct groups, a reader
firstly requests tags to generate a grouping-proof and then yokes groups to generate
a yoking-proof. We call the proof created by the protocol as a yoking-group proof
ΣG.
In some previous grouping-proof protocols, the tags are arranged in a specific
logical structure. For instance, Burmester and Munilla [BM13] assume that a group
of tags form a logical ring and the tags are labelled from 1 to n, where n is the
quantity of tags. Some other protocols [BLS+12, SS05] also consider a group of tags
as a ring or a chain during the authentication. They also consecutively assign each
tag a distinct number. Usually, the protocols which apply symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy pre-define a group by sharing a group key, identity or distinctive counters.
Similar method is employed, especially in some protocols which intend to protect
the tag’s identity and provide anonymity proofs. One reason for this is that the
symmetric-key based protocols normally require exhaustive key search to check the
validity of proofs and undefined groups may cause efficiency problems as the verifier
has to test all the possible combinations of tags. Hence, in our protocol, we assume
that the groups are defined prior to being authenticated.
An important consideration to a grouping-proof protocol which needs to provide
group anonymity is that the computational cost to a verifier shall be lower than the
way of exhaustive key search for each tag. As one phase of yoking-group proof proto-
col, the group authentication in our protocol only requires constant computational
cost O(1) in verifying the validity of a group. Moreover, the total cost of proof
verification equals to the cost of authenticating our yoking proof. To reduce the
computational cost and guarantee the integrity of a group, we employ a binary tree
as a logical structure to represent tags and each tag is assigned a different index in
the specific group. The verifier only needs to check the validity of a proof generated
by the root tag instead of all the tags.
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Figure 7.4: Labeled tree for a group of tags.
The size of a proof influences the performance of a protocol. Normally, a larger
size indicates that more components should be checked during the verification. Re-
gardless whether the proof is a compressed message, it is undesirable if the tags are
verified individually. As a feature of our anonymous yoking-group proof protocol,
the length of a proof remains the same size of our yoking-proof.
7.5.2 Constructions
Our protocol is described in Figure 7.5 that it shows the proof for two groups. To
simplify our protocol, we only consider that each group consist of three tags. It is a
typical case which demonstrates the essential process of most situations, while the
protocol can be extended to groups which contain any number of tags.
Without loss of generality, we firstly introduce the binary tree which represents
the logical structure of a group of tags. According to Figure 7.4, each node, including
leaves and root, represents a tag. From top to down and left to right in each level,
a tag T is assigned to an index i and the root is labelled as 1. For a tag Ti, it stores
three keys which are identification key KiI , authentication key K
i
A and decryption
key KiD. Initially, the tag owner sets these keys as follows.
KiI
$←− K, KiD
$←− K, KiA = K
p
D,
where KpD ∈ K is the decryption key of Ti’s parent. In case that if Ti is the root of a
tree, the owner randomly chooses a keyKiA fromK. The group keyKG is constructed
as in a Merkle tree that for each non-leaf node Ni, the key K
i




where K lN , K
r
N are node keys of Ni’s left and right child respectively and K
i
I is the





apart from the leaves, a tag does not keep a node key, instead, the node keys are
built during the protocol execution. Indeed, the protocol rebuilds the Merkle tree
and outputs the group key K1N at the root T1. The verifier maintains the group key
and it indicates the identity of a specific group of tags.
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In the grouping phase of our protocol, tags generate a proof of group. As an
example, we show the grouping for a group which has three tags T1, T2 and T3. Note
that the grouping-proof is close to yoking-group proof if there are only three tags
in a group. Hence, we show a single round of grouping-proof via our yoking-group
proof protocol and the grouping-proof can be accomplished recursively for a larger
group. We denote that T1 is a root and T2, T3 are respectively left and right child
of T1. Without loss of generality, we refer tags T2 and T3 to Tl and Tr, respectively.
To start with, the reader R broadcasts a request along with a nonce a. A tag
sends its index as a part of the first response to R. According to our system model,
the reader builds a hash tree structure based on the indexes and maintains a link to
each tag. In terms of one group, Tl, Tr and R firstly run the yoking-proof protocol
illustrated in Section 7.4. The only difference is that the reader sets the message
σl = σl||σi, σr = σr||σi,
where σi is generally the response of challenge a from the tags’ parent. The reader
collects a yoking-proof Σ and Ti’s response (σi,∆i). Concurrently, the reader obtains
the reply (σj,∆j) form Tj, which is the root of another group.




r,∆r, σj,∆j) to the
root Ti and starts the yoking phase. Upon receiving the message m, Ti extracts the
node keys K lN , K
r
N of two tags and computes the node key K
i
N . In a case that if
node Ni of a tree only has the left child, the reader sets (σr, σ
′
r) = (σi, 0), where σi
is a response of Ni. Accordingly, the tag Ti ignores a message σ
′
r and simply sets
KrN = 0. We should note that this step does not guarantee the correctness of node
keys as a tag handles the received message without authentication. Since the goal
of our protocol is to check the simultaneous scanning of groups and the hash tree
ensures the integrity of a group, there is no need to verify messages during the proof.
The verifier is able to verify the group’s integrity when it checks the validity of a
yoking-group proof.
Finally, Ti outputs a reply σ
′
i by using K
i
N and Tj outputs σ
′
j via the same
approach. Upon receiving two responses (σi, σ
′
i,∆i) and (σj, σ
′
j,∆j), the reader
compiles a yoking-group proof ΣG. The verifier checks the validity of proofs by







The extension of the protocol for multi-group proof is as follows. Assume that
there are n groups. In the grouping phase, a reader collects each root tag’s response
(σi,∆i), where i = 1, 2, · · · , n. For example, (σ1,∆1) is the response of the root
tag of group G1. In the yoking phase, the reader transmits (σk,∆k), where k =
1, 2, · · · , n − 1, from group Gk to Gk+1, then transmits (σn,∆n) to G1. Note that
this step can be performed concurrently and the following steps are the same as in
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ΣG = (a, σi, σ
′
i,∆i, σj , σ
′
j ,∆j)
Figure 7.5: Yoking-group proof with group anonymity for two groups.
two-group version.
Informally, the protocol protects the group’s privacy as its identity is concealed
by a random number b and a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function H. We
assume that an adversary cannot corrupt a tag to obtain its internal states. Without
given the value of b, the tag’s keys which are also considered as an identity can be
hidden perfectly during the communication. It can only be authenticated by the
verifier through searching possible keys in its database. The formal security proof
of our protocol is given in Section 7.6.
7.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of proposed protocols. We show that both
our anonymous yoking-proof and anonymous yoking-group proof are secure under
the UC framework.
Theorem 7.1. Our anonymous yoking-proof protocol UC-realizes the functionality
Fayp with random oracles.
Proof. To simulate the real world protocol execution, we firstly activate the envi-
ronment Z, create protocol parties of anonymous yoking proof that a reader, some
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tags and a verifier, and the adversary A is activated. To simplify the description,
we now refer G as a function, where G : b
$← {0, 1}k. The same notion is applied
in the proof of Theorem 7.2. The simulator Sayp provides the following actions to
emulate protocol run in the real world.
• Sayp simulates copies of tag T̂i, reader R̂, verifier V̂ and an ideal world adversary
Â. Then, it activates Â.
• Sayp initiates a database D̂ for the verifier V̂ that it adds or removes keys of both
honest tags and adversary controlled tags to D̂.
• Sayp collects the requests of all real world parties and forwards them without any
modification to the functionality Fayp as in Figure 7.6. Then Sayp returns the
outputs to Â.
• Sayp simulates all the interactions between Z and external visible parties of the
protocols. Specifically, Sayp calls Initiate when there is a request to the reader
or tag initiation. In the ideal world, Fayp calls Link, Prove, Impersonate and
Verify when received from Sayp the input request linking two tags, forwarding
unmodified messages between tags and the reader, impersonating a simulated tag
which is controlled by an adversary and translating unmodified messages between
the reader and the verifier, respectively.
• If the input of honest tags to the Prove in the ideal world has been modified, Sayp
ignores the request unless it is from an adversarial controlled reader.
Clearly, the main difference of the protocol execution between ideal world and
real world is related to the functions applied. In the ideal world, the true random
functions which output uniformly independent values are employed. However, in
the real world, a hash function H and the random number generator G are used.
We remark the requirements of Fayp for anonymous yoking proof. It provides
the unforgeability that an honest tag cannot be impersonated by an adversary. The
random values generated during the protocol execution is unknown to the adversary.
A tag’s identity is perfectly protected that no deterministic information of a tag
disclosed to an adversary. Fayp resists replay, collusion, impersonation and other
attacks even the adversary is allowed to interact with Z in arbitrary fashion.
Let E be the event that the simulation fails. If we assume that the output of
function H and G are both truly random and independent, the simulation is perfect
unless E occurs when Sayp ignores the Prove request as the message of an honest
tag has been altered by an adversary. That is, the adversary A forges random
numbers and outputs a valid proof in the real world. It occurs only if A could
guess the random number b generated by G and find a collision of hash function H.
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Simulator Sayp
Upon receiving input Initiate at reader R̂ from Â: It delivers the request to Fayp. On
output init(s,R), it selects a new random number a from a list L̂ and outputs
(s, a) to Â.
Upon receiving input Initiate at tag T̂i from Â: It delivers the request to Fayp. On




A) which are from the database D̂ to
tag T̂i and sends s
′
i to Â.
Upon receiving input Link(s′i, s
′
j) at tag T̂i from Â: It delivers the request to Fayp. On
output link(s′i, Ti), T̂i runs the anonymous yoking proof, except that it replaces
H by a hash function and G by a random number generator, and outputs
(σi, σ
′
i,∆i) to R̂ and Â.
Upon receiving input Prove(s, s′i, s
′
j) at R̂ from Â: It delivers the request to Fayp.
On output proof(s, s′i, s
′
j), R̂ outputs Σ to Â.
Upon receiving input Impersonate(s, s′i, Tj) at tag Tj from Â: It delivers the request
to Fayp. On output proof(s, s′i, ps′j), it outputs proof to Â.
Upon receiving input Verify(proof) at verifier V̂ : It delivers the request to Fayp. On
output valid/invalid, it send this to Â.
Figure 7.6: Simulator Sayp for anonymous yoking-proof.
Given a random a which indicates a subsession of the reader, the probability Pr[E]
that event E occurs is at most 2−2ktn, where k is the security parameter as well
as the length of hash value, t is the number of tags in the database and n is the
interactions placed during the subsession. Hence, the environment Z can distinguish
the simulation in polynomial time whether happened in the ideal world or the real
world with probability Pr[E], which is negligible.
Theorem 7.2. Our anonymous yoking-group proof protocol UC-realizes the func-
tionality Faygp.
Proof. To emulate the real world protocol run, we activate the environment Z.
Then, we create anonymous yoking-group proof protocol parties, such as a reader,
multiple tags, a verifier and a real world adversary A which is activated immediately.
The simulator Saygp which is described as in Figure 7.7 provides actions to simulate
the protocol execution in the real world. The actions supported by Saygp are similar
to the actions described in the proof of Theorem 7.1. Additionally, in the ideal
world, if Faygp receives from Saygp the request of building a node key of several tags,
it calls Build to generate corresponding responses.
The main differences of the protocol execution between the ideal world and the
real world are these: true random functions which output uniformly independent
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Simulator Saygp
Upon receiving input Initiate at reader R̂ from Â: It delivers the request to
Faygp. On output init(s, R), it selects a new random number a from a list
L̂ and outputs (s, a) to Â.
Upon receiving input Initiate at tag T̂i from Â, where 1 ≥ i: It delivers the
request to Faygp. On output init(s′i, Ti,i), it assigns keys (KiI , KiA, KiD)
which are from the database D̂ to tag T̂i and sends (s
′
i, i) to Â.
Upon receiving input Link(s′i, s
′
j) at tag T̂i from Â: It delivers the request to
Faygp. On output link(s′i, Ti, i), T̂i runs the anonymous yoking-group proof,
except that it replaces H by a hash function and G by a random number
generator, and outputs (σi, σ
′
i,∆i) to R̂ and Â.




k) at tag T̂k from Â: It delivers the request
the Faygp. On output build(s′k, T ′k, k), T̂j runs the anonymous yoking-group
proof, except that it replaces H by a hash function and G by a random
number generator and outputs σ′k to R̂ and Â.






k) at tag T̂k from Â: It delivers the re-
quest the Faygp. On output build(s′k, T ′k, k), T̂k runs the anonymous yoking-
group proof, except that it replaces H by a hash function and G by a
random number generator and outputs σ′k to R̂ and Â.
Upon receiving input Prove(s, s′i, s
′
j) at R̂ from Â: It delivers the request to
Faypg. On output proof(s, s′i, s′j), R̂ outputs ΣG to Â.
Upon receiving input Impersonate(s, s′i, Tj) at tag Tj from Â: It delivers the
request to Faygp. On output proof(s, s′i, ps′j), it outputs proof to Â.
Upon receiving input Verify(proof) at verifier V̂ : It delivers the request to Faygp.
On output valid/invalid, it send this to Â.
Figure 7.7: Simulator Saygp for anonymous yoking-proof.
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values are employed, while the H is a hash function and G is a random number
generator in the real world.
The Functionality Faygp for anonymous yoking-group proof provides unforge-
ability which prevents the impersonation of an honest tag, untraceability that an
adversary cannot link tags or groups in different sessions, anonymity that an un-
trusted third party cannot disclose the identity of a group and any random numbers
generated during the protocol run is invisible to an adversary. In any order of acti-
vation between an adversary and Z, Faygp prevents attacks, such as replay, collusion
and impersonation.
Let E be the event that the simulation fails. E occurs if Saygp ignores the Prove
request from A when we consider the functions H and G are true random. As the
yoking-group proof is generated by two root tags as in yoking-group proof, the prob-
ability Pr[E] can be analyzed similarly to the previous proof that the environment
Z can determine whether the simulation is occurred in the real world or and ideal
world with negligible probability at most 2−2kmn, where m is the number of groups
and n is the interactions placed during the subsession.
7.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a novel concept of anonymous yoking-group proofs.
The proposed anonymous yoking-proof protocol achieves computational efficiency
on tags and remains the required security properties. Our anonymous yoking-group
proofs convince a verifier that multiple groups of tags are simultaneously scanned.
We discussed some common attacks to RFID protocols and the security and privacy
were formally proved in the UC framework.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The privacy and security are two important requirements of RFID systems. A chal-
lenging problem in RFID research is the tradeoff among security, privacy, efficiency
and hardware cost. Low-cost RFID tags can normally carry lightweight operations
such as CRC and PRNG, which are too weak to deal with cryptographic operations,
in order to construct secure protocols. Because cryptographic calculations require
a high level of computational capability, the cost of tags will be increased. In this
thesis, we focused on various security and privacy problems of RFID protocols,
considering the computation requirement of tags.
In Chapter 3, we focused on the wide-strong privacy of RFID tag authentication
protocols. We showed the vulnerabilities of a recent protocol and provided some
solutions. We then presented a repaired protocol which is proven secure. We also
proposed a new ECC-based RFID authentication protocol which allows a reader to
extract a tag’s signature. The proposed protocol is private against a wide-strong
adversary.
In Chapter 4, we considered the security of ownership transfer protocols against
strong attacks such as the replacement attack. In our solution, we adopted an
ownership chain to preserve the authenticity of tags. It guaranteed a valid ownership
even if the internal state of a tag is disclosed. The proposed protocol prevented an
unauthorized user from transferring ownership of tags. We defined a formal security
model for ownership transfer protocols and proved that our protocol is secure.
In Chapter 5, we proposed the first secure shared RFID ownership transfer
protocol without TTP. We gave a formal definition of shared ownership transfer
and defined a security model, which captures active attacks such as the collusion
attacks and corruption attacks. Some other attacks in collusion fashion were also
illustrated. The proposed protocol only needs constant tag-key size and provides
partial ownership verification.
In Chapter 6, we introduced a novel concept of authorized RFID authentica-
tion protocols. We reviewed the relationship among RFID tags, RFID readers and
backend server. It shows that we need to address some new issues if they are inde-
pendent. We then proposed three ARA protocols with distinct features and security
levels. Formal models of security and privacy were defined against both strong and
weak adversaries. Our symmetric-key based protocol achieves weak privacy and two
ECC-based protocols are secure in strong model.
In Chapter 7, we introduced the yoking-group proof which is an extension of the
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grouping proof. It allows a verifier to check the simultaneous presence of multiple
groups of tags. We firstly proposed a lightweight anonymous yoking proof which
only requires one hash computation on tag. We then used it as a building block to
construct our anonymous yoking-group proof protocol. The protocol guarantees the
existence of multiple tag groups and the size of proof is constant. Two proposed
protocols were also proven secure in universal composability framework.
Future Work. Scalability is an important requirement of RFID systems. Symmet-
ric key based RFID authentication protocols usually require exhaustive key search
which reduces efficiency. Many solutions have been proposed to address this prob-
lem. Public key based protocols can achieve constant tag authentication time. How-
ever, we demonstrated that some cases, such as ARA protocols, still need new solu-
tions. Our ARA protocol 2 has a linear communication cost and the ARA protocol
3 requires exhaustive key search. In our future work, we will explore solutions to
address the scalability issue in public key based RFID authentication protocols. We
will also consider solutions to avoid exhaustive key search in symmetric-key based
anonymous yoking-group proof.
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